New thread for "Siberians"

[stalins_organ]

does anyone have the Osprey Campaign series title "Moscow 1941: Hitler's first defeat" (#167 of the series)?

I've just read the summary on the Osprey website (http://www.ospreypublishing.com/title_d ... ew=extract) which includes this as hte final paragraph:

While the Soviet Union did possess substantial military forces in the Far East and Caucasus, the limitations placed upon rail capacity by the industrial evacuation programme hindered the ability to transfer substantial forces westward. Furthermore, the impact of the ‘Siberians’ on Operation Typhoon has been exaggerated. Firstly, the ‘Siberians’ were neither a large nor battle-experienced cadre of winter-trained troops who arrived at the decisive moment to tip the balance. Rather, most ‘Siberian’ units were recently raised and lacked significant combat experience or winter training; only the 413th Infantry Division that arrived at the end of October had a large cadre of Nomonhan veterans. Secondly, the ‘Siberians’ did not appear en masse. Thirdly, very few of the divisions transferred from the Far East went to Moscow; of the seven pre-war divisions sent westward, only two went to Moscow (the 32nd and 78th). The true Soviet ‘miracle’ in the Moscow campaign was Stavka’s ability to generate new – albeit untrained and poorly equipped – combat units.

[stalins_organ]

Copying some useful posts from hte "Patch" thread to here for ease of reference -

Ungers pride wrote:

Clearly, all plane and tank factories throughout Russia were pumping out units. Tanks and planes were being sent to the Moscow Front (mostly T-34s).

There were tank and plane factories in the Far East. In addition, many of the Siberian divisions in the Far East were also equipped with tanks and planes. This does not mean, however, that most of these tanks were T-34s.

Here is what Alan Clark, in his book "Barbarossa", says about the Siberians [page 170]:

"The total brought from the Far East in the winter of 1941 included seventeen hundred tanks and fifteen hundred aircraft, and was made up as follows:

Transbaikalia: seven rifle, two cavalry divisions, two tank brigades

Outer Mongolia: one rifle division, two tank brigades

Amur: two rifle divisions, one tank brigade

Ussuri: five rifle divisions, one cavalry division, three tank brigades"

So here we have 17 rifle divisions and 8 tank brigades that were transferred west to the Moscow area from Siberia. Many of these divisions were at full strength and were experienced

Almost 20 reserve rifle divisions were left in Siberia as a precaution in case Japan made a move into Siberia.

[stalins_organ]

by me (with soem spelling corrections!)

Yes i've no doubt there were tank and aircraft transfers from east of hte Urals too - I meant to say that "most" of the Siberians in the Dec counter attacks were possibly "normal" units....not that they all were.

AFAIK there were no tank factories in the "Far east" - there were 1 or 2 small ones at "Tankograd" before the war in the Urals, and a couple shifted there (eg Kharkov factory 183, and the KV-1 line from Leningrad). T-34 output by individual factory by month is listed at http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/weap ... on.htm#T34, and KV output at http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/weap ... ion.htm#KV

Omsk is officially in "South-west Siberia", but is a lot, lot closer to Moscow than it is to Vladivostok, and you can see that there were only 5-6 factories producing medium and heavy tanks at any one time.

Light tanks (T-60, t-70) were produced at a few more plants - see http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/weap ... #tspplants

It's really quite surprising how few tank factories there were IMO - see also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_So ... _factories

According to that site there were no T34's or KV-1's assigned to any formations east of the Urals on 1 June 41.

I don't know where the main aircraft factories were, but there's references on the net to factories at Saratov (about 13,000 Yak fighters), Voroneezh (bombers), Tashkent (Aircraft factory 84, evacuated from near moscow), GAZ-1 (State Aircraft Factory No 1 near Moscow)

Soviet airforce strengths on June 1 41 are given at http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/weap ... rce_41.xls - the far east military districts certainly have thousands of aircraft, but they're mostly obsolete - of 3100 fighters 1500 are I-16's, 1200 are I-15's and I-153's, and only 150 are Mig-3's and Yak-1's (edit: and only 60 serviceable at that date).

bombers are a bit better - 930 are IL-4's, but there's still 1200 SB's, 900 DB-3's and 330 TB-3's out of 3400 total.

And for both fighters and bombers there are many more aircraft actually serviceable than trained crews to man them!

I've resurrected a thread about Siberians on the Battlefront board too - at http://www.battlefront.com/discuss/ulti ... 4;t=001658, which is where someone lists 31 divisions sent to the west by mid-November 41, together with brief details of their combat by that stage where appropriate.

