Panzer Corps goes Pacific

[Retributarr]

First!... historical Industrial background capabilities of Japan WWII:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
What was Japan's industrial capacity during World War 2?
https://www.quora.com/What-was-Japans-i ... orld-War-2

Japan had a sizeable industry during WW2 but its economy was overall way too small to compete with the U.S.A.

Around 1937 Japan’s industry amounted for 5,2% of worldwide capacity. That was on par with France or a bit more than half of the capacity of the UK or the USSR. Yet the U.S.A. had more than 30%.

The Japanese were specialized in light industry products during the 30s, but they also had a fairly developped heavy industry. In 42–45 they produced 24,1 millions tons of crude steel & 361,000 tons of aluminium. The U.S.A. produced respectively 334,5 millions tons and 4,123,200 tons.



The Japanese empire had a GDP 259 billions (of 1990 $) in 1941 however a big part of this GDP was made up by agriculture. The U.S.A. had a GDP of 1,118 billions; it subsequently increased when the Americans recovered from the Great Depression.

The Japanese industry had a fatal weakness during WW2: it was dependent from overseas imports of raw materials. After the entry into war, the Japanese industry was slowed down because Japan didn’t have the shipping to transport enough ressources from its new conquests. The Japanese industry was later crippled by the U.S. submarines attacks.

[Retributarr]

SECOND!... Could Japan have won in the Pacific??? . . .
https://www.thefirearmsforum.com/thread ... fic.36176/

[The Most-Ideal situations that would have produced the most 'Optimum-Result!'.]

*** . . if the attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941, had been better planned and executed?

As we all know, the attack on Pearl Harbor was horribly devastating as it actually happened, yet what if . . .

***The carriers had been actually in port as planned and were destroyed in the attack?

***The Japanese had attacked the submarine base and destroyed the subs then in harbor.

***Attacked and destroyed the ship-repair facilities at Pearl. [Dry-Docks].

***Had destroyed the oil storage facilities at Pearl.

***Had launched a third strike, as Nagumo was urged to do, instead of retiring after the first and second strikes. [If they were prepared to risk running short on fuel for their Carriers upon returning to home-waters... alternatively further re-fueling might or could have been prepared and planned for?].

***Had attacked and occupied Midway in January 1942 instead of waiting until June to make the attempt.

***And worst of all, had invaded the Hawaiian Islands immediately after the attack.

[robman]

All “Japanese victory” scenarios ultimately hinge on a domestic political decision by the US to fight to a draw a limited war. I can imagine no such pathway given Pearl Harbor. It’s interesting to speculate, though!

[Retributarr]

Borrowed From: "Could Japan have won in the Pacific" . . .
https://www.thefirearmsforum.com/thread ... fic.36176/

Posted By: polishshooter Joined Mar 25, 2001 9,350 Posts
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Apr 29, 2007

Actually, PS, there was no way the Japs could have invaded Hawaii, much less supply it after they did, in 1941, they WERE spread pretty thin. MAYBE Naval Landing troops would have taken Midway, but they would have been unable to supply them any better in 41 or early 42 than they could have if they took it in June 42.....even WITHOUT our remaining subs blockading it.

And it was just a "Navy" show, the Army was tied up in China, with actually very few troops committed even for the Philippines and indonesia. (You can't forget the REAL war the Japs were fighting was between the IJA and the IJN, with only OCCASIONAL fighting against the OUTSIDE enemies....)

Now having pooh-poohed your last couple of points, I think your first points are good ones, and it WAS a close run thing....lucky we didn't lose the carriers, but more important than even that was saving the Oil Farms and the repair facilities.

Without the third strike, the Japs actually LOST the "Battle of Pearl Harbor," but you have to give the devil his due, Nagumo was doing what no one had ever done before, nobody REALLY knew even then that Carriers had eclipsed surface forces, his "Strike force" was not very big or heavy, except in carriers, and he WAS told to "Be careful...." Plus he had taken SOME losses, and a third strike would have taken some time, to rearm and refuel, all the while in range of landbased air that he did NOT know for SURE was totally knocked out, plus where WERE those carriers......

Actually, I still do not think they could have won, BUT it might have changed the whole concept of "Germany First." Politically, FDR would have had to put EVERYTHING into the pacific, and Germany, (and England) would have had to wait.

