Better C12th Byzantine cavalry
Moderator: rbodleyscott
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davidharvey1
- Corporal - Strongpoint
- Posts: 54
- Joined: Sat Apr 12, 2008 3:08 pm
Better C12th Byzantine cavalry
Would somone kindly humour me - later C12 Byzantine lancers - reign of Manual Komnenos - are massively underpowered and will be beaten by any knights going. The primary sources suggest that they were in fact, as good as most knights, if slightly less impetuous, more resilient, after the mid C12th reforms and able to fight broadly as equals. Could someone kindly point me to a guide to how I modify the stats or create a C12th lancer category - thanks
Re: Better C12th Byzantine cavalry
I'm curious about this characterization. Choniates was rather full of praises of Latin knights. Kinnamos boasted about victory over German pilgrims during the 2nd crusade but also said (anachronically) Germans preferred to fight on foot.
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davidharvey1
- Corporal - Strongpoint
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- Joined: Sat Apr 12, 2008 3:08 pm
Re: Better C12th Byzantine cavalry
The issue is not whether Niketas Choniates admired Latin knights — he plainly did, at least in military terms. The real question is whether the sources imply that *native* Byzantine cavalry under Manuel I Komnenos had evolved sufficiently to meet western cavalry on roughly equal terms in shock combat. There is good evidence that they had.
I agrre that both Choniates and Kinnamos admired Latin cavalry, but I think the primary sources are more nuanced than “Byzantines bad, knights superior”. Under Manuel I there is fairly strong evidence for the deliberate adaptation of western cavalry methods by at least parts of the native Roman cavalry arm.
Kinnamos explicitly stresses Manuel’s admiration for Latin military practice and says he preferred Latin armour and military exercises. Importantly, this is not presented merely as hiring Frankish mercenaries, but as influencing the imperial army itself.
By Manuel’s reign Byzantine cavalry are repeatedly described conducting disciplined shock action with the lance in ways increasingly difficult to distinguish from western knightly tactics — particularly in the Hungarian wars and at Sirmium (1167).
Even Choniates’ criticisms arguably support this indirectly. His complaints about Manuel’s fascination with western tournaments, martial customs and Latin practices only make sense if these were becoming embedded in the military aristocracy itself.
The poetic evidence is interesting too. Theodore Prodromos and related panegyrists increasingly describe mailed cavalry, dense mounted assault, iron-clad horsemen and aggressive lance combat. The imagery is much closer to knightly shock warfare than older depictions of Byzantine cavalry.
I do not think this means the Byzantines became “Franks”. They still retained combined-arms doctrine, operational flexibility and mounted archery traditions. But I do think the sources support the argument that later C12 Byzantine native lancers were intended to fight western cavalry on broadly equal terms, albeit probably with slightly more discipline and less impetuosity.
So in game terms, I think the current “inferior knight” treatment is probably too weak for Manueline native lancer cavalry after the mid-century reforms.
I agrre that both Choniates and Kinnamos admired Latin cavalry, but I think the primary sources are more nuanced than “Byzantines bad, knights superior”. Under Manuel I there is fairly strong evidence for the deliberate adaptation of western cavalry methods by at least parts of the native Roman cavalry arm.
Kinnamos explicitly stresses Manuel’s admiration for Latin military practice and says he preferred Latin armour and military exercises. Importantly, this is not presented merely as hiring Frankish mercenaries, but as influencing the imperial army itself.
By Manuel’s reign Byzantine cavalry are repeatedly described conducting disciplined shock action with the lance in ways increasingly difficult to distinguish from western knightly tactics — particularly in the Hungarian wars and at Sirmium (1167).
Even Choniates’ criticisms arguably support this indirectly. His complaints about Manuel’s fascination with western tournaments, martial customs and Latin practices only make sense if these were becoming embedded in the military aristocracy itself.
The poetic evidence is interesting too. Theodore Prodromos and related panegyrists increasingly describe mailed cavalry, dense mounted assault, iron-clad horsemen and aggressive lance combat. The imagery is much closer to knightly shock warfare than older depictions of Byzantine cavalry.
I do not think this means the Byzantines became “Franks”. They still retained combined-arms doctrine, operational flexibility and mounted archery traditions. But I do think the sources support the argument that later C12 Byzantine native lancers were intended to fight western cavalry on broadly equal terms, albeit probably with slightly more discipline and less impetuosity.
