Organizational chart

[Redarmy41]

Now with hypothetical campaign in North Africa/Middle East/Caucasus.

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[ErissN6]

There should be an option after Kiev: What about Hitler had been following the grand-strategical wisdom of Guderian?

Instead of continueing attacking (Smolensk was the beginning of the deafeat of the invasion),
. effort is made to take Leningrad, not Moscow, for Leningrad is the north base of the huge defense line running to the south
. immediatly begin the built of the fortified line on the Vitebsk-Orsha big hole, before Smolensk
. use the Dniepr as defense
From Leningrad to Krimae, the "Kiev chinese-wall" instead of later the Berlin wall...

This was tried, but 3 years later, far too late, after the quite destruction of the werhmacht in the attack to the east after Kiev...

[George_Parr]

I don't see how that would be an more benefical compared to the historic outcome.

It might have helped to not bleed yourself dry until the very last moment in the hope to take Moscow, stopping a bit earlier and setting up a proper defense instead. But stopping at the Dniepr means you leave a ton of industrial heartland to the Soviets, including all the manpower available in that territory. The Dniepr as a defensive line also works both ways, so if you stop there, you need to find a way to get across it next year, giving the Soviets prime defensive terrain which they could spend months of preparation on. So you end up with an enemy that is both stronger and better prepared.

Not to mention the effect it would have on the morale, both at home and at the front, when you stop far away from your goals and sit around for 8 months or so until you can restart operations in May or so if all goes well. No one would have understood it if, after just having wiped out the Kiev-pocket, and with still some time until autumn/winter would hit, all advances would have stopped.

[ErissN6]

It might have helped to not bleed yourself dry until the very last moment in the hope to take Moscow, stopping a bit earlier and setting up a proper defense instead. But stopping at the Dniepr means you leave a ton of industrial heartland to the Soviets, including all the manpower available in that territory. The Dniepr as a defensive line also works both ways,

It was "Stalingrad" or nothing, Moscow was only a mid goal. Yes, stopping at the Dniepr doesn't prevent from making attacks from here, but only as gigantic raids and encirclements. Stopping here would be a wise stalemate decision, not to continue later as it was an impossible goal.

[Nalikill]

Slight error in this chart. Barbarossa Center and Barbarossa South do Kiev, but Barbarossa North does Leningrad instead.

As to the other discussion - that's part of why I view Barbarossa North as the "true" "alt-history" path: you take Leningrad, you take Moscow, you take Stalingrad, and you take Kuibyshev. In those absurd, impossible circumstances I could see how the soviets might sue for peace: Order 227 from Stalin failed, with an unbroken string of Soviet defeats, and 99% of the resources, food, population, and industrial capacity of the Soviet Union would be in Nazi hands.

[ErissN6]

I view Barbarossa North as the "true" "alt-history" path: you take Leningrad, you take Moscow, you take Stalingrad, and you take Kuibyshev. In those absurd, impossible circumstances I could see how the soviets might sue for peace: Order 227 from Stalin failed,

Yes, even for their historical strategy, Leningrad must be taken, my base of defense, is too the base to continue the offensive, as germans have not the control of the sea: Just besieging Leningrad takes too much troops (so it must be achieved), and is a 'normandy' 'beach-head' in the back of german advance.
Then it's Moscow which had not to be taken, it has to be isolated if it can be get arround to forbid it's east reinforcement trail and let Moscow die alone (like American wanted at first to do with Paris).

[ErissN6]

Guderian was the one who had the best understanding, for him it was all -the grand strategical very blietzkrieg-, or nothing -stopping defensive early-. And he didn't really belived on the all, at least against Russia...
That's why as after Kiev, as the werhmacht continued on Smolensk, he was to never stop, immediatly go to Moscow: If it's not nothing, then it has to be all without any delay to stand a chance.
Hitler understood Guderian, but not enough: Hitler, by delaying on Ukraine, participated in the preparation of russian army.
When Guderian after Moscow saw that the all was really dead, he wanted to return to his prevous strategy, the defense on Ukraine. Hitler ban him for a moment.

