Military Intelligence Briefings during the Game included... to justify 'Initial-Unit-Placement:

[Retributarr]

Since we already know 'before-hand' what will or what will not take place... to now make an effort to not pre-empt or to try to circumvent a situational conflict to our benefit... but to instead... keep 'History' as close to 'True' as possible... we may need to make 'Some' of ones initial placement of units on the Map as close to the actual historical dispositions that originally existed. A few units of the player's forces [Historical specific unit types of similar rating/calibre... of course] 'should/could' be required to be emplaced in specific highlighted hexes.

A consideration of... such "forced unit-placement" would need to be determined to be "included or excluded" based on the work-ability or playability of the 'particular specific-scenario'.

Does any of this make any sense to anyone?. Is there any need to have any concern or validity for this course of action as far as... helping to make the Game more historically correct?.

[Vorskl]

Since we already know 'before-hand' what will or what will not take place... to now make an effort to not pre-empt or to try to circumvent a situational conflict to our benefit... but to instead... keep 'History' as close to 'True' as possible... we may need to make 'Some' of ones initial placement of units on the Map as close to the actual historical dispositions that originally existed. A few units of the player's forces [Historical specific unit types of similar rating/calibre... of course] 'should/could' be required to be emplaced in specific highlighted hexes.

A consideration of... such "forced unit-placement" would need to be determined to be "included or excluded" based on the work-ability or playability of the 'particular specific-scenario'.

Does any of this make any sense to anyone?. Is there any need to have any concern or validity for this course of action as far as... helping to make the Game more historically correct?.

I am always in favor of historic accuracy so directionally support your suggestion. But as usual, there is a "but..." a player will have a core that's materially different from the real-life prototypes anyhow, so if we has Katyusha in 1940 Abbeville, where do you force place it? I like the briefings, but except the Moscow scenario, they are too precise and accurate - you're always told where the enemy will strike and how to proceed. An impeccable accuracy; hopefully 1942 scenarios will model uncertainty, so except the Blau, they should sound like 'we dont know where Soviet will strike and when, but try get this objective if possible and be preferred to defend this and that'

That said, Auxiliary units should be historically accurate and placed at the historically correct locations. Yet in Kiev the 1st Panzer Gruppe starts from Cherkassy, and not the infamous Kremenchug bridgehead... It's like D-Day taking place in Antwerp

[Retributarr]

I am always in favor of historic accuracy so directionally support your suggestion. "But as usual, there is a but..." a player will have a core that's materially different from the real-life prototypes.

Yes!... Very likely!... that... a player would not have what is needed.

A way to get around this potential problem... might be... to either have the player purchase the necessary required unit-elements... or... upgrade some existing units to fulfill the placement requirement... and... or finally if all-else-fails... to put whatever usually eligible units for placement that the player has into 'Reserve-Status' to make room for... and to then select the option to have "Temporary-Access" to such units as is needed to fulfill the 'Unit-Placement-Issue'... for that 'Scenario'.

[Scrapulous]

if we has Katyusha in 1940 Abbeville, where do you force place it?

I think Ret's suggestion would have to be not for precise unit models, but rather, unit categories. In other words: these hexes are for artillery deployment, these others are for infantry deployment, this third type is for armor, and so on. It's not perfect, but it at least captures the spirit of Ret's suggestion.

I like the briefings, but except the Moscow scenario, they are too precise and accurate - you're always told where the enemy will strike and how to proceed. An impeccable accuracy; hopefully 1942 scenarios will model uncertainty, so except the Blau, they should sound like 'we dont know where Soviet will strike and when, but try get this objective if possible and be preferred to defend this and that'

I also would like less accurate briefings. There is some uncertainty in there, but Wagner is almost never wrong about where an attack will occur or where enemy units are.

[Retributarr]

if we has Katyusha in 1940 Abbeville, where do you force place it?

I think Ret's suggestion would have to be not for precise unit models, but rather, unit categories. [Ret:Good Suggestion!]

I like the briefings, but except the Moscow scenario, they are too precise and accurate - you're always told where the enemy will strike and how to proceed. An impeccable accuracy; hopefully 1942 scenarios will model uncertainty, so except the Blau, they should sound like 'we dont know where Soviet will strike and when, but try get this objective if possible and be preferred to defend this and that'

I also would like less accurate briefings. There is some uncertainty in there, but Wagner is almost never wrong about where an attack will occur or where enemy units are.

