Airborne Units

Schnurri · Post by **Schnurri** » Thu Jun 02, 2011 5:30 pm

Does anyone else see a problem with airborne units? I've played several games now where Allied airborne drops late in the game come out of visible range to drop and create a game changing situation either by causing a minor ally to change sides or capture a vital city. In one case I had garrisoned the capitals but with insufficient strength. In another, the garrison was out chasing partisans and down comes the airborne unit. It seems a little crazy for airborne divisions to be capable of dropping roughly 400 miles behind the lines with no hope of relief for some time. Yes, the local French population would probably feed them but where are they getting their ammunition from? And in the case of a landing in Köln I doubt the local population would feed them. The problem is that late in the game the Axis doesn't have spare troops to dislodge them once landed, the Allies can have a potentially large number of units and they can drop from up to 11 hexes away - so they are invisible to the Axis player (as there is usually not sufficient air power). Obviously I need to protect territory better but when I play I guess I suspend reality and assume the game has some basis in the real world and can't imagine a division of Russian paratroopers landing hundreds of km's behind my lines, especially when I don't know they are there to begin with. If I'm the only one that sees this as a problem I'll have to adjust. Some possible solutions -

1) decrease the max range for airborne units to something like 6 hexes. Enough to get them over the channel for Overlord but not enough to establish an Alpine redoubt.
2) increase the damage sustained by air units as a function of the distance of the drop. This is fairly realistic as transport formations would suffer more from flak the greater their distance of travel.

The Axis has enough to worry about from multiple fronts without having to worry about unrealistic air drops many miles behind the front.[/u]

Plaid · Post by **Plaid** » Thu Jun 02, 2011 5:36 pm

Being unwilling to pay 5 PP to repair capital garrison from 3 steps deserves very this outcome, no?
Even landing each paratrooper cost 10.

Schnurri · Post by **Schnurri** » Thu Jun 02, 2011 5:45 pm

I know you liked it - was a nice move, given the rules. But, completely unrealistic.

Plaid · Post by **Plaid** » Thu Jun 02, 2011 6:30 pm

But its very easy to counter without any significant expences. Non-garrisoning capital is realistic?

rkr1958 · Post by **rkr1958** » Thu Jun 02, 2011 6:36 pm

A305054 wrote:I know you liked it - was a nice move, given the rules. But, completely unrealistic.

How so? I would be interested in seeing any supporting historical data one way or the other with respect to this.

By the way, even with the trouble that the British XXX Corps had linking up with the US airborne divisions on their way to relieve the British and Polish airborne troops in Arhem one could make a historical based argument that if the 2nd SS Panzer Division hadn't been in the Arhem sector at the time of the operation that Operation Market-Garden would have (might have) succeeded. The history of this operations reinforces in my mind, at least, the historical realism of the airborne model in GS. Obviously the British "dropped outside their spotting range" and took that chance which turned out to be a disaster because of the 2nd SS Panzer Division. Just like a player might take that chance in the game to get a valuable objective.

By the way, an airdrop is assumed to consist of both paratroopers and gliders just like it was historically.

I've had to learn this lesson the hard way but you can't leave valuable cities ungarrisoned or weakly garrisoned if your opponent has airborne capability or he may force you to pay the price.

I'm not sure where the bases were that the British and Polish took off from but I do know they were in England. The flying distance from Londonw to Arhem is almost 400-km.

Schnurri · Post by **Schnurri** » Thu Jun 02, 2011 6:47 pm

In the Market Garden example, the real failure was the inability to link up with ground troops in time. An operation like that is completely realistic as the Allies had troops on the ground not far away - they just didn't arrive in time.

In one of what I feel is unrealistic examples, the Allied player, prior to Barbarossa, drops into Orleans while the garrison was dealing with a partisan. Then, after waiting a few turns to build back up to sufficient efficiency, drops next to Turin beside a partisan. All before Overlord has been launched.

Plaid · Post by **Plaid** » Thu Jun 02, 2011 6:51 pm

A305054 wrote: In one of what I feel is unrealistic examples, the Allied player, prior to Barbarossa, drops into Orleans while the garrison was dealing with a partisan. Then, after waiting a few turns to build back up to sufficient efficiency, drops next to Turin beside a partisan. All before Overlord has been launched.