We had Yorktown, and Wasp, in the Atlantic, even not bringing along Ranger, we would have had a viable fleet left, and we had quite a few ships left in Diego and the Atlantic, including subs and BBs. And ALL those ships laid down in 1938-1941 for the Naval expansion would have been put on a fast track for construction and launching, spare no expense, no diversion of effort. We might have even seen Essex, and the Princeton class converted cruiser CVLs in action in late 42, instead of late 43, granted, flying Wildcats instead of Hellcats....but still deadly....

We would have based the remaining reinforced US Pacific Fleet (still powerful) on the West coast, if we couldn't use Pearl, and later based them in New Zealand or Australia.

I'm not COMPLETELY sure the outcome in the Pacific would change much, if 90% of our effort and output went to the pacific, instead of the shoestring we actually fought it with diverting so many men and material to Europe.

But the KEY would probably have been no North Africa, Italy, or cross channel attack in 1944, maybe even 1945..... but then again, without planning those operations, there wouldn't have been the delay in producing DDs and DEs and SCs caused by giving landing craft and LSTs priority....

[Retributarr]

For WWII Japanese Industry... Is this a case of.,, "Do!.,, or Do-Not,,, there is 'No-Try!' "
Is it at all possible that "Japanese-Industry" could have relocated to 'Korea' after the conquest of Korea,,, in order to more easily maintain supplying these 'Military-Factories'???. Might be an interesting idea for anyone who wants to tackle an 'Ahistorical' study of this concept!.

Just as a reminder... that "If there is a Will!... there is a Way!".
Here... later on... further on below is a refresher as to how the Russians did it!... and if they could do it,,, might not the Japanese also have had the capacity to carry out a similar effort as their persistant problem being,.. that not enough Shipping was available to ship 'Strategic-Materials' from newly conquered regions to the Japanese mainland to be used by the manufacturing Industry.

------------------Here it is!!!... The Russian Effort!-------------------

https://www.bing.com/search?q=Russian+F ... 3b2ae6351c
Relocation of Soviet Factories in 1941:
Nearly 500 factories were moved to the Urals, more than 200 to Western Siberia and 250 to Central Asia. The others were evacuated further east, even off the Pacific coast. Locations rich in raw materials and far from the front were chosen so that they would not be exposed to Luftwaffe air raids.
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"Comrades, we are transporting the whole factory!".

---
https://www.mhistory.net/comrades-we-ar ... r%20raids.


Factory with Russian Yak fighter planes being manufactured on an assembly line.


KV tanks during assembly at the factory in Leningrad
----
If the transport from the [ORIGINAL] factory had already managed to reach its destination, it did not mean the end of the difficulties, because the equipment had to be unloaded and returned. Often there was a lack of documentation, parts were lost or stolen along the way, and all this was accompanied by terrible working conditions. The workers worked up to 14 hours a day, and because of the lack of hands, women and children were not spared either. The communist authorities of the USSR also reached for Gulag prisoners. Heavy, physical work combined with malnutrition, frost and lack of accommodation meant that many people did not survive.

Despite all these difficulties, as well as the organizational chaos and warfare that spread across more and more of the USSR territory, it is estimated that by the end of 1941 more than 1500 large factories were deported, together with millions of workers, engineers and their family members.
---

Women casting metal in a factory in besieged Leningrad.

the regions which lie in danger of oncoming Axis powers forces are to be evacuated to the Urals, the Volga region, Siberia and Central Asia. In total 2,593 industrial enterprises, more than 12 million people, about 2.4 million livestock, significant food reserves, agricultural machinery and objects of cultural value were evacuated.

During the rescue of the factories, priority was given to the military plants and they were the fastest to transport and restart – there were individual cases even a month after the start of the relocation. The first T-34 tank assembled in the relocated factory (Nizhny Tagila in the Urals) left the production line already in December 1941, and most of the military production started in the first half of 1942, just before the Stalingrad Battle, which began in August 1942 and was the turning point of the Second World War for the Soviet Union. It is worth mentioning that the hasty launch of production had an impact on the poor quality and higher failure rate of the manufactured weapons – an example of this can be the already mentioned medium T-34 tank, which, depending on the place of manufacture, could even have slightly different dimensions from the same type of tank produced in another factory.