"Military Intelligence"... was usually only a 'Half-Truth'... or even... completely misleading... Yes!... 'Less Precise Intelligence Briefings'... would definitely be a welcome addition to heighten the 'Anxiety-Level' for the player!... and to take the 'Hum-Drum-Boredom' out of the Game.

[Vorskl]

Thinking about game uncertainties... some ideas to make game experience more interesting:
- partisans spawning out of thin air in 1942+ scenarios. Historically accurate and the game does that already
- map inaccuracies. Currently the map at deployment shows you everything. Instead, it should only show geography, and 'surprises' discovered by using recons: i.e. missing bridges (implying that Soviets managed to blow them); new defensive lines or bunkers

[Retributarr]

Thinking about game uncertainties... some ideas to make game experience more interesting:
- partisans spawning out of thin air in 1942+ scenarios. Historically accurate and the game does that already
- map inaccuracies. Currently the map at deployment shows you everything. Instead, it should only show geography, and 'surprises' discovered by using recons: i.e. missing bridges (implying that Soviets managed to blow them); new defensive lines or bunkers

More "Great-Ideas!"... I hope that 'Kerensky' is listening!.

[VirgilInTheSKY]

I think in Moscow you were already surprised by the Siberian units arriving at Moscow when you encounter them, which was not mentioned in briefing?
Anyway, a slightly misleading/inaccurate briefing is welcomed for me, as long as it doesn't throw you into a situation of "what the hell", like the one in ahistorical route final mission of the base campaign, you were suddenly stormed by a group of US paratroopers landed behind your line capturing every location they can reach. That one really annoyed me for the first time, and I think we all agree that "briefings" in game only works for the first contact, since the second time you already know what to expect in it.

As for unit placement change, I would prefer some aux units pre-placed on the map to show "historical accurancy" instead of a forced deployment zone. You just cannot have a single unit category dealing with everything to expect in game, and mixed usage is always needed, so forced deployment has no meaning on that, and would slow players down by "those guys will have nothing to do until I can get what they need to them", which is very annoying for me, i.e. in AO 1941 those muddy maps where your armoured units would be forced to stop and wait for your infantry and artillery that might only be able to move 1 or 2 hexes per turn to reach the target fortifications and start to clear those enemies out.

[Retributarr]

The situation in Normandy – the German Perspective_ Now an opportunity to cheat-history!.:
https://www.warhistoryonline.com/milita ... tanks.html

What were the effects on the the Panzertruppen?

To keep the destination of the landings secret, a deception plan, Operation Fortitude, was mounted which led the Germans to believe that the main target was the Pas de Calais (Fortitude South)

Let's say that now... the 'German-Player'... initiates the Normandy Scenario/Campaign. As-well... he now has the ability to exercise... 'Full-Unrestricted-Control'... of all of his 'Unit-Placements'. At this point... Now!... knowing full well that the invasion will take place in 'Normandy' instead of at 'Calais'... [Ret:"German-Military Intelligence"... was superbly deceived by British-Counter-Intelligence into coming to the conclusion that... the main target was the Pas de Calais for the Invasion of France!.] ... so then... the German-Player {With Hind-Sight-Foreknowledge} emplaces what-ever 'Panzer-Divisions' that are available to him to place them all at the beaches... as 'Rommel' wanted to have done or carried out in the first place. He would now just be following 'Rommels' original plan to have the 'Panzers' ready to go at the beaches in Normandy.

It is for situations such as the one that has just been described,... that I had previously pushed for a 'Historical-Reality-Check' to make sure that especially some specific units be historically placed into the Game... to deter such an out-right abuse of the Campaign-Series.

[Vorskl]

The situation in Normandy – the German Perspective_ Now an opportunity to cheat-history!.:
https://www.warhistoryonline.com/milita ... tanks.html

What were the effects on the the Panzertruppen?

To keep the destination of the landings secret, a deception plan, Operation Fortitude, was mounted which led the Germans to believe that the main target was the Pas de Calais (Fortitude South)

Let's say that now... the 'German-Player'... initiates the Normandy Scenario/Campaign. As-well... he now has the ability to exercise... 'Full-Control'... of his 'Unit-Placements'. At this point... knowing full well that the invasion will take place in 'Normandy' instead of at 'Calais'... he then emplaces what-ever 'Panzer-Divisions' that are available to him to place them all at the beaches... as 'Rommel' wanted to have done or carried out in the first place. He would now just be following 'Rommels' original plan to have the 'Panzers' ready to go at the beaches in Normandy.