Edit: I'm also unsure of the provence of the claims that the "siberians" were all veterans of the Japanese-Soviet border clashes of 1939. as someone pinted out on the Matrix boards, the war in Mongolia was over for almost 2 years prior to Barbarossa, so most troops in those divisions would have been conscripted after the end of it, and there were NOT on-going clashes - once the war was over there were no more conflicts in that theatre.

[ungers_pride]

does anyone have the Osprey Campaign series title "Moscow 1941: Hitler's first defeat" (#167 of the series)?

I've just read the summary on the Osprey website (http://www.ospreypublishing.com/title_d ... ew=extract) which includes this as hte final paragraph:

While the Soviet Union did possess substantial military forces in the Far East and Caucasus, the limitations placed upon rail capacity by the industrial evacuation programme hindered the ability to transfer substantial forces westward. Furthermore, the impact of the ‘Siberians’ on Operation Typhoon has been exaggerated. Firstly, the ‘Siberians’ were neither a large nor battle-experienced cadre of winter-trained troops who arrived at the decisive moment to tip the balance. Rather, most ‘Siberian’ units were recently raised and lacked significant combat experience or winter training; only the 413th Infantry Division that arrived at the end of October had a large cadre of Nomonhan veterans. Secondly, the ‘Siberians’ did not appear en masse. Thirdly, very few of the divisions transferred from the Far East went to Moscow; of the seven pre-war divisions sent westward, only two went to Moscow (the 32nd and 78th). The true Soviet ‘miracle’ in the Moscow campaign was Stavka’s ability to generate new – albeit untrained and poorly equipped – combat units.

Hmmm...

How many threads about the Siberians are we going to see? This is getting very tiring and pointless. I have posted enough on this topic (see the patches thread).

The documented evidence by established historians (Glantz, Clark) about the Siberians is there for all to read.

The above paperback book is a very thin 96 pages in length (but only 60 pages actually have text) and it was written by Dr Robert A Forczyk who has a PhD from the University of Maryland. He is currently a lieutenant colonel in the US Army Reserves.

I have never heard of Dr. Forczyk.

I am afraid that I would rather read books of Soviet history by established heavy weights in their field such as Glantz, Clark, Erickson, et al. One simply cannot give equal weight to Forczyk alongside these other authors.

So here are some reviews of his book:

http://www.armchairgeneral.com/articles ... e=1&cat=59

Critics of the book:

1) It is essentially a mechanical and unimaginative narration of facts in chronological order. It has details such as; a particular German division had this many killed and this many injured during this particular battle or 4 of a particular kind of Russian machine guns was distributed to each infantry divison...etc. All of these trivial facts have probably been painstakingly researched and verified and are accurate. There are many excellent high quality detailed color maps of battle fields.

But the most bizzare aspect of this book is that mixed in with all the minute insignificant details are fantastic startegic observations that flies in the face of convential beliefs (e.g. Hitler's military decisions were superior to his professional commanders; even if it was summer then Hitler would still have been defeated due to logistic problems as weather was just a minor contributing factor to German defeat...etc.). But a careful reading of the text shows that author has no real evidence to support his unorthodox grand observations. One suspects that the mass of detail is produced to hide author's lack of evidence in big observations.

2) His description of Hitler's strategy as 'militarily sound' in the introduction coupled with his strong criticism of the operational decisions taken by some of the German generals leads me to question the author's judgement.

3) One weakness I also found his where the author attempts to insert his own opinions more as fact than opinion. One case in point is when Hitler turned the army south to eliminate the SOviet forces in the around Kiev before moving against Moscow. The author implies this was a good decision and that is very debatable. He also attempts to justify some of Hitler's actions about launching the Typhoon Campaign and in a few points later contradicts himself. Although the book presents nice coverage of the campaign, the author seems to forget to mention German treatment of the populace and prisoners and the short and long term effects they could have had on the Russian Campaign.

[stalins_organ]

I've never heard of Gerard A Proudfoot who wrote that review - what's his qualifications?

Forczyk's full "qualifications" are a little more interesting than "merely a PhD" and a Lt Colonel - from the Osprey author's site:

Dr Robert A. Forczyk has a PhD in International Relations and National Security from the University of Maryland and a strong background in European and Asian military history. He is currently a lieutenant colonel in the US Army Reserves and has served 18 years as an armour officer in the US 2nd and 4th Infantry Divisions and as an intelligence officer in the 29th Infantry Division (Light).

