The Komnenian Byzantine army post 1150

[davidharvey1]

Having lurked through the site up until last summer - when I gave up, not through frustration but having too much else to do, I have never gotten round to finishing the rough the piece below but hoping it might be enough!

For Komnenian Byzantines, i'd make the following points, drawn from the contemporary sources Chonaites and Kinnamos and more modern observers, Prof Paul Magdalino as biographer of Manual I and Birkenmeier's publsihed doctoral thesis on the Komnenian army, amongst others.


The post, 1150 army list as presently drafted shifts from its pre-1150 predecessor, with a largish mercenary contingent, to one dominated by Latinikon, Cuman Varangian and other mercenaries. Particularly, there is a much smaller native regular Kavallarioi contingent (16 elements reduced to 8 ), which had been the centre of the old pre-1071 army and is still substantial in the pre-1150 list. There are no options for superior regular mounted troops or for heavily armoured knight kavallarioi and no armoured kontaratoi - and few of them. Many actual and potential allies are missing. The sources and modern commentators point to an army with a large mercenary contingent but on which was still much more Byzantine in character and composition. Certainly the most detailed battle account - Semlin in 1167 - is of very much a native Byzantine army.

Manual I adopted many Latin practices, including training his own cavalry fight in the Latin style (Choniates and later Prodromos describes Manual’s prowess in tournament). There are fair questions that can be posed. Did Manual I , increase reliance on Latin mercenaries as part of the army, how far did change go? Was there no increase at all? Was the increase related to specific campaigns e.g.1160 and 1176? Was the army simply bigger all around? After all, the expedition of 1176 that met defeat at Myriokephalon was perhaps the largest Byzantine army to take the field after 1071. Answers to most of the above questions remain conjecture based on limited hints and contradictory statements from the sources. Our best sources for list composition are accounts of battles, and the relative descriptions of army compositions that can be inferred.

As a source Choniates is quoted as the misquoted source of the suggestion that the mercenaries took over, (Birkenmeier 101, Magdalino 3) under Manual. , Choniates is not an objective observer (who is), but writes with an agenda driven by the fall of Constantinople 1204 to the hated Latins and part of that agenda is anger at the use of Western -- Latinikon -- soldiers. Anyway, the detail of Choniates account is more balanced. Choniates notes that Manual’s system of military funding meant that "everyone wanted to enlist in the army, and many bade farewell to their trades as tailors and cobblers… while some ran away from their charge of grooming horses and others, washing away the mud brick making and wiping off the soot from working the forge, presented himself to the recruiting office ", suggesting that if mercenary recruitment was up, so was the recruitment of native Byzantines. Choniates accounts of armies are of primarily Byzantine forces.

Kinnamos makes no suggestion of any change in the balance and composition of the army after 1150. As Birkenmeier notes "the army, as it fights its way through the pages of Choniates and Kinnamos, if composed of "native" Byzantine soldiers. The chroniclers describe the presence of many particular foreigners, but Byzantines, Rhomaioi, whatever their ethnic heritage, are usually the officers, and Byzantine natives provide most of the cavalry, (Birkenmeir 161). He concludes , "our sources for Manual’s army show cavalry and infantry, byzantine and foreigners, light troops and heavy, in the same proportions as they appeared in John's (John I Komnenos 1118 -- 1143) expeditions".



What do the battles tell us?

The major encounters and campaigns, described by Kinnamos and/or Choniates, which can give us some indicators as to the likely composition of the Byzantine army after 1150 are listed below

1147 -- Battle between Byzantines and Germans outside Constantinople at the beginning of the second Crusade.
The Byzantines are victorious over the Germans, contingents of Turks and Cumans are specifically mentioned, no Latins are mentioned, the heavy cavalry are Kataphractoi, a term usually used for the native Byzantine heavily armoured cavalry.

