stalins_organ wrote:Um....the 24th army was sent to the Ukraine where many veterans of Khalkin gol were assembling...??
sounds to me like the veterans are different to the army!
there weer many divisions in the Soviet army - many European ones fought well too, but often their story is lost in the general disaster of the Russian army.
Is it the 16th or the 24th that is recorded as having divisions of 100 and 400 men somewhere in Stumling Colossus? I'm at work so don't have it with me.
Your post 2 ago is exactly what I've been saying - i'm pleased you'er finally seeign the light!!
Also I note that in CEAW the soviets have a number of corps in "garrison" well back on the map (urals, Stalingrad, etc) that "other" games do not represent, and the limitations of rail movment means they drift in in 1's and 2's as capacity allows. I havent' tried to map these to historical formations in those areas, but I do wonder if they are surrogates for "Siberians".
16th Army had many of the Kholkin-Gol veterans, and it was sent to the Ukraine.
I agree that things can be confusing, however, there are certain things that almost all the historians agree upon, and that is the effectiveness of the Far Eastern divisions.
The issue under discussion is not that the Siberians came all at once, because we already knew that they didn't.
The issue, I think, is whether the Siberians were effective or not. According to Zhukov they were not that effective, coming as they did in divisional strength (except for 16th and 24th Armies).
So the question is: were the Siberian/Far Eastern divisions effective? Did they have an impact?
I truly believe they did.
My long post above proves that the Siberians made an effective impact. Even diluted with 5 raw divisions, the Siberian 24th Army still beat the Germans at Yelnya. This was the most substantial reverse that the Wehrmacht had suffered up to that date and it was the first successful planned Soviet offensive operation in the Soviet-German war.
On page 151, of "Road to Stalingrad", Erickson notes:
"The dozen militia divisions raised in Moscow [in late 1941] were ultimately taken into Red Army strength proper: the Far Eastern units were carefully filtered into the front."
Erickson, in "Road to Stalingrad", on p.240 writes:
"The 58th Tank Division... in mid-November was hastily pulled out of 16th Army and sent as 'reinforcement' to 30th Army."
At Istra, on Nov 27th/41, the Siberian 78th division of 16th Army fought "hand-to-hand with the SS infantry of
Das Reich Division" [p.261].
Here again, we see the Soviets mixing the raw recruit divisions with the better trained Siberian units. The Siberians steadied and helped the more inexperienced units. By doing this they increased the effectiveness of the recruit divisions and thereby played a big role in stopping the Germans.
Did the Far Eastern troops have an impact? Oh, yes.... far more than we realize.
I believe that it is our thinking that is faulty. We think that just because the Siberians didn't arrive en masse, then they weren't effective. However, the Soviets understood how to use these excellent troops after they had transferred them to the west.
They mixed them with the newly recruited divisions; they transferred them to threatened sectors; they pitted them against some of Germany's best troops (the SS divisions).
This was really the only way to use them.
Here is what other authorities have to say:
In "Barbarossa", on page 149, Alan Clark writes:
"But there was one reserve pool still left to the Russians, and i
t contained some of the finest units in the whole Red Army; these were the twenty-five infantry divisions, and the nine armoured brigades of General Apanasenko's 'Far Eastern Front'. Apanasenko's command had been fully mobilized on 22nd June, and as the western frontiers began to cave in a Japanese attack was expected hourly."
John Erickson, in "Road to Stalingrad", writes [p. 237]:
"Locked up in the Soviet Far East Stalin had more than
three-quarters of a million excellent troops, organized into more than a score of well-trained divisions with very strong tank and air support....
"For ten years, the strength of the Far Eastern forces had been steadily built up, and had reached some 30 divisions, 3 cavalry brigades, 16 tank brigades and over 2,000 tanks and aircraft. All forces east of Lake Baikal were considered first line formations for operations involving the Japanese, while a second line force was maintained to the west of Baikal, consisting of the Siberian district garrisons and the Ural troops, to act as reinforcement for either the Far Eastern or European theatres."
In "Barbarossa", on page 170, Alan Clark writes:
"The total brought from the Far East in the winter of 1941 included seventeen hundred tanks and fifteen hundred aircraft, and was made up as follows:
Transbaikalia: seven rifle, two cavalry divisions, two tank brigades
Outer Mongolia: one rifle division, two tank brigades
Amur: two rifle divisions, one tank brigade
Ussuri: five rifle divisions, one cavalry division, three tank brigades"
So here we have 17 rifle divisions and 8 tank brigades that were transferred west to the Moscow area from Siberia. Many of these divisions were at full strength and were experienced
Anthony Beever, in his book, "Stalingrad", mentions that "The Siberian divisions, including many ski-troop battalions, formed only part of the counter-attack force.... (page 40-41)".
Erickson, in "Road to Stalingrad", on p.239 writes:
"Stalin set about moving what was eventually to amount to half the divisional strength of the Far Eastern command (including the formation transferred in the late spring of 1941); between eight and ten rifle divisions were moved in October and November, together with 1,000 tanks and 1,000 aircraft.
"Not that this left gaps in the Far Eastern ranks: by immediate mobilization, eight rifle divisions, one cavalry division and three tank brigades were established by the end of 1941".
"At the same time as he reached into his Far Eastern hoard of men and tanks, Stalin sent a high-powered command contingent to the Urals to supervise the training of reserve and recruit formations.... that the new divisions be trained in close combat, in particular anti-tank tactics, and that the officers should be told how to handle operations."