Ming Chinese Tactical System

[SirGarnet]

I raised the question of what the Chinese tactical system (mentioned in the rules) was in the Beta forum, and thought I would take a crack at a thematic summary from my notes. Criticism welcome! It's important to get it right.

The Ming Chinese tactical system was founded on the Chinese classics and development of traditional Chinese practice, with the important early adoption of gunpowder with both small arms and artillery in order to provide an advantage in raising and fielding a large army as well as a firepower and moral advantage against their opponents. Combined arms principles continued to be applied, with infantry generally the more defensive arm, providing a base of manoeuvre and firepower to support the activities of the cavalry, who used the bow as their primary weapon but were also armoured and equipped for close combat.

Chinese organization and tactics sought combined arms benefits within as well as between units. Mixing missile foot and close combat foot in different ranks within tactical units was a continuation of traditional practice with the addition of gunpowder weapons. Training (such as there was) and tactics at the Ming’s few military training schools focused on military classics for officers and individual skill for troops, rather than drill or battle management.

The effective forces raised and trained by General Qi Jiguang between 1556 and 1582 were a successful attempt to carry the internal combined arms approach down to a drilled and disciplined coordination of different troop types within the squad in the famous Mandarin Duck formation, designed to counter specific opponents – pirate swordsmen in the initial system, or Mongol-type cavalry in the second, which featured more firearms in the squad and the use of firearms battle wagons. Mainly for political reasons, his reforms were not adopted more widely.

Heavy guns, useful at sieges and defiles but slow and cumbersome in the field, were used at towns, passes, bridges and other fixed positions. In field battles the Ming favored light and very light cannon, rockets, grenades, and an ingenious variety of other gunpowder weapons and devices (as well as fortifications, wagons and portable obstacles) distributed along the line of battle to bolster the firepower and capabilities of the infantry, armed with a simple arquebus, handgun or fire lance (gunpowder-projected arrows and often a substantial proportion of bowmen or crossbowmen. The objective was to disrupt and demoralize an attacking enemy, stopping them at or before contact and then breaking them through multiple forms of attack, including gunfire.
[In FoG Renaissance, the overall effect of these various weapons is represented by the Arquebus shooting capability.][Side question whether re depiction as Regimental Guns makes sense rather than as batteries of Light Artillery].

The Ming had the largest army in the world, on paper several million strong, but in practice military service was disdained as low status and the army neglected and its finances abused except as a last resort in crisis. There were some good units, but the vast bulk of the armies were untrained or ill-trained, ill-organized, ill-disciplined, ill-equipped, ill-supplied, ill-led and generally ill-treated. The annual cost of maintaining the border garrisons rose from 559,000 ounces of silver in 1480 to a staggering 4,940,000 ounces of silver between 1480 and 1590 despite concurrent deterioration of the available troops, which illustrates the effects of administrative bloat and corruption. Hawley, 589. Given the institutional constraints, major reform was impractical. The added cost of aiding Korea from 1592-1598 weakened the empire against Manchu expansionism in the 17th century.

Regulations provided that an array of flags, gongs and drums be used to convey orders, but the actual conduct of battle is described in Osprey’s Late Imperial Chinese Armies thus: "On the battlefield itself, rather than trying to manoeuvre these huge and sketchily trained masses, generals tended to put themselves at the head of specially picked units of not much more than battalion size and use these to spearhead attacks. Liu T’ing, for example, led a bodyguard of 736 men in 1619, fighting personally in the front rank with a two-handed sword. Many such elite troops were ferocious fighters who took vows to die with their commanders rather than flee, and their desperate charges greatly impressed their allies in Korea. However, with most of the able officers fighting as ordinary soldiers, the problems of control became even worse; the tactical manoeuvre warfare practiced by earlier Ming armies had become largely replaced by a reliance on massed frontal assaults". [Need permission or summary]