1155/1156 campaigns in Apulia
Various actions involve Cumans, foot archers, Byzantines in general and Italians under local counts. Kinnamos specifically describes reinforcements of "Alans and French knights and Romans” - Byzantines would never have referred to themselves as such, they were Romans (Kinnamos 148). Battles descriptions mention Romans and note other contingents, e.g.Bassonville’s Italo-Normans by exception.

Campaigns in Asia, against the Turks, and in Cilicia 1158
Kinnamos mentions local – presumably native - troops -- the emperor ordered the local governor of Seluekia . "to assemble the forces" and await his arrival (Kinnamos 179) .

Campaigns against the Turks in 1160-1161 (Kinnamos 199)
The emperor assembles a large army, including "Lombard knights and summoned the grand zupan of Serbia, with the troops under him.” He also "aware that the landfall for the Latin races bound for Palestine was at the island of Rhodes, he recruited a mercenary band of knights from there”. In 1161, the general John Kontostephanos recruits knights in Palestine and defeat a large army of Turks. A peace treaty is made and the Sultan agrees to provide an ally contingent annually when requested.

Semlin and campaigns against Hungary 1167

The most detailed account, we have of a Byzantine deployment is at the Battle of Semlin against the Hungarians in 1167

"When Andronicus heard this, / 271 / he let him go to report to Dionysius that the emperor, who was unable to endure the injuries which had been inflicted by them on the Romans, was (behold!) at hand to apply the requisite punishment. He led the Romans' army, fully equipped, out of camp. It was drawn up as follows. He ordered the Cumans and most of the Turkish force, together with a few knights who fought with lances, to lead the way, then on either hand followed regiments of Romans, which Kogh Vasil and Philokales commanded, and in addition Tatikios whom they entitle Aspietes. Behind them marched infantry mingled with bowmen and an armoured regiment of Turks. Thereafter, on either hand marched Joseph Bryennios and George Branas and Demetrius his brother, and Constantine Aspietes the sebastos; then both Andronicus by surname Lampardas, who was the emperor's chartoularios, and . . .t7 together with picked Romans and Germans, and also Turks. Andronicus {Kontostephanos] the general marched behind with many other men worthy of note, who usually were arrayed under the emperor when he went to war, and Italians from the mercenary force, as well as Serbs, who followed behind him, holding spears and broad shields."

Here, the Vanguard consists of horse archers, with a few knights , the second line of the army consists entirely of native byzantine cavalry, the third line of infantry, and what appears to be Turkish Ghilman cavalry – cav o or cav s , the following line with a number of byzantine generals had specifically noted Germans -- Latinikon -- with elite byzantine cavalry and Turks, these are not mentioned as armoured and are presumably LHs. The final line comprises what appear to be Imperial bodyguards, Italian knight and Serbs –which Birkenmeir suggests are heavy infantry (I can find no evidence as to the latter and think it more likely that they are Serbian knights).

This army composition does not look particularly like the existing list. There appear to be only two full units of Latins, plus a few knights in the vanguard and many more native Byzantine cavalry. The Turks present seem to be fighting as subunits of the Byzantine army with ghilman amongst them, there are also Serbs.

It is notable here, as it is throughout both Kinnamos and Choniates, that non-native contingents, whether long-term military settlers within the empire, such as the Cumans, or mercenaries are worthy of specific mention when the authors are able to give any detail about the battle .

Campaigns in Anatolia 1175/1176,
Kinnamos breaks off at the beginning of the campaign of Myriokephalion, which he says starts late as the Serbian and Hungarians allies "did not arrive at the right moment" . Choniates states that the "Emperor collected the existing forces and augmented their numbers with fresh recruits. He also enlisted not a few mercenaries, especially from among the Latin race, and from Cumans along the Danube" (Choniates 178). It is notable that it is the crusader ally division of Baldwin of Antioch, brother of the Empress, not the Prince of Antioch, that breaks in the defeat - Baldwin is killed trying to escape with his knights. The rest of the Byzantine army comes through, what may or may not have been a disaster -- there are different views on n how serious the defeat was --; the army of Manual I is far more resilient than that defeated at Manzikert by the Turks the century before. Choniates notes (Choniates 178/9) that Manual is rescued by a native cavalryman , and then by another 10 Roman troops .