It is for situations such as the one that has just been described,... that I had previously pushed for a 'Historical-Reality-Check' to be incorporated into the Game... to deter such an out-right abuse of the Campaign-Series.

Here is the second similar case
1942, South Russia. Germans just partially occupied Voronezh and turned South, chasing retreating Soviet troops along Don River in the direction of Stalingrad. Romanian and Italian troops were placed along Don river to use it as a natural barrier. Now, look at the pre-Uran map - Soviet troops managed to keep two large bridgeheads near Serafimovich and Kletskaya on the West bank of Don (north-west from Stalingrad). All the time until the Soviet offense began, Romanians rightfully complained to Paulus to put efforts in removing these bridgeheads. The reply was to f... off (as OKH believed there were not many Soviet troops left around anyhow, so why waste time and efforts) until it was too late. How do we model this?

[Retributarr]

Here is the second similar case
1942, South Russia. Germans just partially occupied Voronezh and turned South, chasing retreating Soviet troops along Don River in the direction of Stalingrad. Romanian and Italian troops were placed along Don river to use it as a natural barrier. Now, look at the pre-Uran map - Soviet troops managed to keep two large bridgeheads near Serafimovich and Kletskaya on the West bank of Don (north-west from Stalingrad). All the time until the Soviet offense began, Romanians rightfully complained to Paulus to put efforts in removing these bridgeheads. The reply was to f... off (as OKH believed there were not many Soviet troops left around anyhow, so why waste time and efforts) until it was too late. How do we model this?: )

This is "a problematic" in 'Particular' for the 'Game-Designer'... to determine if this awkward 'German-Allied-Situation' merits a slight 'A-Historical' deviation... or... 'Game-Sequence-Intervention'... meaning!... to what-end or purposeful function in the determination or furtherance of the Game.

Personally!... I have no hard determined answer to this... so!... "propose your ideas in detail" for 'Kerensky' to ponder over to see what he can or cannot do with it!.

[Magni]

The situation in Normandy – the German Perspective_ Now an opportunity to cheat-history!.:
https://www.warhistoryonline.com/milita ... tanks.html

What were the effects on the the Panzertruppen?

To keep the destination of the landings secret, a deception plan, Operation Fortitude, was mounted which led the Germans to believe that the main target was the Pas de Calais (Fortitude South)

Let's say that now... the 'German-Player'... initiates the Normandy Scenario/Campaign. As-well... he now has the ability to exercise... 'Full-Unrestricted-Control'... of all of his 'Unit-Placements'. At this point... Now!... knowing full well that the invasion will take place in 'Normandy' instead of at 'Calais'... [Ret:"German-Military Intelligence"... was superbly deceived by British-Counter-Intelligence into coming to the conclusion that... the main target was the Pas de Calais for the Invasion of France!.] ... so then... the German-Player {With Hind-Sight-Foreknowledge} emplaces what-ever 'Panzer-Divisions' that are available to him to place them all at the beaches... as 'Rommel' wanted to have done or carried out in the first place. He would now just be following 'Rommels' original plan to have the 'Panzers' ready to go at the beaches in Normandy.

It is for situations such as the one that has just been described,... that I had previously pushed for a 'Historical-Reality-Check' to make sure that especially some specific units be historically placed into the Game... to deter such an out-right abuse of the Campaign-Series.

Actually Rommel wanted no such thing, he wanted the mobile divisions sent east and be given a hell of a lot mroe infantry and artillery to defend the Atlantic beaches in depth. Becuase he understood that the material supremacy of the Allies meant that any solid beachhead would be functionally impossible to push back into the sea, so the only hope was to stop the invasion right as it landed, not hours or days after. And that trying to move armor to the beaches en masse was just going to see it smashed to pieces by overwhelming airpower and naval artillery.

Also, failed Normandy landings mean the Germans are still wholly and utterly doomed. Great, you rushed all remaining reserves in the theatre into Normandy to stop that invasion. And now they're stuck there as allied fighter-bombers make large-scale daytime movement sheer suicide and allied strategic bombers have throughly smashed up the rail and road infrastructure you need for those movements. Which means you have nothing left to send as Operation Dragoon storms ashore in southern France and the Allies throw the entire weight of their warmachine behind that instead, having the strategic flexibility to do that owing to their virtually total naval dominance at this point.

Oh, and meanwhile Army Group Center is still getting smashed to pieces by Bagration at the same time. So I guess "best" case the Red Army gets to take more of Germany owing to the slightly slower allied advance.