So, it seems contradictory with my previous post. Well preparing the rear to be able to continue, vs go speedy ahead without looking back. But well preparing was meaning to stop for good, and going ahead as hell was foolish,
but as it had succeeded in France 40... (what had not given hot head to Guderian, but to many others)

[Redarmy41]

Exact Nalikill.
I correct

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[PoorOldSpike]

Here's some interesting reading for the weekend..

[ErissN6]

Very early, Leningrad was considered lost by the russians, they were absolute sure the town won't stand even a month.
But Hitler, even if he was among the few not mocking Guderian, listening him seriously, did not choose priorities, he didn't actually enforced enough an army, he didn't assured success on the majority of the strategical attack: He scattered on the 3 fronts, as he wanted total immediate success. Front north, he gaves armors for few times, and warn he'll removed them, success or not. But he already had not given enough time, nor men (as, like russians, he must have think it would be easily done); and moreover the infantry german generals there didn't know how to use armors, and moreover were quite bad at infantry! dividing their troops on 2 objectives and so without taking any, and so for sure had even less needed men... So, North army, due to lack of initial time (they will have many afterward, but still not enough armors), lack of troops, worsened by lack of competence, was able of nothing for all the war, they were entrenched in 1st WWW! Hitler mocked them, but it was mainly his fault.

No success on Leningrad,
no success on Moscow despite Guderian here (and despite taking some from other fronts, but not enough as it was taking too long time),
after success of fireman Guderian on the South, but not enough to take Stalingrad (to cross the Volga to reach the main goal).

For me, Moscow had to be ignored, or rather attacked as a diversion (Guderian attack strategy, but he was first for the defense, was to ignore the South front, but I give right to Hitler on not ignoring its food and oil, as "an army walks on his belly"; but Leningrad back and sea position is even more important that Moscow hub, so Moscow should be the one sacrificed, so the 2 other fronts may succeed, and then surround Moscow afterward).

[ErissN6]

I talk as Guderian for being the best grand-strategist, but I want to talk about Budienny.

At first, Budienny was seen wrong in Russian civil war:
Budienny was cosack, but he was the more bolshevik, so he wanted to make forget his origins, by acting though and diverting: he was a serious clown, both loved and feared by his men. That's why he was friend with Stalin, and later miraculously survived to him.
Bolsheviks want to see Budienny as a genious offensive cavalry man, but it was, and still is!, propaganda:
Budienny, behind his bravado, was always a cosack, and a fearfull, he was very bad at attacking directly, he needed more than 10 vs 1 ratio to be able to succeed (10vs1 he root against poles), whites and makhnovists mocked him, he could only attack flesh if he had armored cars... His big heroic "attack" on the whites threatening Moscow, was in fact following their already decided retreat (because makhnovist had destroyed their supplies).

BUT, if he was bad attacker, if he was not this genious told by bolsheviks, for me he was maybe still the greatest cavalry general, even in front of the Whites:
Due to his cosack origins, that he wanted to hide, but was still in love with horses, Budienny was a genious of indirect warfare, but in the defensive way: he could win a battle, destroying enemies, even without battling against them! he was a genious of use of terrain and weather, if General Winter was a man, his name would be Budienny.
All mocked him (save bolshevicks), but still told about him that he had great luck, that weather and terrain saved him while harming his enemies. But for me that was never luck, just knowing nature, like a wolf, a true cosack, but the absolute reversed style of white Shkuro...

To tell back about WW2: Yes, Budienny was here a bad general, but it's because he was used in a bad way, and because he was given absolute bad orders. Since the beggining (and it goes with the Guderian story of spoiled wisdom), he was for retreating, for his usual way of indirect warfare. We can see this again when he retreats very afar, in Caucasus!, where germans lose time and men while Budienney was just moving. His finally usual way of fleeing, but winning still...

[ErissN6]

Hitler's Directive No33, ignoring Moscow to put priority on Leningrad and Ukraine, was to correct his error, that I had explained. But it was too late, in war you have to not hesitate, this very good plan had to be launched few months ago: from best plan, it had became a bad one, again transfering armor divisions between fronts, which is costly, and that russians succeded in cancelling about the north.