1177
The Turks invade the Aegean coast, with 24,000 men to exploit Myriokephalion (Choniates 193) and are crushingly defeated by an army led by the emperor's nephew John Vatatzes. Romans are mentioned, and the Turkish commander was killed by an Alan ally

What do these accounts tell us about the Byzantine army?
Much depends on what is interpreted by the term Roman as used in the sources for native Byzantines. Does it apply only to native Romans settled in the empire, which would include military colonists such as many Patzinaks and Cumans? Alternatively, does it simply mean, a Roman army, even if composed entirely of mercenaries?

On balance I am clear. In the accounts above Choniates and Kinnamos draw specific attention to the presence of mercenaries such as Germans, French, Lombards and Turks. John Kontostephanos specifically recruits, Western knights in Palestine to win his victory in 1160. Skythikon – Cumans and Patzinak military settlers - are referred to by Kinnamos as the Scyths , who normally fight with the Romans, to distinguish them from general mercenaries. This suggests that the term Roman's primarily refers to native troops. Certainly, the balance of the Byzantine army at Semlin is substantially more Byzantine and less Latin than the current list allows.

revising the lists

Kavalliaori - numbers and classes

The evidence -- such as it is nearly 9 centuries later -- suggests that the post 1150 Byzantine list needs to be rebalanced toward a more substantial native Kavallarioi contingent, while still reflecting the extensive recruitment of mercenaries. i would suggest:

* that up to 16 Kavaliaroi are allowed as armoured knights, .
* The account of Semlin and several other passages in Kinnamos and Choniates points to elite troops around the Emperor and to elite units thus up to 8 Kavaliaroi should be upgradable to superior (or perhaps up to hal of those present). Battle performance suggests this - John I and Manual I both defeat armies of Western and Hungarian knights and so so as their forces are suggested to combine proficiency and prowess. The battles are head to head collisions, not ambushes or strategems; for instance the defeat of the Germans in 1147. Kinnamos also suggests native household troops being used for fast raiding campaigns eg against the serbs and distinguishes elite vanguard units.
* The maxium Latinikon should remain as is, but the recruitment of crusaders on an ad hoc basis seems to me, from the accounts above, to be the way that numbers were pushed up for specific campaigns thus above a certain level any additional latinikon should have to be irregular.

Other issues are thrown up by the sources which may point to further amends in the list

Allies

1. Serbian vessels - After successful campaigns against the Serbs in 1150 (Kinnamos 112/113) the grand zupan agrees to provide 2000 men in Europe, and " for fighting in Asia, he would send 200 in addition to the previously customary 300". Serbs were also present in 1176 and the campaign was delayed to await their arrival. Although often called on in Kinnamos, the Serbs were not reliable allies and should remain as allies, except to allow a small 4 base unit of cavalry in the main list . The Serbs revolted after Manual I's death in 1180.

2. Hungarians - Kinnamos describes Hungarians allies being called to fight in the army 0f 1176, .

3. Georgians - during the campaign in Apulia Kinnamos mentions Georgians fighting in the Roman army . "They sent them with Georgians and Alans to skirmish" (Kinnamos 168). so a unit of 4 Georgian lancers

4. Turks -- the deployment of the Turkish contingent at Semlin is throughout the divisions of the army, not as a separate ally contingent. particularly Turkish heavy cavalry are mentioned so a unit of 4 ghilman heavy horse archers should be allowed in the body of the list.

Kontaratoi

5. Kontaratoi - no one talks about the performance of the poor bloody infantry very much, whosever's army they are in, so this is more conjectural.