This obsession about how to win this one battle and how it would totally allow the Germans to not suffer utter and total defeat in the end is both tedious and futile. It as a rule completely ignores that the other side gets to also react and adjust their plans in turn, and it always completely fails to change the overall strategic reasons that truly doomed Nazi Germany to total defeat. All you're doing is rearranging the chairs on the deck of the Titanic.

PS: The elipses are filing a restraining order. They want you to stop abusing them.

[Retributarr]

Actually Rommel wanted no such thing, he wanted the mobile divisions sent east and be given a hell of a lot mroe infantry and artillery to defend the Atlantic beaches in depth. Becuase he understood that the material supremacy of the Allies meant that any solid beachhead would be functionally impossible to push back into the sea, so the only hope was to stop the invasion right as it landed, not hours or days after. And that trying to move armor to the beaches en masse was just going to see it smashed to pieces by overwhelming airpower and naval artillery.

Somehow I must have wrongly understood some of 'Rommels-Intensions'... I will check on this!. However!... at the same time... it is good to see that some others have a greater in-depth insight into these matters... so that is very-good to have such talented forum personnel here!. Thank-You for your input!.

[Retributarr]

While Hitler Snored: D-Day, Rommel and the Panzers
https://www.military.com/daily-news/201 ... nzers.html

One of the perennial debates among military historians and armchair generals revolves around Adolf Hitler's decision to directly control the disposition of the Panzer units in northern France in the period immediately preceding the Normandy landings.

The basic elements of the debate are well known. The question is, would a different deployment of the Panzer units have affected the outcome of D-Day? Specifically, had Hitler followed Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's plan to station the Panzer units forward along the coast, would the Germans have successfully repulsed the Allied landings in Normandy?

Rommel believed that the Allied landings would come somewhere between Dunkirk and the mouth of the Somme River, with the most likely area being between Calais and Boulogne-sur-Mer. This area was well to the north of the Normandy beaches. Moreover, the Seine River separated this zone from Normandy.

Rommel argued that the invasion force had to be destroyed in the water and on the beaches, where they would have little cover or fire support. His proposed strategy consisted of static defense along the coasts, backed by concrete pillboxes and overwhelming firepower. Rommel wanted to deploy the Panzer units to support the infantry as a local tactical force that could strike against weak points in the Allied line, and could be deployed to seal any breaches in the German lines. He believed, correctly, that it would take the Allies some time to build up their tank strength on the beaches and that, in the first 48 hours of the landings, the Germans would have an overwhelming advantage in armor.

Rommel asked that the 12th SS Panzer Division, for example, be stationed at Isigny rather than at Evreux. That would have placed it less than 10 miles from Omaha Beach rather than roughly 110 miles to the east. Both von Rundstedt and von Schweppenburg disagreed. So did Heinz Guderian, the Inspector General of Armored Troops and an architect of the Blitzkrieg concept of using massed tank formations to deliver a decisive blow to an opposing force.

By June 7, they were at Caen, where they participated in the defense of the town. Germany had roughly 1,400 tanks in theater at the beginning of the Normandy invasion. Roughly 400 were south of the Loire with Army Group G. Of the balance remaining in northern France, less than 400 saw any action within the first 48 hours of the Allied invasion.

Excluding the three Panzer divisions transferred to Army Group G, Rommel could have ended up controlling seven Panzer divisions instead of three. Would that have made a difference in the outcome of the D-Day landings? That depends on how Rommel would have deployed them.

Rommel expected that the Allied landings would take place north of the Seine delta, and presumably would have deployed most of the Panzers there. We'll never know how Rommel might have employed the additional Panzer units, but it's likely that only one, at most two, would have ended up near the Normandy landings. The balance would have been further north, where Rommel expected the landings to occur.
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Weapons and Warfare
https://weaponsandwarfare.com/2017/09/2 ... ompromise/

Rommel also wanted the panzer divisions to be placed near the coast where the Allies were most likely to land. They would then launch the decisive counterattacks within the first forty-eight hours of the invasion. The German tanks were meant to counterattack in small packets deployed from behind the beaches. The panzers would attack once the Allies had landed with close encounters to mix in and break up the seaward assault. With this deployment Rommel hoped to avoid being blasted by Allied destroyers firing at point-blank range as previously occurred at the Sicily and Salerno landings.