So in game terms, I think the current “inferior knight” treatment is probably too weak for Manueline native lancer cavalry after the mid-century reforms.
Re: Better C12th Byzantine cavalry
Possibly but unfortunately there was no 'head to head' battle between Manuel's army and Western knights during his reign to be definitive. Less than a decade after his death however, as Frederick Barbarossa's army marched right through the empire, the Byzantine army did not dare give battle.
"As he was approaching the city gate one Tuesday, and was drawing up his knights in squadrons either to fight the enemy in the open or for an attack on the city itself, lo they saw the enemy in arms outside the gates, observing our men. They seemed as if they were about to do something significant, and to offer the battle that was desired to our men, but this was far from the case, for as soon as they heard the noise of the sergeants and squires [pueri militiari] rushing noisily upon them they shamefully turned tail, and sought safety by fleeing through the opposite gate of the city and climbing up into the mountains." "The army of the most Holy Cross pursued the Greek forces wherever they went, and sometimes passed through their deserted camps, but they never brought them to battle." (The History of the Expedition of the Emperor Frederick)
Of course, this could have been for other reasons than the weakness of the Byzantine cavalry but historical records are clear that whenever Byzantine cavalry came up against Western knights, they did not perform well; and Byzantine historians themselves did not hide that fact. That doesn't preclude the hypothesis that during a short period of Manuel's reign, during say the Hungarian wars, they were their equal. I will have something to say about that when I do a write up on Sirmium.
I had collected a few quotes regarding the topic during the fourth crusade:
https://www.militaryhistorywithfog.com/odrin-1205-ad
"As he was approaching the city gate one Tuesday, and was drawing up his knights in squadrons either to fight the enemy in the open or for an attack on the city itself, lo they saw the enemy in arms outside the gates, observing our men. They seemed as if they were about to do something significant, and to offer the battle that was desired to our men, but this was far from the case, for as soon as they heard the noise of the sergeants and squires [pueri militiari] rushing noisily upon them they shamefully turned tail, and sought safety by fleeing through the opposite gate of the city and climbing up into the mountains." "The army of the most Holy Cross pursued the Greek forces wherever they went, and sometimes passed through their deserted camps, but they never brought them to battle." (The History of the Expedition of the Emperor Frederick)
Of course, this could have been for other reasons than the weakness of the Byzantine cavalry but historical records are clear that whenever Byzantine cavalry came up against Western knights, they did not perform well; and Byzantine historians themselves did not hide that fact. That doesn't preclude the hypothesis that during a short period of Manuel's reign, during say the Hungarian wars, they were their equal. I will have something to say about that when I do a write up on Sirmium.
I had collected a few quotes regarding the topic during the fourth crusade:
https://www.militaryhistorywithfog.com/odrin-1205-ad
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davidharvey1
- Corporal - Strongpoint
- Posts: 54
- Joined: Sat Apr 12, 2008 3:08 pm
Re: Better C12th Byzantine cavalry
That is fair caution, but I think the Barbarossa episode is doing too much work here.
The Byzantine tradition was not “seek a chivalric test of arms”. It was almost the opposite. The military manuals, from the Strategikon through Leo VI and later tactical writing, repeatedly warn against offering pitched battle unless the circumstances are favourable. George Dennis summarises the tradition well: Byzantine commanders were advised not to fight simply to overpower the enemy face-to-face, and “a wise commander” should not engage in pitched battle unless a genuinely exceptional opportunity or advantage presented itself.
So a Byzantine army shadowing Barbarossa but refusing open battle is not, by itself, proof that its cavalry were inferior. It may simply show that the Romans were behaving like Romans.
Looking after the accession of John II, I do not think the evidence gives a simple pattern of Byzantine cavalry collapsing whenever it met knight-style troops. John’s campaigns in Cilicia and Syria show the imperial army operating effectively against Armenians and Antiochenes in a military environment already heavily influenced by Latin warfare. Cilician Armenia was not a purely eastern or steppe-style opponent; its ruling elite had close contact with the Crusader states and increasingly operated in a westernised military-political world.
Under Manuel the evidence is stronger still. In the Hungarian wars the Byzantines were not fighting a primitive cavalry force. Hungarian armies by the mid-twelfth century had substantial western influence and could draw on allies and military traditions from the German imperial frontier world.