But not everything came out as it should. Nearly 300 factories did not reach their destination at all – they simply got lost in transport, were stolen or taken over by the Germans. Some of the plants were too difficult to relocate (such as smelters) and sometimes even attempts were not made to export, but were destroyed on the spot.

[VirgilInTheSKY]

For WWII Japanese Industry... Is this a case of.,, "Do!.,, or Do-Not,,, there is 'No-Try!' "
Is it at all possible that "Japanese-Industry" could have relocated to 'Korea' after the conquest of Korea,,, in order to more easily maintain supplying these 'Military-Factories'???. Might be an interesting idea for anyone who wants to tackle an 'Ahistorical' study of this concept!.

Just as a reminder... that "If there is a Will!... there is a Way!".
Here... later on... further on below is a refresher as to how the Russians did it!... and if they could do it,,, might not the Japanese also have had the capacity to carry out a similar effort as their persistant problem being,.. that not enough Shipping was available to ship 'Strategic-Materials' from newly conquered regions to the Japanese mainland to be used by the manufacturing Industry.

Do some more research before arguing "a will makes a way". Japanese NEVER ever stabilised the Manchuria-Korean region enough to relocate their industry there. Those are enemy territory conquered merely 10~40 years ago, and they only treated local residents as slaves instead of their own people (similar to the Nazis, yeah?), which is absolutely different from the situation for the Russians. Plus, Korea is not industrialised enough at all, they preferred Manchuria much more at that time, as colony, not part of Japan.

Japan started to move their own citizens to Manchuria early as before WWI, but all efforts failed due to not enough funds and resistance of the famous local warlord Chang Tso-lin, or Zhang Zuolin as in modern Chinese Pinyin, who was killed in 1928 as part of their efforts to gain direct control of Manchuria.
Large scaled relocation only started after 1937, the time the Chinese Nationalist government finally declared war on Japan. A plan was made to relocate 5 million into Manchuria in 10 years, but total number of Japanese residents in Manchuria only reached around 300k before the situation turned worse and worse, around 80k of them already dead by the end of the war due to disease, crops failure and bad infrastructures.

Japan never gained firm control over the region, and I have to remind you, the region was under Russian influence ever since 19th century, and Japan already had a border war with USSR in 1939 which ended in the defeat of Japanese forces after they claimed it from the Russian Empire in 1895. The region is not safe at all.
Japanese homeland was actually considered safer due to their gain in early Pacific campaigns, another reason that prevented them from relocating their domestic industry. With control of Wake, Guam etc they did created a more steady barrier for their homeland than a narrow Amur River with Soviet forces stationed right across it.
As you have quoted yourself, relocating is very costly, and the break of production for such a long period was just a no for the Japanese Empire because they never ever had enough supplies. Guerilla forces deployed by the CCP has been harassing their captured territories every now and then, and millions of IJA forces were spread across these territories trying to pacify them with no results. Situation on the continent was never favourable enough.

[Retributarr]

5 Things Japan Could Have Done To Win World War II:
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboo ... -ii-170520

***Portions of the Article:***

Wage one war at a time.
*Conserving enemies is a must even for the strongest combatants. It's imperative for small states with big ambitions to avoid making war against everyone in sight. Imposing discipline on the war was particularly hard for Japan, whose political system -- patterned on Imperial Germany's, alas -- was stovepiped between the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy (IJA and IJN), with no meaningful civilian political oversight.
* Absent a strong emperor, the army and navy were free to indulge their interservice one-upsmanship, jostling for influence and prestige. The IJA cast its gaze on continental Asia, where a land campaign in Manchuria, then China proper, beckoned. The IJN pushed for a maritime campaign aimed at resources in Southeast Asia. By yielding to these contrary impulses between 1931 and 1941, Japan in effect surrounded itself with enemies of its own accord -- invading Manchuria and China before lashing out at the imperial powers in Southeast Asia and, ultimately, striking at Pearl Harbor.
*Any tactician worth his salt will tell you a 360-degree threat axis -- threats all around -- makes for perilous times. Tokyo should have set priorities. It might have accomplished some of its goals had it taken things in sequence.