The byzantine economy of the C12th was the wealthiest in the middle east or Europe see Harvey on the Byzantine economy. Economically it seems odd that there is no option to upgrade kontaratoi to armoured when the impoverished crusaders and Armenians get it. Tim Dawson and David Nicolle both point to the superiority of Byzantine armour over most of the alternatives on the market, certainly in the West. Anna Komnena states that heavy infantry should have at least fabric armour and that's in the 1120s. The counter arguement is performance - the arguement that Byzantine foot did not perform well. I put it that their peformance was no worse or better than their counterparts and they seem to have gotten through the 1176 campaign and not fallen apart, unlike the latin division. There is no more evidence for armoured crusader or armoured infantry than for Byzantine so they should have the option.

Very conjecturally, the focus on cavalry service in the sources makes it difficult to estimate infantry composition or numbers. However, the numbers of sieges and the use of fortifications suggests a large infantry contingent. Compared to other armies 8 kontoratoi does not seem enough - 12 seems better. up to 6 upgradable to armoured.


My starters for 10!

David [/b][/list]

[PaulByzan]

Excellent analysis David. Much of what you stated for the Byzantine infantry of the Komnenan period holds true for the early Macedonian period under the later 10th Century emperors, especially Basil II. Your statement that other army lists are allowed armored foot with no more or less proof than the Byzantines having it is well taken.

Paul G.

Having lurked through the site up until last summer - when I gave up, not through frustration but having too much else to do, I have never gotten round to finishing the rough the piece below but hoping it might be enough!

For Komnenian Byzantines, i'd make the following points, drawn from the contemporary sources Chonaites and Kinnamos and more modern observers, Prof Paul Magdalino as biographer of Manual I and Birkenmeier's publsihed doctoral thesis on the Komnenian army, amongst others.


The post, 1150 army list as presently drafted shifts from its pre-1150 predecessor, with a largish mercenary contingent, to one dominated by Latinikon, Cuman Varangian and other mercenaries. Particularly, there is a much smaller native regular Kavallarioi contingent (16 elements reduced to 8 ), which had been the centre of the old pre-1071 army and is still substantial in the pre-1150 list. There are no options for superior regular mounted troops or for heavily armoured knight kavallarioi and no armoured kontaratoi - and few of them. Many actual and potential allies are missing. The sources and modern commentators point to an army with a large mercenary contingent but on which was still much more Byzantine in character and composition. Certainly the most detailed battle account - Semlin in 1167 - is of very much a native Byzantine army.

Manual I adopted many Latin practices, including training his own cavalry fight in the Latin style (Choniates and later Prodromos describes Manual’s prowess in tournament). There are fair questions that can be posed. Did Manual I , increase reliance on Latin mercenaries as part of the army, how far did change go? Was there no increase at all? Was the increase related to specific campaigns e.g.1160 and 1176? Was the army simply bigger all around? After all, the expedition of 1176 that met defeat at Myriokephalon was perhaps the largest Byzantine army to take the field after 1071. Answers to most of the above questions remain conjecture based on limited hints and contradictory statements from the sources. Our best sources for list composition are accounts of battles, and the relative descriptions of army compositions that can be inferred.

As a source Choniates is quoted as the misquoted source of the suggestion that the mercenaries took over, (Birkenmeier 101, Magdalino 3) under Manual. , Choniates is not an objective observer (who is), but writes with an agenda driven by the fall of Constantinople 1204 to the hated Latins and part of that agenda is anger at the use of Western -- Latinikon -- soldiers. Anyway, the detail of Choniates account is more balanced. Choniates notes that Manual’s system of military funding meant that "everyone wanted to enlist in the army, and many bade farewell to their trades as tailors and cobblers… while some ran away from their charge of grooming horses and others, washing away the mud brick making and wiping off the soot from working the forge, presented himself to the recruiting office ", suggesting that if mercenary recruitment was up, so was the recruitment of native Byzantines. Choniates accounts of armies are of primarily Byzantine forces.

