How unsupplied units will be handled?

[Redpossum]

Gentlemen, did we ever get an answer to my question about how the "First Winter In Russia" factor will be handled, as far as its effect on german units?

[IainMcNeil]

It's not yet modelled. We'll have to have a think about what could be done.

[Redpossum]

Every source I've ever read suggests that the first winter in Russia was a very bad one for the wehrmacht, that there were no cold weather clothes issued, no winter-proofing for vehicles, etc.

[joe98]

For the turn(s) covering that winter, all the German attack and defense values could be reduced.


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[IainMcNeil]

It's relatively simple to reduce the attacks - it's more difficult to give feedback to the player wbout which areas of teh map are effected by it and when.

[Redpossum]

It's relatively simple to reduce the attacks - it's more difficult to give feedback to the player wbout which areas of teh map are effected by it and when.

That's not going to be enough to model the actual historical effects, I'm afraid.

There also needs to be some actual attrition of unsupplied units which are subject to the "First Russian Winter" effects.

Furthermore, unless you're including Russia east of the Urals in your map, the Russians need to receive significant mechanised reinforcements to represent the transfer of the Siberian Armor to the west once the freeze began, and Stalin could be sure the Japanese wouldn't attack.

[firepowerjohan]

We have several tool that will slow down Axis in USSR. Manpower, Oil and also the big distance from Poland to Moscow will mean it takes months for Axis just to march to Moscow and that is if the USSR lines are totally routed. Another thing is that USSR will still have rising production % when Barbarossa begins so just a few months after barbarossa begins Axis will have a tough time.

The winter penalties would pretty much depend on that Axis pushed too far into USSR in too short time and had poor winter clothing and all that. Question is if that winter effect was inevitable, because if it wasn't then we are just limiting the players, forcing them to repeat bad decisions that Axis did in WW2. Same would be in Dunkirk in 1940 where Axis let Allies escape, just because Axis made a mistake in reality does not mean they would be limitted to it in the game.

We can always install ad-hoc penalties but what I wanted to say is that it is the thing we would do as last resort if nothing else fixes obvious problems. Beta testing will begin very soon now so we will see how it turns out and I am hoping for alot of gameplay criticism so that we can fine tune the final pieces of the puzzle

[honvedseg]

Would it be possible to have "supply units" directly assigned to a front-line unit, and have them automatically shuttle back and forth from their source of supply to the targeted unit? The player would never directly interact with them, but they would appear as small markers on the map to show a supply "trail". As a unit pushed forward, the supply units would take longer to catch it, if it stopped or was forced back, it would receive more reinforcement "points" as the supply counters arrived. Once a rail depot allowed accumulation of "point" stockpiles further forward, the player could reassign units to draw supply from those depots. The player would need to take care not to deplete the depot faster than it could be restocked by assigning too many units to draw on it. Various types of units would use more or less supply points per turn, which could vary in terms of static needs, movement costs, and combat costs.

Resupply would not necessarily be done every turn, but would cause a gradual erosion if not maintained. The front line unit would only hold a small amount of "current" supplies, and loaded supply units could wait to "unload" points at the rate from no more than so many points per turn. This would prevent the supply units from bunching up after all dumping their cargos in the same turn.

Example: three supply units with 50 points each follow their combat unit. The combat unit holds up to 100 supply points, which it depletes to 70 between movement costs and action against the enemy. Effectively, it now fights and moves at 70% effectiveness unless resupplied. During the beginning of the first turn after the action, the first supply unit automatically unloads 25 of its supply points, bringing the combat unit back to 95, but meanwhile the combat unit uses 10 more points just to stay in place, leaving it at 85. Next turn, the first supply unit unloads its remaining 25 points, which brings the unit back up to 100 and also replaces the 10 supply points used during the turn. The empty supply unit is now ready to proceed back to its supply source without any action by the player, and the second supply unit is ready to begin providing its supplies to the combat unit. Hopefully, the first supply unit will have reloaded and returned to the combat unit before the third supply unit is empty.

This would also serve as a game-balancing mechanism, since a distant force's supply units would take longer to make the round trip than one close to home. This problem would require spending more resources to increase the number of supply units, or frequent halts to allow the unit to resupply. In the example given, the unit depicted would draw 10 supply points per turn while stationary, 15 or 20 while moving, and 20-30 while fighting. An infantry unit would have a lower movement cost than an armored unit, while an artillery unit would have a very high combat cost to reflect the heavy use of ammunition. Replacements could either be figured in terms of supply points, as a direct conversion, or could be handled as a seperate entity. This could also work in reverse as an isolated unit without any supply points would automatically convert a small amount of unit strength to supply points each turn to meet the minimum upkeep requirements. Again, the player would not see the mechanism behind the effects, but a unit out of supply would quickly lose fighting ability and mobility.

[IainMcNeil]

That sounds really interesting but is a step too far for now. I'd like to see that kind of thing in the future as an option people can turn on/off as some people just don't want to worry about this stuff, while others live for it

[vypuero]

I think I agree with the admins here - I like a supply model that works but does not require micro-management and I think there are ways to keep it both realistic and simple. If what they say is true, perhaps winter effects are not necessary. They did attack in winter anyway, just with units at extremely low effectiveness (simulated say, as the admin states, as pushing too far too fast) and then against some fresh new units the russians had.

I am not sure if you are going to simulate the "siberian transfer" by way of more resources for russia or if there will be an actual transfer of units that takes place - say from the east edge of the map over a period of time? I think the latter is better but slightly more complicated.

Also, will there be overall weather effects, such as lower effectiveness in winter and the like? How about spring flooding on the eastern front (mud, rivers)?