Wage unrestricted submarine warfare.
*Inexplicably, the IJN neglected to do what the U.S. Pacific Fleet set in motion while Battleship Row was still afire: unleash its submarine force to sink any ship, naval or merchant, that flew an enemy flag. By 1945, American boats dismembered the island empire by severing the shipping lanes connecting its parts.
*Japanese submarines were the equals of their U.S. Navy counterparts. IJN commanders should have looked at the nautical chart, grasped the fact that U.S. naval forces must operate across thousands of miles of ocean simply to reach the Western Pacific, and directed sub skippers to make the transpacific sea lanes no-go zones for American shipping. It's hard to imagine a more straightforward, cost-effective scheme whereby Japan's navy could exact a heavy toll from its opponent. Neglecting undersea warfare was an operational transgression of the first order.

[Retributarr]

One of the most decisive battles of the Second World War could have ended up very differently. Be glad it didn’t though.

https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/what-if ... of-midway/
By Benjamin David Baker January 08, 2016

Almost more than any other during the Second World War, this battle was won due to a fortunate combination of good intelligence, planning, and, most of all, luck. The U.S. Navy was far inferior to its Japanese counterparts in terms of numbers and experience but was still able to sink all four of the Imperial Navy’s committed aircraft carriers. This marked the beginning of the long, grueling allied island-hopping advance in the Pacific, which eventually culminated in Japan’s defeat over three years later.

Although the Japanese and American navies had fought an inconclusive battle at the Coral Sea, in which each side lost an aircraft carrier, the Imperial Navy retained the strategic initiative.

Due to the efforts of the Navy’s Combat Intelligence Unit (known as “HYPO”), Admiral Chester W. Nimitz’s staff knew that the Japanese were planning another offensive. HYPO had been able to partially decipher the Imperial Navy’s JN-25 code, which revealed that the geographical location known as “AF” was the target for the Japanese attack. In order to uncover the location behind “AF,” the U.S. garrison on Midway sent a fake plain-text radio message saying that the island was running out of water. When Allied listening stations in Australia picked up a Japanese radio message saying that “AF” was running out of water, Nimitz knew that Midway was the intended target for the Japanese attack.

The U.S. Navy was therefore able to spring a trap on the Japanese fleets approaching Midway. As they believed the U.S. fleet to be in Pearl Harbor, recuperating after the Coral Sea, the Imperial Navy was in a rush to take Midway before American reinforcements could arrive. As a result, Admiral Nagumo Chuichi didn’t post a picket line of submarines to provide early warning of the U.S. fleet’s movements. As the Japanese aircraft were refueling and rearming after their initial bombing run on Midway, Admirals Jack Fletcher and Raymond Spruance were able to catch the Imperial fleet by surprise. Attacking from a flanking position named “Point Luck” and, informed of the Japanese movements by submarines, the Japanese lost all four of their committed carriers, in exchange for one out of three American (the U.S.S. Yorktown, hastily repaired after its heavy damage in the Coral Sea). Almost as critical as the destruction of the Japanese carriers was the loss of its experienced aircrews and sailors. From this victory, the Americans were able to gain the strategic initiative, starting with the landings at Guadalcanal in August 1942.

Our second order counterfactuals start here. Yamamoto could either have called off the attack on Midway, choosing other targets for Japan’s aircraft carriers; perhaps a renewed offensive towards Fiji, Australia, or Dutch Harbor in Alaska. However, as Cook argues, he was well aware of the necessity of dealing a critical blow to the U.S. Pacific Fleet in order to keep the strategic initiative. It is more likely that he would have attempted to set his own trap against the United States at Midway. In accordance with the Imperial Navy’s Kantai Kessen, or decisive battle doctrine, Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy’s general staff could hope to draw the remaining U.S. carriers into a decisive battle. With the U.S. Pacific Fleet removed and Hawaii under threat, Yamamoto hoped that the U.S. would sue for a negotiated peace, securing Japan’s conquests in Asia. [Ret: Always a possibility, but... not likely!]

If they [Yamamoto' & Admrl.Yamaguchi ] knew, or strongly suspected that if the United States was aware of their plans, Yamamoto and Nagumo would in all likelihood have deployed their submarines in advance of the rest of the fleet, probably in a screen between Midway and Hawaii. These subs would discover the U.S. fleet steaming to Midway, alerting the Imperial fleet. Instead of finding an unprepared Japanese fleet in the middle of rearming after their bombing run on Midway, the U.S. carriers would have run right into a prepared ambush, carried out by superior aircraft and experienced aircrews.

