THE ALLIES' BIG MISTAKES
Big Mistake #1. Sea Lion.
Max Blitzed me right away, and in short order I was looking at an early loss of France. Before I lost France, though, I lost my head and panicked. (You could say this was my own fault, and it was, but it was also a 'forced error'--not the first in this game!--where Max's brilliantly aggressive style pushed me out of my comfort zone.) So I sent some British units, including the UK mech, to try to keep France in the game longer. Big mistake.
France was doomed in any case, and staving off the fall of Paris for a turn or at most two, which is what I bought with those units, wasn't worth not having them there where I really needed them in the defense of England.
Big Mistake #2. Agadir.
I do not regret making Agadir my opening action--a sort of Operation Torch. When the USA first entered the war I was nowhere near ready for a major engagement, and the port of Agadir was one of my few options not requiring a big amphibious operation. My main motivation in landing there was to lay the groundwork for the arrival of the Free French in November 1942 [note that since Max refused the Armistice, the Free French activation happens automatically in No. '42].
No, my mistake was letting myself get outmaneuvered by Max when he countered my attack on Casablanca with a big end-around amphibious landing. Result: I lost my entire Agadir contingent (mech, corps, tank, gar) plus an American tactical bomber (ouch!).
There was a silver lining to this ugly cloud. Max's victory came at a price. He used oil for his transports and DD's. He lost a number of units & steps, including a DD sunk. And he lost the 8PP@ for several transports that he used to surround my forces. And finally he had a pretty considerable force tied up in the desert when it might have been of use elsewhere. This doesn't erase or justify my error, but it was a compensation.
Big Mistake #3. Libya.
Now, when Max launched his Barbarossa, the Eastern Front looked like this:
Seeing all that firepower, I thought it was finally safe to invade Libya. After all, he couldn't have troops everywhere, could he?
So in the summer of 1942, while Max was (I thought) preoccupied in Russia, I launched an attack on Tobruk. Well, you all know how that turned out. A total debacle. The Brits were bruised and bloodied and sent packing, only rescued barely in time by the Americans and Free French hurried in from Morocco. At one point I was afraid he'd drive all the way to Iraq. And as you all know, he then entrenched at the Suez canal and it took me until late 1943. As a result, here it is late October 1944 and I'm only just reaching Tunis.
As with Morocco, there was a bit of a silver lining. Again, his great victory came at a cost of PP's lost to transport costs, a number of land and sea units damaged and destroyed, and a contingent tied down.
Do you see a pattern in all this? I do. I see that in each of these cases I was lulled by what seemed to be Max's full commitment elsewhere at the same time that I hurried myself due to a sense that I had to act, had to do something in the face of Max's massive success. While I fully admit that these are my own errors, I also credit Max. It's part of his genius that he keeps his opponents off-balance, in the dark, and reacting to him instead of following their own agendas. This is one of the reasons it's so darn hard to beat him.