Well, in our game Duncan landed paras into Arnhem since it was not garrisoned. German tanks and bombers were immediately called to deal with invasion, and now allies lost 1 para build permamently. Allowing hostile paras to sit in your land is unrealistic aswell, so it leads to unrealistic consecuences, as it looks to me.

Exploiting ungarrisoned important object seems almost only thing, current paras can do well. And you want to reduce this ability to make unit complete useless?

I think all ways to punish people for total careless game should be left as it is. Remeber how Massina landed garrison into Rome, forcing Italy surrender? Its totally unrealistic, but I can't remember that anyone asked to do something with it, because its obvious what should be done - Rome should be garrisoned.

There is some abstraction in the game. Yes, makes no sence that soviet paras fly over long distance to land in Bucharest and force the surrender, if city is ungarrisoned. But if you keep no troops in capital, revolution may happen there, for example, forcing the country to leave the war. So its way its simulated in the game, I guess.

richardsd · Post by **richardsd** » Thu Jun 02, 2011 10:30 pm

Although it wasn't by Para's, look at how easily Norway was taken by the German's.

Some times it doesn't take much Military Power to get a Political result.

And sometimes its nice to draw the high value German units into TAC range when they deal with the Para's

metolius · Post by **metolius** » Fri Jun 03, 2011 6:46 am

I disagree with the premise –– the Allies could have used airborne more aggressively, if they had been willing to take heavy causalities. With the air dominance that the Allies enjoyed for the last few months, they could probably have taken Tempelhof Airport by storm, and even held out until Soviet troops arrived. Sure, Hitler and Co. would have gone ballistic, but they didn't have any troops left, and even less capacity to move them around (except in their imagination). The resulting panic might have shortened the war by a few months.[/b]

PionUrpo · Post by **PionUrpo** » Fri Jun 03, 2011 7:14 am

I just see Airborne as a deterrent too force Axis to actually garrison places from '42 onward. Just keep cities in range from England garrisoned + unit or two to deal with partisans and this isn't likely to be a problem. After WAllies get to the continent things do get harder though... too hard? I doubt it.

Celeborn · Post by **Celeborn** » Fri Jun 03, 2011 7:07 pm

In my current game the Russians landed in Varna in July 1942 forcing me to detail Rommel and accompanying pipe-hittin' mofos* to clean up a problem that should never have arisen in the first place.

Having been victimized by surprise garrison landings several times (it cost me my last game) I am tempted to criticize the game design that allows such a thing, but the real problem is negligence on my part. Garrisons are not intended to man the front lines except in extremis, they are instead supposed to --you guessed it--garrison.

*more commonly known as armor, mechanized and tactical air

Colonel Klink

rkr1958 · Post by **rkr1958** » Fri Jun 03, 2011 7:34 pm

Airborne Operations During World War II

A very nice summary of airborne operations undertaken during WW-II.

ferokapo · Post by **ferokapo** » Sat Jun 04, 2011 2:17 pm

Plaid wrote:(...)
There is some abstraction in the game. Yes, makes no sence that soviet paras fly over long distance to land in Bucharest and force the surrender, if city is ungarrisoned. But if you keep no troops in capital, revolution may happen there, for example, forcing the country to leave the war. So its way its simulated in the game, I guess.

I agree and I think it does make sense. As Garrisons are the smallest unit available in the game, its absence means that there are no troops whatsoever in Bucharest. None, except maybe some "palast guard" or whatever. So when a whole corps of airbourne troops lands, they can take over the city without any resistance. Considering that it is the capital, it means that the government, the parliament (if there is any), the high command, central administration, communications, etc. etc. all is in their hands. If that is not a reason for surrender for a minor country, then I don't know what is.

rkr1958 · Post by **rkr1958** » Sat Jun 04, 2011 7:46 pm

Here's another interesting article that I dug on airborne operations in WW-II.

AIRBORNE OPERATIONS: A German Appraisal

Originally published: Washington : Dept. of the Army, 1951. Originally published in series: German report series.

FOREWORD

(By Gen. Franz Halder, Chief of Staff of the German Army, 1938-42.)