Yamaguchi Tamon, 17 August 1892 – 5 June 1942) was a rear admiral in the Imperial Japanese Navy

If the tables had turned, it is possible that the United States could have suffered as catastrophic a defeat at Midway as the Japanese did in reality. One logical conclusion is that Midway would have fallen to the Japanese; although heavily defended, the island would have been surrounded. With the U.S. carriers gone, the Japanese would have had aerial dominance, allowing Imperial warships and aircraft to bomb the defenders at will.

What next? In this hypothetical scenario, the U.S. Navy would have been left with only one carrier in the entire Pacific (the U.S.S. Saratoga, which had was being refitted in San Diego during the battle).

The wider possible implications are also important. If the United States had lost most of its carriers at Midway, would the allies have continued to pursue a “Europe First” policy, as they actually did?

[kverdon]

Yes! The air and Naval combat need to be REALLY revamped from where they are in AO 1944 for the Pacific to work. The sounds too! Naval gunfire sounds more like a pathetic sneeze that the rumbling roar it should be!

[CaptainRope1]

One of the most decisive battles of the Second World War could have ended up very differently. Be glad it didn’t though.

https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/what-if ... of-midway/
By Benjamin David Baker January 08, 2016

Almost more than any other during the Second World War, this battle was won due to a fortunate combination of good intelligence, planning, and, most of all, luck. The U.S. Navy was far inferior to its Japanese counterparts in terms of numbers and experience but was still able to sink all four of the Imperial Navy’s committed aircraft carriers. This marked the beginning of the long, grueling allied island-hopping advance in the Pacific, which eventually culminated in Japan’s defeat over three years later.

Although the Japanese and American navies had fought an inconclusive battle at the Coral Sea, in which each side lost an aircraft carrier, the Imperial Navy retained the strategic initiative.

Due to the efforts of the Navy’s Combat Intelligence Unit (known as “HYPO”), Admiral Chester W. Nimitz’s staff knew that the Japanese were planning another offensive. HYPO had been able to partially decipher the Imperial Navy’s JN-25 code, which revealed that the geographical location known as “AF” was the target for the Japanese attack. In order to uncover the location behind “AF,” the U.S. garrison on Midway sent a fake plain-text radio message saying that the island was running out of water. When Allied listening stations in Australia picked up a Japanese radio message saying that “AF” was running out of water, Nimitz knew that Midway was the intended target for the Japanese attack.

The U.S. Navy was therefore able to spring a trap on the Japanese fleets approaching Midway. As they believed the U.S. fleet to be in Pearl Harbor, recuperating after the Coral Sea, the Imperial Navy was in a rush to take Midway before American reinforcements could arrive. As a result, Admiral Nagumo Chuichi didn’t post a picket line of submarines to provide early warning of the U.S. fleet’s movements. As the Japanese aircraft were refueling and rearming after their initial bombing run on Midway, Admirals Jack Fletcher and Raymond Spruance were able to catch the Imperial fleet by surprise. Attacking from a flanking position named “Point Luck” and, informed of the Japanese movements by submarines, the Japanese lost all four of their committed carriers, in exchange for one out of three American (the U.S.S. Yorktown, hastily repaired after its heavy damage in the Coral Sea). Almost as critical as the destruction of the Japanese carriers was the loss of its experienced aircrews and sailors. From this victory, the Americans were able to gain the strategic initiative, starting with the landings at Guadalcanal in August 1942.

Our second order counterfactuals start here. Yamamoto could either have called off the attack on Midway, choosing other targets for Japan’s aircraft carriers; perhaps a renewed offensive towards Fiji, Australia, or Dutch Harbor in Alaska. However, as Cook argues, he was well aware of the necessity of dealing a critical blow to the U.S. Pacific Fleet in order to keep the strategic initiative. It is more likely that he would have attempted to set his own trap against the United States at Midway. In accordance with the Imperial Navy’s Kantai Kessen, or decisive battle doctrine, Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy’s general staff could hope to draw the remaining U.S. carriers into a decisive battle. With the U.S. Pacific Fleet removed and Hawaii under threat, Yamamoto hoped that the U.S. would sue for a negotiated peace, securing Japan’s conquests in Asia. [Ret: Always a possibility, but... not likely!]