At Sirmium/Semlin in 1167, the Roman army fought a serious central European opponent in a set-piece battle and won decisively. Kinnamos presents the Byzantine cavalry arm operating aggressively and effectively in close battle, not merely skirmishing or avoiding contact. Choniates likewise describes the Hungarians being broken and scattered. That is not the language of a cavalry arm incapable of operating against western-style mounted opponents.
The Armenian evidence is also interesting. In John II’s Cilician campaign, Choniates presents Armenian resistance as brave, well-armed and aristocratic, not as light skirmishing. The military culture of Cilician Armenia by this period had already absorbed considerable western influence. Again, this is not proof that Armenians were “French knights”, but it does show the Byzantines operating successfully in a military environment increasingly shaped by heavily armoured lance cavalry.
The negative examples are much less conclusive. Myriokephalon was an ambush and marching-column disaster against Turks, not a clean cavalry test against knights. Barbarossa’s march was after Manuel, under a weaker Angeloi regime, and occurred in a strategic crisis where refusing battle was entirely consistent with Byzantine doctrine. The Fourth Crusade period is later again, after major institutional decay.
So I agree that we cannot prove Manueline native lancers were equal to the best western knights. But I do think the sources support a more generous rating than “inferior knights”. The better formulation might be: native Roman lancer cavalry under Manuel should be competent shock cavalry, less impetuous than western knights, still embedded in a combined-arms system, but not automatically outclassed by knightly opponents.
I explored some of this in more detail in my article on the Manueline army in Slingshot 341, particularly regarding cavalry evolution, tactical adaptation and the interaction between Roman and western methods under Manuel. Happy to share a copy if of interest.
The Byzantine tradition was not “seek a chivalric test of arms”. It was almost the opposite. The military manuals, from the Strategikon through Leo VI and later tactical writing, repeatedly warn against offering pitched battle unless the circumstances are favourable. George Dennis summarises the tradition well: Byzantine commanders were advised not to fight simply to overpower the enemy face-to-face, and “a wise commander” should not engage in pitched battle unless a genuinely exceptional opportunity or advantage presented itself.
So a Byzantine army shadowing Barbarossa but refusing open battle is not, by itself, proof that its cavalry were inferior. It may simply show that the Romans were behaving like Romans.
Looking after the accession of John II, I do not think the evidence gives a simple pattern of Byzantine cavalry collapsing whenever it met knight-style troops. John’s campaigns in Cilicia and Syria show the imperial army operating effectively against Armenians and Antiochenes in a military environment already heavily influenced by Latin warfare. Cilician Armenia was not a purely eastern or steppe-style opponent; its ruling elite had close contact with the Crusader states and increasingly operated in a westernised military-political world.
Under Manuel the evidence is stronger still. In the Hungarian wars the Byzantines were not fighting a primitive cavalry force. Hungarian armies by the mid-twelfth century had substantial western influence and could draw on allies and military traditions from the German imperial frontier world.
At Sirmium/Semlin in 1167, the Roman army fought a serious central European opponent in a set-piece battle and won decisively. Kinnamos presents the Byzantine cavalry arm operating aggressively and effectively in close battle, not merely skirmishing or avoiding contact. Choniates likewise describes the Hungarians being broken and scattered. That is not the language of a cavalry arm incapable of operating against western-style mounted opponents.
The Armenian evidence is also interesting. In John II’s Cilician campaign, Choniates presents Armenian resistance as brave, well-armed and aristocratic, not as light skirmishing. The military culture of Cilician Armenia by this period had already absorbed considerable western influence. Again, this is not proof that Armenians were “French knights”, but it does show the Byzantines operating successfully in a military environment increasingly shaped by heavily armoured lance cavalry.
The negative examples are much less conclusive. Myriokephalon was an ambush and marching-column disaster against Turks, not a clean cavalry test against knights. Barbarossa’s march was after Manuel, under a weaker Angeloi regime, and occurred in a strategic crisis where refusing battle was entirely consistent with Byzantine doctrine. The Fourth Crusade period is later again, after major institutional decay.
So I agree that we cannot prove Manueline native lancers were equal to the best western knights. But I do think the sources support a more generous rating than “inferior knights”. The better formulation might be: native Roman lancer cavalry under Manuel should be competent shock cavalry, less impetuous than western knights, still embedded in a combined-arms system, but not automatically outclassed by knightly opponents.
I explored some of this in more detail in my article on the Manueline army in Slingshot 341, particularly regarding cavalry evolution, tactical adaptation and the interaction between Roman and western methods under Manuel. Happy to share a copy if of interest.