Kinnamos makes no suggestion of any change in the balance and composition of the army after 1150. As Birkenmeier notes "the army, as it fights its way through the pages of Choniates and Kinnamos, if composed of "native" Byzantine soldiers. The chroniclers describe the presence of many particular foreigners, but Byzantines, Rhomaioi, whatever their ethnic heritage, are usually the officers, and Byzantine natives provide most of the cavalry, (Birkenmeir 161). He concludes , "our sources for Manual’s army show cavalry and infantry, byzantine and foreigners, light troops and heavy, in the same proportions as they appeared in John's (John I Komnenos 1118 -- 1143) expeditions".



What do the battles tell us?

The major encounters and campaigns, described by Kinnamos and/or Choniates, which can give us some indicators as to the likely composition of the Byzantine army after 1150 are listed below

1147 -- Battle between Byzantines and Germans outside Constantinople at the beginning of the second Crusade.
The Byzantines are victorious over the Germans, contingents of Turks and Cumans are specifically mentioned, no Latins are mentioned, the heavy cavalry are Kataphractoi, a term usually used for the native Byzantine heavily armoured cavalry.

1155/1156 campaigns in Apulia
Various actions involve Cumans, foot archers, Byzantines in general and Italians under local counts. Kinnamos specifically describes reinforcements of "Alans and French knights and Romans” - Byzantines would never have referred to themselves as such, they were Romans (Kinnamos 148). Battles descriptions mention Romans and note other contingents, e.g.Bassonville’s Italo-Normans by exception.

Campaigns in Asia, against the Turks, and in Cilicia 1158
Kinnamos mentions local – presumably native - troops -- the emperor ordered the local governor of Seluekia . "to assemble the forces" and await his arrival (Kinnamos 179) .

Campaigns against the Turks in 1160-1161 (Kinnamos 199)
The emperor assembles a large army, including "Lombard knights and summoned the grand zupan of Serbia, with the troops under him.” He also "aware that the landfall for the Latin races bound for Palestine was at the island of Rhodes, he recruited a mercenary band of knights from there”. In 1161, the general John Kontostephanos recruits knights in Palestine and defeat a large army of Turks. A peace treaty is made and the Sultan agrees to provide an ally contingent annually when requested.

Semlin and campaigns against Hungary 1167

The most detailed account, we have of a Byzantine deployment is at the Battle of Semlin against the Hungarians in 1167

"When Andronicus heard this, / 271 / he let him go to report to Dionysius that the emperor, who was unable to endure the injuries which had been inflicted by them on the Romans, was (behold!) at hand to apply the requisite punishment. He led the Romans' army, fully equipped, out of camp. It was drawn up as follows. He ordered the Cumans and most of the Turkish force, together with a few knights who fought with lances, to lead the way, then on either hand followed regiments of Romans, which Kogh Vasil and Philokales commanded, and in addition Tatikios whom they entitle Aspietes. Behind them marched infantry mingled with bowmen and an armoured regiment of Turks. Thereafter, on either hand marched Joseph Bryennios and George Branas and Demetrius his brother, and Constantine Aspietes the sebastos; then both Andronicus by surname Lampardas, who was the emperor's chartoularios, and . . .t7 together with picked Romans and Germans, and also Turks. Andronicus {Kontostephanos] the general marched behind with many other men worthy of note, who usually were arrayed under the emperor when he went to war, and Italians from the mercenary force, as well as Serbs, who followed behind him, holding spears and broad shields."

Here, the Vanguard consists of horse archers, with a few knights , the second line of the army consists entirely of native byzantine cavalry, the third line of infantry, and what appears to be Turkish Ghilman cavalry – cav o or cav s , the following line with a number of byzantine generals had specifically noted Germans -- Latinikon -- with elite byzantine cavalry and Turks, these are not mentioned as armoured and are presumably LHs. The final line comprises what appear to be Imperial bodyguards, Italian knight and Serbs –which Birkenmeir suggests are heavy infantry (I can find no evidence as to the latter and think it more likely that they are Serbian knights).

