bondjamesbond wrote: Fri Jun 26, 2026 12:27 am
You can sleep soundly until 2050, because neither the Russians nor the Chinese stand to gain from a war between themselves—one that would only weaken both sides and restore Europe and the U.S. to their former glory! China is wise—instead of waging wars, it prefers to buy up countries, so an economic war is already underway, and whatever God didn’t create has been made in China! The U.S. is winding down its presence in Europe, so all this muscle-flexing by old Europe just provokes laughter and irritation ))) Well, Russia simply needs to stop selling you oil and gas—let’s see how long you can hold out then! Revolutions will sweep over you, since people value warmth and comfort ))) But that’s all just poetry—let’s get back to our favorite game, dear hawks and dreamers!!!
I love geopolitics (I think that shows in my campaigns), so I’m going to stick with the topic for one last round.
One has to be wary of the logic that "they have too much to lose by clashing."
A few years ago, I gave a presentation on the potential for a Chinese war in Southeast Asia, highlighting, among other things, China’s policy of "faits accomplis" regarding the islands in the South China Sea. I specifically pointed out a few minor skirmishes between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels that came very close to escalating and resulting in casualties.
Basically, China wants those waters and their resources, while the Vietnamese (logically) want to keep them for themselves. In practice, it is common for Chinese ships to act as if they own the place while the Vietnamese coast guard tries to drive them off, leading to threats and intimidation between the vessels.
A member of the audience picked up on a point I had raised earlier: the two countries' economies are deeply intertwined, with China having invested heavily in the Vietnamese economy and hoping to reap future benefits. Therefore, the likelihood of war should be very low.
I offered a more nuanced view: the odds are indeed quite low today, but not THAT low.
I told him to simply look at the situation prior to the war in Ukraine (which had barely begun at the time).
Europe was benefiting from very low-cost oil, while Russia was able to sell massive quantities to a market of 300 million energy-hungry consumers.
Jeopardizing that market by invading a smaller country seemed foolish, yet that is exactly what happened.
It all stemmed from a series of miscalculations: the assumption that the target would fall quickly enough to leave no time for a reaction, and the belief that Europeans valued their comfort too much to risk it by cutting themselves off from a cheap energy source.
If the gains for something that jeopardize shared interestes seem important while the risks seem low, chances are high that shared interestets are neglected.
As for the threat to cut off oil supplies, it is worth remembering that Russia wasn't selling it out of charity. Financing a war requires vast sums of money, and a total supply cutoff would have been just as damaging to the Russians as it was to the Europeans.
Europe needed time to redirect its imports (or boost domestic production), while Russia also needed time to find other export markets. Time was required not only to redefine strategies but also to adapt infrastructure.
Furthermore, not all of Europe was dependent on Russian oil. Hungary and Slovakia lacked maritime infrastructure (for the obvious reason that they are landlocked) and required significantly more time to adjust. Some governments sought to maintain the status quo, but most other European countries had already adapted to the situation.
Conversely, France, for instance, relies heavily on nuclear power for its energy needs and depended very little on Russian supplies. Gas imports from Russia peaked at 15–17% before the war, and other exporters stepped in very quickly to fill the gap. The import volumes were marginal, and the transition was rapid, with no real impact on the economy.
Thus, the level of dependency varied greatly from country to country, but in any case, that reliance is now coming to an end across the board.
Today, Russia supplies only about 10% of the oil imported by the EU (down from nearly half before the war); the final contracts are set to expire by the end of 2027, with a ban on their renewal.
I know the media often repeated that the EU would collapse without Russian oil; that turned out to be false.
In reality, there isn't much Russian oil left to cut off today.
To sum up: countries do not engage in charity. If Russia has not stopped selling its oil to Europe, it is because it needs foreign currency for its war.
If halting all exports could have triggered a wave of revolutions in Europe without harming Russia, it would have done so. That would have made it possible to get rid of powers that are providing military and diplomatic support to a country against which Russia has been fighting on the battlefield for four years.
I repeat: in geopolitics, there is no such thing as charity.
If we start saying "all we’d have to do is this to reach our goal" without actually doing it, it means in reality that something is preventing it.
that’s the end of my geopolitical minute
