Quick Battle Report

[SirGarnet]

So, yes, infantry in line was certain defeat vs. cavalry if that infantry did not have secure flanks, which after all is the only combat/tactical advantage a square offers.

I mentioned above the additional advantages of squares against cavalry assault beyond not being subject to being taken in flank, which, as you said, a steady linear battle line also offered. Among these, the micro-tactical advantages of reduced exposed frontage of are too often forgotten.

[MikeHorah]

Keep in mind that it was unusual for infantry in the 18th century to form squares to counter cavalry. There's very little, if any, combat difference (i.e., muskets that can fire or bayonets that can reach the cavalry) between the centre of a line and the centre of a square's face against cavalry. The advantage is that the square has no flanks. The 18th century "grand tactical" line (i.e., with battalions arranged in a line) did the same thing by having battalions "shoulder to shoulder"; the commander need only worry about protecting the end of the whole line (i.e., secured by difficult terrain, with supporting cavalry, troops in depth, etc.). The 18th century "cavalry versus infantry" doctrine viewed cavalry charging the face of an infantry battalion as sure defeat and that cavalry should aim for gaps / ends of lines. If this were not true there is little reason for the demise of the pikeman when retaining a small number of pikeman was the standard counter-cavalry tactic for infantry up until 1700.

What's different in the Napleonic period is that infantry doctrine changes from manoeuvring to the enemy in line and engaging that enemy in lines to one that is to manoeuvre to the enemy in columns and then deploy into line to engage the enemy. Deploying into line only as you reach the enemy means that you can't easily ensure that battalions will be "shoulder to shoulder". Your flanks are protected by columns in a second line that can quickly manoeuvre to the threatened area....except that cavalry are quicker / more fluid and are more likely to get there quicker.

So the game is accurate in my view and avoid the typical battle evolution in most rules of:

1) Opposing cavalry advance quickly to combat
2) The winning cavalry force pins the enemy infantry in squares while supporting infantry slowly trundles up
3) Supporting infantry blast the pinned enemy infantry to pieces.

So victory goes to whomever wins the initial cavalry combat. I can't recall - off the top of my head - a single Napoleonic battle that evolved this way. More usual was:

1) Infantry close to combat
2) One side's infantry begins to waver or as a result of maneouvring an infantry force presents its flank target or is temporarily disordered
3) Cavalry hit the wavering infantry or the infantry that are temporarily disadvantaged.

Part of the problem with many Napoleonic rules is that they use units as battalions which makes "multi-battalion" tactics difficult to represent (in particular the spacing between battalions).

So, yes, infantry in line was certain defeat vs. cavalry if that infantry did not have secure flanks, which after all is the only combat/tactical advantage a square offers. A square has fewer muskets that can be fired at any given target and in terms of close combat physically no more bayonets can reach the enemy. In any event, if depth of the line was the issue, a line 4 deep has much greater firepower (to the front) than a square and equal depth of ranks.[/quote]

A most interesting and illuminating string . The comparison with the 18th century is very apt. For what has NOT changed? The man on the horse for the most part is the same and the infantryman has still got basically the same weapon with the same capabilities and lethality. BUT the average quality of the infantry man firing the weapon is not as high because of mass recurrent conscription used in most of the main continental powers with much bigger armies (but not so for Britain) so maintaining infantry steadiness in line is much harder and in 1813, for example, the new French recruits in the provisional regiments did not even train to form a line ( or practice regimental level manouvres) . If good quality steady infantry are trained to form and keep a line in good order and can give steady fire and are attacked frontally by cavalry in similar numbers to themselves then they are no less likely than their earlier 18th century counterparts to drive them off -other things being equal. It is the job of generals to make those other things less equal of course.

Remember too our unit in extended line in FOG(N) is of 2 or more battalions. But a small cavalry unit may be just one regiment.

In Grand Manner - a btn based game - it is harder for cavalry to get in against a steady battalion in line than a column , but the key is still "steady" and that set allows for a hasty volley having the effect of long range (half the effect, quarter if the cavalry are in a single line ) even if Infantry morale is OK. But once the cavalry survive the fire and get in then the line is vulnerable.

But that said one of the principles Terry and I have worked to over many years in our (mostly unpublished) rules is that that we want to aim for is not to focus on or model so much the detailed step by step processes that contribute to an outcome but the probable/most common net outcome of a given type of confrontation and then work back from that so that e.g. casualties are more often the outcome of a combat than the key generator of that outcome.

Troops are more often beaten because they believe they are and not because they look along the line and think "Oh we've just had X% casualties compared with only Y% for the enemy that must be worrisome..." When one thinks of the high casualties of the American Civil War for example where units took a lot before they would skeddadle that appears right. And one thinks of the Spanish ( Talavera?) who ran at the sound and fury of their own volley reassembling in a " state of nature" as Wellington put it. ( They improved.)

When you look at major cavalry successes against infantry as at Salamanca, Albuera , at Waterloo and at Eylau there was some other disadvantage the infantry had that made them less effective or it was not a straightforward frontal attack . Then look at Aspern Essling where the repeated charges of the French were to keep the Austrians back not beat them but with very heavy losses.

Massed cavalry were for breaking into an already weakened and worried line of battle ( which is what the artillery are there to do ) .

[hazelbark]

The other key point is when a square is formed the risk factor for the infantry drops tremendously in game terms.

So how much risk do you want to take with the infantry.

[Trailape]

Massed cavalry were for breaking into an already weakened and worried line of battle ( which is what the artillery are there to do ) .

And that's what I really like about these rules. Combined arms tactics really count, and artillery is given the 'punch' it actually had.

[nigelemsen]

Sounds like there might be hope for my cavalry heavy imperial guard list after all supported by the Hollywood old guard div. I'm sure I'll spend all game rolling 3s so much for superior/vet/guard