If they [Yamamoto' & Admrl.Yamaguchi ] knew, or strongly suspected that if the United States was aware of their plans, Yamamoto and Nagumo would in all likelihood have deployed their submarines in advance of the rest of the fleet, probably in a screen between Midway and Hawaii. These subs would discover the U.S. fleet steaming to Midway, alerting the Imperial fleet. Instead of finding an unprepared Japanese fleet in the middle of rearming after their bombing run on Midway, the U.S. carriers would have run right into a prepared ambush, carried out by superior aircraft and experienced aircrews.

Yamaguchi Tamon, 17 August 1892 – 5 June 1942) was a rear admiral in the Imperial Japanese Navy

If the tables had turned, it is possible that the United States could have suffered as catastrophic a defeat at Midway as the Japanese did in reality. One logical conclusion is that Midway would have fallen to the Japanese; although heavily defended, the island would have been surrounded. With the U.S. carriers gone, the Japanese would have had aerial dominance, allowing Imperial warships and aircraft to bomb the defenders at will.

What next? In this hypothetical scenario, the U.S. Navy would have been left with only one carrier in the entire Pacific (the U.S.S. Saratoga, which had was being refitted in San Diego during the battle).

The wider possible implications are also important. If the United States had lost most of its carriers at Midway, would the allies have continued to pursue a “Europe First” policy, as they actually did?

Hi @Retributarr we the gamer understand what you are trying to do but there is no way for the Japanese Empire could have won WW2. Germany is another story as people have thought about it for years. Japan could not win even at the high of its power because of the population different and industry capable. It was just not going to end will, and for ideas air and naval forces you could add a mode switch for fighter to drop bombs or rockets as most fights where able to drop really weak bombs on targets they do little damage but way better they just bullets and have AA fire count as a support medal point. For naval ships I think you should add range to all naval ships weapons and AA gun range as well fire from thoughts guns should always cause moral damages because the pilots are flying thought a wall of flak to hit there target.

[rafstaff]

And here i am again with the most annoing question - are there any news on this dlc? Screenshots, when it will be done, how are going works on that? Just anything

[Retributarr]

Hi @Retributarr we the gamer understand what you are trying to do but there is no way for the Japanese Empire could have won WW2. Germany is another story as people have thought about it for years. Japan could not win even at the high of its power because of the population different and industry capable. It was just not going to end will, and for ideas air and naval forces you could add a mode switch for fighter to drop bombs or rockets as most fights where able to drop really weak bombs on targets they do little damage but way better they just bullets and have AA fire count as a support medal point. For naval ships I think you should add range to all naval ships weapons and AA gun range as well fire from thoughts guns should always cause moral damages because the pilots are flying thought a wall of flak to hit there target.

I have given reasons from reviews and assessments from others who seem to have some knowledge on this subject-matter... in order to provide another aspect or outlook on these WWII Pacific Events.

To me... at least... their rationale' or reasonings are not "absurd!", there is some "likely-hood" that some of these unknown aspects or possible occurrences... have... or had the potential to occur!. I have given plenty of information dealing with these WWII alternatives in great detail. What you are doing is just outright denying that any of it is possible at all without giving any realistic information to back-up your statements. Why is that?.

The 'Americans' were 'Heavily' tied up in the war in Europe... most of their resources... 'Manpower-Weapons-Fuel-Etc'... was allocated to that cause... not the 'Pacific!. Most of the American Industry and Manpower was dedicated to fighting the Germans... not the Japanese!.

[kverdon]

It is very hard to justify any Japanese Campaign extending past 1943. Just look at the numbers of Essex Fleet Carriers, Independence Light Carriers and Commencement Bay Escort Carriers the USN has available. Even if the USN looses all its carriers in 1942 (and we only had 2 left), that wave is still coming. Than to have the So. Dakota BBs, the Iowas and the dozens of cruisers that show up in 1943-44 and the writing is on the wall. There is no way the Japanese could stop that. They could not win the war but could have prolonged it to 1946 and maybe 1947, though even that assumes that they find a way to break the submarine blockage that was starving them of everything.

A 1942 to 1943 campaign where the Japanese strive to better their historical outcome could be interresting however.

[CaptainRope1]

Hi @Retributarr we the gamer understand what you are trying to do but there is no way for the Japanese Empire could have won WW2. Germany is another story as people have thought about it for years. Japan could not win even at the high of its power because of the population different and industry capable. It was just not going to end will, and for ideas air and naval forces you could add a mode switch for fighter to drop bombs or rockets as most fights where able to drop really weak bombs on targets they do little damage but way better they just bullets and have AA fire count as a support medal point. For naval ships I think you should add range to all naval ships weapons and AA gun range as well fire from thoughts guns should always cause moral damages because the pilots are flying thought a wall of flak to hit there target.