[Scrapulous]

Rommel argued that the invasion force had to be destroyed in the water and on the beaches, where they would have little cover or fire support. His proposed strategy consisted of static defense along the coasts, backed by concrete pillboxes and overwhelming firepower. Rommel wanted to deploy the Panzer units to support the infantry as a local tactical force that could strike against weak points in the Allied line, and could be deployed to seal any breaches in the German lines. He believed, correctly, that it would take the Allies some time to build up their tank strength on the beaches and that, in the first 48 hours of the landings, the Germans would have an overwhelming advantage in armor.

I don't think this is necessarily at odds with what Magni wrote.

The orange text confuses me, though. I understand why throwing armor at the weak point in a traditional enemy line is valuable: it allows a breakthrough and then disruption and all the other benefits of mobile warfare. But that's not the case when defending against an amphibious assault. What will the armor do against a weak point in a beachhead? Help the static defenses win, which they were already presumably doing? Break through the enemy line and charge into the ocean? I'd think that in this situation, you'd want the armored reserve to support the weakest points in your own defensive line. But I'm only an armchair general at best, and several armchairs have been lost under my command, so I concede that I may not understand the situation as it was.

[Retributarr]

Rommel argued that the invasion force had to be destroyed in the water and on the beaches, where they would have little cover or fire support. His proposed strategy consisted of static defense along the coasts, backed by concrete pillboxes and overwhelming firepower. Rommel wanted to deploy the Panzer units to support the infantry as a local tactical force that could strike against weak points in the Allied line, and could be deployed to seal any breaches in the German lines. He believed, correctly, that it would take the Allies some time to build up their tank strength on the beaches and that, in the first 48 hours of the landings, the Germans would have an overwhelming advantage in armor.

Now!... for the "Full-Explanation".
[Ret: Previous Posting: "... so then... the German-Player {With Hind-Sight-Foreknowledge} emplaces what-ever 'Panzer-Divisions' that are available to him to place them all at the beaches... as 'Rommel' wanted to have done or carried out in the first place. He would now just be following 'Rommels' original plan to have the 'Panzers' ready to go at the beaches in Normandy".]

I don't think this is necessarily at odds with what Magni wrote. [Ret: ???????]

This is what Magni wrote:
[Magni's Response: "Actually Rommel wanted no such thing, he wanted the mobile divisions sent east and be given a hell of a lot mroe infantry and artillery to defend the Atlantic beaches in depth. Becuase he understood that the material supremacy of the Allies meant that any solid beachhead would be functionally impossible to push back into the sea, so the only hope was to stop the invasion right as it landed, not hours or days after. And that ".trying to move armor to the beaches en masse was just going to see it smashed to pieces by overwhelming airpower and naval artillery]

Not So!...This is 'In-Fact!'... in the following explanation... what 'Rommel' really wanted to do... instead of...
[Magni:"trying to move armor to the beaches en masse was just going to see it smashed to pieces by overwhelming airpower and naval artillery"]

Now!... For Rommels real plan:
[Ret: In another previous posting: "Rommel also wanted the panzer divisions to be placed near the coast where the Allies were most likely to land". ...as well as... "The German tanks were meant to counterattack in small packets deployed from behind the beaches". ...as well as... "With this deployment Rommel hoped to avoid being blasted by Allied destroyers firing at point-blank range as previously occurred at the Sicily and Salerno landings".]

[Scrapulous] for some unknown reason... this posting has determined to 'Bold Text' this... your next statement?... which continues below.]

The orange text confuses me, though. I understand why throwing armor at the weak point in a traditional enemy line is valuable: it allows a breakthrough and then disruption and all the other benefits of mobile warfare. But that's not the case when defending against an amphibious assault. What will the armor do against a weak point in a beachhead? Help the static defenses win, which they were already presumably doing? Break through the enemy line and charge into the ocean? I'd think that in this situation, you'd want the armored reserve to support the weakest points in your own defensive line. But I'm only an armchair general at best, and several armchairs have been lost under my command, so I concede that I may not understand the situation as it was.

[Vorskl]

Leaving aside the dire strategic outlook, what was Rommel's plan to deal with total allies air superiority? Do you know the German joke of 1944+: if there are silver planes in the sky - these are yankees; if camouflaged planes - these are brits; if no planes in the sky - that's Luftwaffe.
Talking tactically about sea bridgeheads, Soviets demonstrated in 1943 two opposite examples - successful ('Malaya Zemlya') and devastating (Etilgen south of Crimea). The decisive factors were the arty support and an ability to supply the bridgehead.