This army composition does not look particularly like the existing list. There appear to be only two full units of Latins, plus a few knights in the vanguard and many more native Byzantine cavalry. The Turks present seem to be fighting as subunits of the Byzantine army with ghilman amongst them, there are also Serbs.

It is notable here, as it is throughout both Kinnamos and Choniates, that non-native contingents, whether long-term military settlers within the empire, such as the Cumans, or mercenaries are worthy of specific mention when the authors are able to give any detail about the battle .

Campaigns in Anatolia 1175/1176,
Kinnamos breaks off at the beginning of the campaign of Myriokephalion, which he says starts late as the Serbian and Hungarians allies "did not arrive at the right moment" . Choniates states that the "Emperor collected the existing forces and augmented their numbers with fresh recruits. He also enlisted not a few mercenaries, especially from among the Latin race, and from Cumans along the Danube" (Choniates 178). It is notable that it is the crusader ally division of Baldwin of Antioch, brother of the Empress, not the Prince of Antioch, that breaks in the defeat - Baldwin is killed trying to escape with his knights. The rest of the Byzantine army comes through, what may or may not have been a disaster -- there are different views on n how serious the defeat was --; the army of Manual I is far more resilient than that defeated at Manzikert by the Turks the century before. Choniates notes (Choniates 178/9) that Manual is rescued by a native cavalryman , and then by another 10 Roman troops .

1177
The Turks invade the Aegean coast, with 24,000 men to exploit Myriokephalion (Choniates 193) and are crushingly defeated by an army led by the emperor's nephew John Vatatzes. Romans are mentioned, and the Turkish commander was killed by an Alan ally

What do these accounts tell us about the Byzantine army?
Much depends on what is interpreted by the term Roman as used in the sources for native Byzantines. Does it apply only to native Romans settled in the empire, which would include military colonists such as many Patzinaks and Cumans? Alternatively, does it simply mean, a Roman army, even if composed entirely of mercenaries?

On balance I am clear. In the accounts above Choniates and Kinnamos draw specific attention to the presence of mercenaries such as Germans, French, Lombards and Turks. John Kontostephanos specifically recruits, Western knights in Palestine to win his victory in 1160. Skythikon – Cumans and Patzinak military settlers - are referred to by Kinnamos as the Scyths , who normally fight with the Romans, to distinguish them from general mercenaries. This suggests that the term Roman's primarily refers to native troops. Certainly, the balance of the Byzantine army at Semlin is substantially more Byzantine and less Latin than the current list allows.

revising the lists

Kavalliaori - numbers and classes

The evidence -- such as it is nearly 9 centuries later -- suggests that the post 1150 Byzantine list needs to be rebalanced toward a more substantial native Kavallarioi contingent, while still reflecting the extensive recruitment of mercenaries. i would suggest:

* that up to 16 Kavaliaroi are allowed as armoured knights, .
* The account of Semlin and several other passages in Kinnamos and Choniates points to elite troops around the Emperor and to elite units thus up to 8 Kavaliaroi should be upgradable to superior (or perhaps up to hal of those present). Battle performance suggests this - John I and Manual I both defeat armies of Western and Hungarian knights and so so as their forces are suggested to combine proficiency and prowess. The battles are head to head collisions, not ambushes or strategems; for instance the defeat of the Germans in 1147. Kinnamos also suggests native household troops being used for fast raiding campaigns eg against the serbs and distinguishes elite vanguard units.
* The maxium Latinikon should remain as is, but the recruitment of crusaders on an ad hoc basis seems to me, from the accounts above, to be the way that numbers were pushed up for specific campaigns thus above a certain level any additional latinikon should have to be irregular.