I concur completely with the ideas of the principal author of this study, which are presented on the basis of his collaboration with the most experienced German specialists.

In view of the present state of technical development, I place a considerably higher estimate on the opportunities for airborne operations in a war between military powers than does the principal author. The latter considers that the essential conditions for the successful use of airborne operations-even on a large scale-exist only in close cooperation with the operations of ground troops.

Assuming that there are sufficiently strong air forces and air transport facilities, I believe that in the future airborne landings by large bodies of troops (several divisions under unified command) can also be used for independent missions, that is, for such military operations as are not closely related in place and time with other ground actions, but are only bound to the latter by the general connections existing between all military operations in the theater of war. It is precisely along these lines that I envisage the future development of airborne warfare. I am convinced that with the proper preparation and present-day technical facilities it is possible to form new military bases by means of large-scale airborne landings far in the enemy's hinterland, in areas where he expects no threat from ground troops and from which independent military operations of large scope can be undertaken. To supply by air such large-scale airheads for the necessary time is essentially a technical problem which can be solved. The independent commitment of large airborne forces seems to offer a present-day high command an effective means for suddenly and decisively confusing the enemy's system of warfare.

Future wars will not be confined to the customary military fronts and combat areas. The battle fronts of opposing ideologies (resistance movements, revolutionary partisan organizations, Irredentist elements), which today in an age of dying nationalism cut through all great powers and civilized nations, will be able to create favorable conditions for large-scale airborne landings deep in the enemy's country and for maintaining such bases of operation as have been won by airborne operations in the interior of the enemy's sovereign territory. To prepare the people in these territories in time and to make them useful in war will be the task of these forces, under a unified command, to which the language of our time has given the name of the "Fifth Column."

THE CONTRIBUTORS

Generalmajor (Brigadier General) Hellmuth Reinhardt, committee chairman and principal author, was Deputy Chief, General Army Office, 1941-43, and later Chief of Staff, Eighth Army, on the southern front in the Ukraine and Romania.

Contributors on German airborne operations:

Generalleutant (Major General) Werner Ehrig, operations officer of the 22d (Army Air Landing) division during the attack on Holland.

Oberst (Colonel) Freiherr von der Heydte, an outstanding field commander of German parachute troops, author of the "Appendix."

Generalfeldmarschall (Field Marshal) Albert Kesselring, commander of the German Second Air Force during the Netherlands campaign, and later Commander in Chief, Southwest.

General der Fallschirmtruppen (Lieutenant General) Eugen Meindl, regimental commander during the attack on Crete, later airborne division and corps commander.

Generalleutant (Major General) Max Pemsel, Chief of Staff, XVIII Corps, which included the ground forces committed in the attack on Crete.

Generaloberst (General) Kurt Student, the chief of German parachute troops during the entire war.

Contributors on Allied airborne operations, and on German defense measures against them:

General der Infanterie (Lieutenant General) Guenther Blumentritt, Chief of Staff, OB West.

Oberst (Colonel) Albert Emmerich, G-3, German First Army.

General der Flakartillerie (Lieutenant General) August Schmidt, in 1944 commander of Luftgau VI, which provided the mobile troops to combat Allied airborne landings at Nijmegen and Arnhem.

General der Kavallerie (Lieutenant General) Siegfried Westphal, the chief of staff of OB Southwest in Sicily and Italy, and later of OB West.

Oberst (Colonel) Fritz Ziegelmann, G-3, 352d Infantry Division.

rkr1958 · Post by **rkr1958** » Sat Jun 04, 2011 9:09 pm

I found the following statement from the contributors to AIRBORNE OPERATIONS: A German Appraisal on being able to maintain secrecy in Italy particularity funny and thought I'd share it with you.

After the airborne operations against Holland and Crete, he [Hilter] believed surprise attacks to be impossible and maintained that the day of successful airborne operations were over. The fact that the Cretan operations came so close to defeat strengthened his opinion. Moreover, the Malta operation would have to be prepared in Italy and launched from there. Prior experience with the Italians had proved that the enemy would be apprised in advance regarding every single detail of the preparations, so that even a partial surprise was impossible.