[honvedseg]

The idea would be that the whole resource "point" system would be invisible to the player, except for designating a new "depot" if you wanted to put more of the burden on the rail versus road transport, or putting more emphasis on transportation in general to increase the supply units availble per combat unit. Optionally, you could individually tweak a unit's supply train by adding transports, if you wanted.

Russian units in winter would be easily simulated by lower base supply requirements, the Germans would need to put more points into theirs during winter to retain effectiveness.

I guess the project is too far along at this point to implement such drastic supply changes.

[Redpossum]

I am not sure if you are going to simulate the "siberian transfer" by way of more resources for russia or if there will be an actual transfer of units that takes place - say from the east edge of the map over a period of time? I think the latter is better but slightly more complicated.

But the point is that the arrival of the siberian armor in the west at the start of Winter 41/42 gave the USSR a body of veteran armored troops, with solid morale, who were experienced at snow/mud operations.

And this at a time when the rest of the red army west of the urals was not in good shape, either materially or in terms of morale.

A simple shot of resources will not simulate this. Really, it needs to be reinforcements of veteran troops.

Hey, Stalins Organ, what do you have to say about this?

[SMK-at-work]

AFAIK the idea of large numbers of veteran Siberian troops suddenly arriving in front of Moscow and saving the USSR is a myth.

Several divisions were transfered for a total of about 200,000 troops - no doubt they were useful, but the German advance had already failed through lack of supplies. and they arrived in dribs and drabs over a couple of months.

there is also no reason to suppose the "Siberian" troops were any more veteran than any other soviet troops in 1941 - a maximum of 60,000 troops had fought the Japanese, and many of them had been discharged or returned to European Russia before the war, so the vast majority of the 200,000 were exactly the same quality as those soldiers who had been captured in millions in 1941.

[Redpossum]

AFAIK the idea of large numbers of veteran Siberian troops suddenly arriving in front of Moscow and saving the USSR is a myth.

Several divisions were transfered for a total of about 200,000 troops - no doubt they were useful, but the German advance had already failed through lack of supplies. and they arrived in dribs and drabs over a couple of months.

there is also no reason to suppose the "Siberian" troops were any more veteran than any other soviet troops in 1941 - a maximum of 60,000 troops had fought the Japanese, and many of them had been discharged or returned to European Russia before the war, so the vast majority of the 200,000 were exactly the same quality as those soldiers who had been captured in millions in 1941.

OK, cool, that answers that question!

Another myth exploded

[SMK-at-work]

doing a bit more digging around on the 'net, it seems that some "Siberian" troops were transferred from the Finnish front, and were indeed veterans who had done some fighting and avoided the German assaults.

the term "Siberian" is possibly a misnomer then - being used to refer to all seemingly "fresh" Russian troops around Moscow at het end of 1941, whereas actual transfers from the Far East occured right through 1942.

Most such "Siberian" troops were therefore fresh recruits. However their fightign quality seems to have been quite high - the Russians had stopped surrendering en-masse when surrounded, instead going down fighting in battle such as Vyazma with many escaping the ring.

[Redpossum]

Oh man, I am looking forward to this game so much.

I enjoyed SPI's War in the East enormously. It's a fascinating topic.

[honvedseg]

The increase in quality of the Russian troops may also have been the perception of the Germans due to the decrease in the fighting quality of their own. In order to continue the stalling drive toward Moscow, the Germans cannibalized much of their logistical support: mechanics, supply clerks, drivers, and other specialists, to replaces losses in the fighting elements. These "skilled" replacements were not at all experienced in combat, and died in disproportionately high numbers, but were difficult to replace later in their original functions. Riflemen could be replaced with a few weeks of training, the skilled technical and logistical people behind the lines took a lot longer. The long-term effects of this poorly-considered depletion of essential support elements may have gone a long way toward losing the war for Germany.

At least a division of "Siberian" troops with "oriental features" was noted by the Germans during the last days of the advance toward Moscow. Whether this "Far Eastern" contingent had a significant effect on its own, or was merely one example of many disparate elements being pulled in from all over the Soviet Union over a longer period of time, is debatale.

[sum1won]

We're going over this in history class right now, interestingly enough,

Apparently, at this point the Germans were running low on supplies, and couldn't break through leningrad. One thing somebody brought up is that many of the tanks and armor brought up by the Germans was designed for warmer climates- and the fuel they used was believed to have often frozen.

Add to that that Russia, with significant reserves and a lot fo space was perfect for countering the blitzkrieg style of attack, so once the germans ran out of steam and momentum, it became a war of attrition.

And the german machine was not well geared towards a war of attrition, while the USSR could more easily handle it.

[SMK-at-work]

All good points

sum1won - I think famously it was lubricating oil that tended to freeze - in everything - small arms, tanks, planes, trucks.

[Redpossum]

Umm, when I lived in the Midwest (midwestern USA, center of the north american continent), there was a fuel additive you had to buy in the auto parts store for when the weather suddenly turned cold.

Supposedly, if the cold weather was expected, the gas company added it at the station.

Now, I know for a fact that there's no water in gasoline (or there damn well better not be), and german tanks in 1941 all used gasoline engines (usually a thing called a Maybach, IIRC), while at least the T-34 family of russian tanks ran on diesel.

Now, a diesel engine has a water filter. I'm not sure whether this is because diesel is more subject to water contamination, or whether it's because water can actually damage a diesel engine, as opposed to just making a gas engine run like crap.

To further complicate the matter, some gasolines in the US actually contain some ethanol, which is part water...

Complex issue all around.

A question, no two...

1) Just how cold does winter get in western russia?

2) Was the winter 1941/42 ususually cold?