Other issues are thrown up by the sources which may point to further amends in the list

Allies

1. Serbian vessels - After successful campaigns against the Serbs in 1150 (Kinnamos 112/113) the grand zupan agrees to provide 2000 men in Europe, and " for fighting in Asia, he would send 200 in addition to the previously customary 300". Serbs were also present in 1176 and the campaign was delayed to await their arrival. Although often called on in Kinnamos, the Serbs were not reliable allies and should remain as allies, except to allow a small 4 base unit of cavalry in the main list . The Serbs revolted after Manual I's death in 1180.

2. Hungarians - Kinnamos describes Hungarians allies being called to fight in the army 0f 1176, .

3. Georgians - during the campaign in Apulia Kinnamos mentions Georgians fighting in the Roman army . "They sent them with Georgians and Alans to skirmish" (Kinnamos 168). so a unit of 4 Georgian lancers

4. Turks -- the deployment of the Turkish contingent at Semlin is throughout the divisions of the army, not as a separate ally contingent. particularly Turkish heavy cavalry are mentioned so a unit of 4 ghilman heavy horse archers should be allowed in the body of the list.

Kontaratoi

5. Kontaratoi - no one talks about the performance of the poor bloody infantry very much, whosever's army they are in, so this is more conjectural.

The byzantine economy of the C12th was the wealthiest in the middle east or Europe see Harvey on the Byzantine economy. Economically it seems odd that there is no option to upgrade kontaratoi to armoured when the impoverished crusaders and Armenians get it. Tim Dawson and David Nicolle both point to the superiority of Byzantine armour over most of the alternatives on the market, certainly in the West. Anna Komnena states that heavy infantry should have at least fabric armour and that's in the 1120s. The counter arguement is performance - the arguement that Byzantine foot did not perform well. I put it that their peformance was no worse or better than their counterparts and they seem to have gotten through the 1176 campaign and not fallen apart, unlike the latin division. There is no more evidence for armoured crusader or armoured infantry than for Byzantine so they should have the option.

Very conjecturally, the focus on cavalry service in the sources makes it difficult to estimate infantry composition or numbers. However, the numbers of sieges and the use of fortifications suggests a large infantry contingent. Compared to other armies 8 kontoratoi does not seem enough - 12 seems better. up to 6 upgradable to armoured.


My starters for 10!

David [/b][/list]

[davidharvey1]

Agree with you Paul on earlier Byzantine infantry. I am rushing through George Dennis's translation of the Strategicon of Leo VI and will try and put some thought up - but it does seem to re-inforce your point that Byzantines are sometimes "qualitied down" to the lower end of performance when others are given every benefit of the doubt. Leon describes how troops should be equipped, clearly they were not always so; they were not always as well trained and led as they should be but equally when describing the ideal, it is clear that some units would have been equipped/performed at that level and the author appears to write from a detailed knowledge of warfare. Again there seems to be no reason not to allow the option to upgrade a proportion of Nikephorian (a smaller proportion as the number of infantry was so expanded) and certainly later thematic infantry to armoured infantry.

The questions about performance also remain, the usual Byzantine deployment of 2 ranks, one lancers and one horse archers, reflected in the strategicon just does not work against historical opponents. The army that conquered the Arab emirates between 910 and 960 arguably would not have done so as constrained in FOG today, opposed by the massed bedouin, Daylaimi and superior cavalry of the Hamdanids

David

[philqw78]

Your statement that other army lists are allowed armored foot with no more or less proof than the Byzantines having it is well taken.

But surely it is about effect against actual opponents not just equipment. Were Byzantine foot at the time better in impact and melee than their mounted opponents, and as good in impact but better in melee than their foot opponents? If not all their opponents need upgrading as well.

[nikgaukroger]

Your statement that other army lists are allowed armored foot with no more or less proof than the Byzantines having it is well taken.