I have given reasons from reviews and assessments from others who seem to have some knowledge on this subject-matter... in order to provide another aspect or outlook on these WWII Pacific Events.

To me... at least... their rationale' or reasonings are not "absurd!", there is some "likely-hood" that some of these unknown aspects or possible occurrences... have... or had the potential to occur!. I have given plenty of information dealing with these WWII alternatives in great detail. What you are doing is just outright denying that any of it is possible at all without giving any realistic information to back-up your statements. Why is that?.

The 'Americans' were 'Heavily' tied up in the war in Europe... most of their resources... 'Manpower-Weapons-Fuel-Etc'... was allocated to that cause... not the 'Pacific!. Most of the American Industry and Manpower was dedicated to fighting the Germans... not the Japanese!.

The other thing to is Japanese Battle Doctrine Kantai Kessen was one of the problems with their way to war as they want a decision battle with a enemy that will not fight it on their trems here a video on YouTube about it https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kss0X8oaeow. Also, many Japanese commander where a problem as will. There aggressive attack and good battle plan can be commendable but their inability to straight out their supply line problem or in some cases make it worst like the Denotata tail campaign to take Post Mosbey is one explain in were the near continues attack get revenge on the Australians for causing so many to be kill push the supply to the breaking point and the battle for Gautalea canal has taken what every supply they had for the attack Port Mosbey and send it there for their decisive battle to not happen and bleed them of troops and ships that they cannot replace. I am not trying to be a mean person and point this out and if you want to try with what you are doing i will not stop you but know must of us will be very escarp of it being capable to play out as we are talking the ocean and not land where it could be control by a small force but at sea a standing target is a dead one.

[kverdon]

An interesting alternative that *Might* work is to not do Pearl Harbor and start the game with attack against the Philippines. There is a good argument to be made that Pearl Harbor cost Japan their plan for victory because it made their grand strategy of bleed the USN dry by the death of a thousand cuts as it sailed to relieve the Philippines where it would be defeated in a grand naval battle. Instead it forced the USN on the defensive where they had to cool their heals until the new construction ships came off the ways in 1943. This was the one strategy the Japanese could not win. It would be an interesting alternative Pacific War.

Midway enabled the USN to consider the bold move to prevent the building of the Japanese airfield on Guadalcanal and THAT is where the Japanese lost the war. As one person put it. “Before Guadalcanal the Japanese advanced at their leisure, afterwards they retreated at ours”. The Solomons bled the IJN and Japanese AirPower white.

[CaptainRope1]

An interesting alternative that *Might* work is to not do Pearl Harbor and start the game with attack against the Philippines. There is a good argument to be made that Pearl Harbor cost Japan their plan for victory because it made their grand strategy of bleed the USN dry by the death of a thousand cuts as it sailed to relieve the Philippines where it would be defeated in a grand naval battle. Instead it forced the USN on the defensive where they had to cool their heals until the new construction ships came off the ways in 1943. This was the one strategy the Japanese could not win. It would be an interesting alternative Pacific War.

Midway enabled the USN to consider the bold move to prevent the building of the Japanese airfield on Guadalcanal and THAT is where the Japanese lost the war. As one person put it. “Before Guadalcanal the Japanese advanced at their leisure, afterwards they retreated at ours”. The Solomons bled the IJN and Japanese AirPower white.

Another idea would be that at the Battle of Midway the Americans were not so lucky and suke all four of the Japanese fleet carriers there

[Retributarr]

You Tube Midway Battle - Search (bing.com)
You Tube VIDEO The Battle of Midway 1942: Told from the Japanese …
Video URL: https://youtu.be/Bd8_vO5zrjo
In this video
Click any segment to jump ahead
Ominous Signs for the Japanese 5:51
Strike of 108 Aircraft 7:27
Initial Air Strikes against Aikido Butai 11:49

[CaptainRope1]

You Tube Midway Battle - Search (bing.com)
You Tube VIDEO The Battle of Midway 1942: Told from the Japanese …
Video URL: https://youtu.be/Bd8_vO5zrjo
In this video
Click any segment to jump ahead
Ominous Signs for the Japanese 5:51
Strike of 108 Aircraft 7:27
Initial Air Strikes against Aikido Butai 11:49