[Retributarr]

Leaving aside the dire strategic outlook, what was Rommel's plan to deal with total allies air superiority? Do you know the German joke of 1944+: if there are silver planes in the sky - these are yankees; if camouflaged planes - these are brits; if no planes in the sky - that's Luftwaffe.
Talking tactically about sea bridgeheads, Soviets demonstrated in 1943 two opposite examples - successful ('Malaya Zemlya') and devastating (Etilgen south of Crimea). The decisive factors were the arty support and an ability to supply the bridgehead.

Quite simply!... here is an excerpt from one of my previous postings... and it was in reference to Rommel's commenting about allied air-power,... so... this was his solution. [" "The German tanks were meant to counterattack in small packets deployed from behind the beaches".]

Meaning that the German-Tanks would be formed into small groups... perhaps 2 to 4 tanks in each small group... and as well... they might also have been hidden as well as camouflaged... to be discretely hidden behind the beaches... not at or in-front of the beach... until they were called upon.

[Magni]

You know, the biggest nail in the coffin for all of this is what actually happend when 21st Panzer did actually try to push into the beachheads right on D-Day: Their whole attack attracted more and more allied airpower as it closed in on the beaches, and then ground to a complete halt and was forced to retreat when the naval artillery started to get involved. It's a classic Catch 22: You can't stop the Allies once they've solidifed the beachhead because of their materiel supremacy, and your static infantry in the Atlantic Wall can't stop them from taking that beachhead. But you also can't put your armor forward onto the beaches because that exposes them to overwhelming allied aerial and naval firepower that you have no real answer for. Counterattacks in small packets against allied forces with plentiful anti-tank firepower and overwhelming amounts of air and naval artillery support on call is just throwing those panzers into certain annihilation for no chance of any real success.

The Germans had lost that battle quite literally since before it was even planned. The details don't matter in the grand scheme of the completely hopeless strategic situation of the Axis - no matter the particulars, the Allies were always guaranteed an insurmountable advantage in firepower, numbers, logistics and aerial and naval strength and the only "hope" the Germans had was that of the Allies failing abysmally to even try to take advantage of any of it. In other words, that the Allies were actually even more incompetent than how the worst of the nazis own propaganda depicted them as. Needless to say, the reality was quite different.

[Retributarr]

You know, the biggest nail in the coffin for all of this is what actually happend when 21st Panzer did actually try to push into the beachheads right on D-Day: Their whole attack attracted more and more allied airpower as it closed in on the beaches, and then ground to a complete halt and was forced to retreat when the naval artillery started to get involved. [Ret: Rommel realized that this would happen, therefore... he wanted no-part of it... he knew that this was a foreseen problem!. That is why he wanted to try a different approach... as to how exactly what he intended to do... I don't know!. For some reason he was confident enough... to believe that by placing the Panzer's behind the beaches... safely... out of harm's way... to then be used in or as single-packets or for them to rendezvous as a collective force (Local Beach area... by Local Beach area) to be used for some greater purpose... is for him to know alone. I'm quite sure that he wouldn't be so carelessly rash... so as to expose his Panzer's to the full-weight of the devastating Sea and Air Bombardment dangers.]

It's a classic Catch 22: You can't stop the Allies once they've solidifed the beachhead because of their materiel supremacy, and your static infantry in the Atlantic Wall can't stop them from taking that beachhead. But you also can't put your armor forward onto the beaches because that exposes them to overwhelming allied aerial and naval firepower that you have no real answer for. Counterattacks in small packets against allied forces with plentiful anti-tank firepower and overwhelming amounts of air and naval artillery support on call is just throwing those panzers into certain annihilation for no chance of any real success.

The Germans had lost that battle quite literally since before it was even planned. The details don't matter in the grand scheme of the completely hopeless strategic situation of the Axis - no matter the particulars, the Allies were always guaranteed an insurmountable advantage in firepower, numbers, logistics and aerial and naval strength and the only "hope" the Germans had was that of the Allies failing abysmally to even try to take advantage of any of it. In other words, that the Allies were actually even more incompetent than how the worst of the nazis own propaganda depicted them as. Needless to say, the reality was quite different.
[Ret: With the great difficulties at 'Omaha-Beach'... which nearly ended in 'Total-Disaster' for the invasion force that landed there... as well as having high casualties at most of the other beaches... and to now include the desperately dangerous channel conditions starting to surface "weather-wise" which started to disrupt landing operations, the decision to abort the invasion was a very-near reality occurrence!. Eisenhower did plan to give a speech for just that very situation... should it have actually happened... he knew that the invasion was risky!.]