But surely it is about effect against actual opponents not just equipment. Were Byzantine foot at the time better in impact and melee than their mounted opponents, and as good in impact but better in melee than their foot opponents? If not all their opponents need upgrading as well.

Phil touches on a very important point. Inevitably the historical record is patchy and open to interpretation in the vast majority of cases, plus in FoG there are really very few absolutes in terms of what constitutes classification (the rules definitions are, at best, guidelines) - thus in many cases a judgement call is needed and we look for the classification that gets the best results in historical representation of the troops in question and the army overall. Thus, in absolute terms, some troops do indeed get the benefit of the doubt whilst others do not even though the evidence may be more or less the same for both.

[davidharvey1]

Really not impressed by the "surprised" surely Most other nations seem just to get the benefit of the doubt that says "they could have so they should have it", whereas byzantines get "computer says no", even when source material is provided

the point is that Byzantine army lists should:

a) be based on the sources - Kinnamos and Choniates make it as clear as any source does that the later Komnenan list is wrong both in terms of composition and performance - no one has provided source material either here on on other lists that gives any suggestion that the current list is either right or at least arguable based on the sources. Likewise Leon VI makes it clear that armour was often available for some foot units and to get winning interactions that reflect the Byzantines winning performances in the C10th this is not unreasonable.

b) be based on what we know about performance; on the Komnenon list we know that Byzantine native horse often took on and matched or defeated knights. On the question of infantry performance, we upgrade armenian and crusader foot with armour when their is no evidence of them always beating Byzantine foot. Before the collapse in the 1190s, the byzantines win most of their battles and what evidence we have suggests that their foot performed as well as crusader infantry, they defeated germans at Constintiniple in 1147 and a sicilian Norman army in 1185. I know this is not a PHD thesis of evidence but it's as much as we have for anyone else. On the question of earlier byzantine cavalry ve Arab lancers, I think all players are looking for is equal treatment, not that they should be superior. if Arab armies are going to tend to defeat byzantine at the time that Generals like Ionnes Kurakas were regularly winning most - not all - encounters then the current options do not allow for a correct interaction. equally, in the C8th Ghilman decisively defeated byzantine thematics on several occasions and so the lists need to provide for that too.

In summary , there is performance evidence that should allow byzantines to have the limited upgrade option others get, not to be a super army but to reflect the army at upper /equipment rather than just mediicore. I don't give protected Hi kontoratoi much of a chance against Hamdanid daylami (still trying to get the source evidence for these), an armoured unit has a chance - the Byzantines won by the way.

if byzantines should not have the above options, where is the source and performance evidence that says so? I have been challenging folks for years to come back with evidence that the C12th byzantine was substantially mercenary, rather than a Byzantine army with a large mercenary contingent, and no one can or seems to want to.

Where we have some eidence, let the opition in , this way you pays your points and chooses your army, whether you want the army of constantine V, average troops or Constantine VII, a much more powerful but expensive proposition.

[davidharvey1]

i suppose i would add to Nik's last point the PS - how is the interaction where the Byzanines have, say no option to upgrade some protected to armoured kontaratoi and some Kavalliaroi to superior armoured knights right ? the lists as published tend to non historical interactions where crusader / Hungarian knights man for man always win and Armenian / crusader infantry likewise; not to mention the interaction between Umneyed lancers and thematic cavalry.

i had forgotten how much I enjoy this debate ![/b]

[nikgaukroger]

i suppose i would add to Nik's last point the PS - how is the interaction where the Byzanines have, say no option to upgrade some protected to armoured kontaratoi and some Kavalliaroi to superior armoured knights right ? the lists as published tend to non historical interactions where crusader / Hungarian knights man for man always win and Armenian / crusader infantry likewise; not to mention the interaction between Umneyed lancers and thematic cavalry.

i had forgotten how much I enjoy this debate ![/b]

This is why we have asked for input.

BTW - Umayyad

[davidharvey1]

but how many "y"s in Arabic ?

D