I thought of an idea you could do for the Pacific DLC Campaign as a hole would go a non-history campaign mostly because from both the Japanese and Americans view of it is like World War one stile warfare attack well defended positions, with machineguns and mortars sited in on target. Where every attack is always blooded. I would go a route for the American campaign as one were you try to save your allies and survive off or stuff you take from the Japanese during there take over the south Pacific. For the Japanese campaign is your force are a combine army and navy force under control of the emperor of Japan where you are like the Shogute of ancient Japan history where you help you are a imported factor to help win the war for Japan.

[robman]

I agree with kverdon that the only way to make a Japanese victory plausible would be to have the option to forego the attack on Pearl Harbor. Japan could have “won” only a limited war, and to remain limited, the stakes would have to have remained distant to the American public.

If Japan had succeeded at Midway, the subsequent twists and turns of the Pacific War would have been different, but I doubt that the final outcome would have been. By that point, Japan and the US were already locked in a total war that Japan could not win, regardless of the outcome of the war in Europe.

It would be great fun to explore some of these possibilities via PzC2!

[Retributarr]

***Alternate Perspectives***
If Japan could do WW2 over again, what would they different?
https://www.quora.com/If-Japan-could-do ... r-conquest
Howard Yale Lederman adjunct Professor of Franchise Law at Thomas M. Cooley Law School (2012–present)

If Japan wanted to win World War II, Japan would have to stay out any war with the two great powers far stronger than her: The United States and the Soviet Union. Also, Japan could never fight so many other nations at the same time. If Japan concluded that it had to go to war, it should have limited its enemies, besides China, to Britain, France, and the Netherlands. All three were relatively weak in the Far East. Even together, they could not assemble the military power to stop Japan. If Japan had adopted and carried out this strategy in 1940–1941, they would have defeated all thee of these colonial powers without forcing America into the war. American public opinion would never have stood for an aggressive war to prop up the dying Western colonial empires in Asia and the Pacific. So, as long as Japan did not attack the US or the Soviet Union, Japan would have emerged from the war victorious with greater industrial and military power than ever and with a strong bargaining hand vis-a-vis these latter two powers.
Howard Lederman
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Could Japan have won WW2 without interservice rivalry?
https://history.stackexchange.com/quest ... ce-rivalry
It depends on just what you include in WW2. IF the Japanese had not attacked Pearl Harbor (and the Phillipines &c), the US might have been persuaded to remain neutral, allowing them to control much of Southeast Asia. (The colonial powers being pretty well occupied in Europe.) That would have given them access to oil & minerals, and a secure base from which to attack the US in later years. –
jamesqf
Nov 27, 2021 at 18:20

Not exactly. We agree that there's no way Japan could have won against the US after Pearl Harbor. I'm suggesting that if they didn't attack the US then, but took the British, French, & Dutch territories in SE Asia, consolidated those territorial gains, then later attacked the US using the resources of their new conquests, it could have won such a war. –
jamesqf
Nov 29, 2021 at 3:54
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The inter service rivalry in the Japanese military did exist, but examples of how that degraded fighting ability are not that prominent.

The IJN made a notable effort to reinforce the IJA on Guadalcanal, and lost a lot of ships, and especially lost a lot of trained naval aviators that they couldn't quickly replace. During the battles around Guadalcanal, most notably the Battle of Santa Cruz, Japan lost over 1/5 of their carrier pilots - such training requiring about a year. These were losses they couldn't replace.

Japan never intended to defeat the US. Remember Admiral Yamamoto's quote: "You can't invade America. There will be a rifle behind every blade of grass."

The intent was to disable the US Navy, and reinforce their positions around their sources of oil and raw materials, so that any US naval attack would be made over a great distance and at great disadvantage.

Japan appeared to be hoping to recreate the decisive battle of Tsushima in their war with Russia, that led to Russia's withdrawal from that conflict, after the Baltic Fleet had endured a lengthy voyage.

After a similar defeat of the US navy, Japan expected a negotiated peace, with them in possession of the oil and raw materials they wanted.

Could Japan have won or prolonged the war, absent inter service rivalries? No, Japan didn't have the resources. At most, it could have prolonged the war enough to see use of more nuclear(Atomic) bombs.