For a more balanced look Amazon has 8 reviews of the book - http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/custom ... merReviews

2 of htem are 1 star - 1 of which is someone who thought it was a different book entirely!! the otehr is the one you link to above.

One person rates it OK. 1 rates it OK but notes that he's using the author's own harsh review criteria otherwise it would have been excellent, and the other 4 rate it as excellent.

I expect it will be in local bookshelves so I shall purchase it when I see it.

If you are actually not interested in the Siberian question then please feel free not to contribute any further.

[ungers_pride]

Yes i've no doubt there wre tank and aircraft transfers from east of hte Urals too - I meant to say that "most" of the Siberians in the Dec counter attacks were possibly "normal" units....not that they all were.

AFAIK there were no tank factories in the "Far east" - there were 1 or 2 small ones at "Tankograd" before the war in the Urals, and a couple shifted there (eg Kharkov factory 183, and the KV-1 line from Leningrad). T-34 output by individual factory by month is listed at http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/weap ... on.htm#T34, and KV output at http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/weap ... ion.htm#KV

Omsk is officially in "South-west Siberia", but is a lot, lot closer to Moscow than it is to Vladivostok, and you can see that there were only 5-6 factories producing medium and heavy tanks at any one time.

Light tanks (T-60, t-70) were produced at a few more plants - see http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/weap ... #tspplants

It's really quite surprising how few tank factories there were IMO - see also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_So ... _factories

According to that site there were no T34's or KV-1's assigned to any formations east of the Urals on 1 June 41.

Hi - thanks for all the links


First, I'm wondering what is the source that the Armchair General has used for its source for these tank figures? Who has put out that literature? How reliable is it?

Second, none of the historians I have read, have indicated that the Far East sent T-34s to the west. Remember, that according to Clark the tanks that were sent west from the Far East were indicated as "Tank Brigades". Before the war, tank production (of various types) would have ensured that these Siberian tank brigades were at full strength.

I wonder what the figures for tank production before June/41 in the USSR would be? Many of the Siberian divisions had been formed in the Far East in 1938 and 1939. A great deal of tank production would have been sent there. Most of the tanks would have been of various types.

Since these Siberian tank brigades would have been at full strength, and since tanks were needed on the Moscow Front, then it follows that seventeen hundred tanks could easily have been sent from the Far East to the west. In addition, as you yourself have stated there were tank factories in the Urals that were no doubt pumping out tanks and sending them west.

So I see no conflict between the historical sources and those figures you have posted.

I don't know where the main aircraft factories were, but there's references on the net to factories at Saratov (about 13,000 Yak fighters), Voroneezh (bombers), Tashkent (Aircraft factory 84, evacuated from near moscow), GAZ-1 (State Aircraft Factory No 1 near Moscow)

Soviet airforce strengths on June 1 41 are given at http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/weap ... rce_41.xls - the far east military districts certainly have thousands of aircraft, but they're mostly obsolete - of 3100 fighters 1500 are I-16's, 1200 are I-15's and I-153's, and only 150 are Mig-3's and Yak-1's.

bombers are a bit better - 930 are IL-4's, but there's still 1200 SB's, 900 DB-3's and 330 TB-3's out of 3400 total.

Using your figures, in the Far East districts there were about 11,000 aircraft. So even if many were not of the most modern type, the fact that 1500 were sent west from the Far East districts seems more than reasonable and accords well with the historical sources.

Even less modern planes can strafe troops and drop bombs. Look what the swordfish biplanes did to the battleship Bismarck.

The Siberian divisions would have been fully stocked with air squadrons before June/41 as part of their deployment to deal with the potential Japanese threat.

I've resurrected a thread about Siberians on the Battlefront board too - at http://www.battlefront.com/discuss/ulti ... 4;t=001658, which is where someone lists 31 divisions sent to the west by mid-November 41, together with brief details of their combat by that stage where appropriate.

OK, someone in that link is quoting from Zhukov's memoirs.

Let's deal with Zhukov first:

I think we should be careful about everything that Zhukov writes about in his memoirs.

Zhukov wrote his book in 1964 and published it in 1969. This, at a time when the USSR was still under the heavy dictatorship of the Communist Party, of which Zhukov was a prominent member.

As such, Zhukov's book was heavily censored by Soviet authorities on numerous occasions during its 10 printings. It was last printed in 1990.

Due to this heavy censorship we may never truly know the exact extent of true or fabricated information in this book. No doubt Zhukov would want to make himself look good; no doubt the Communist Party would want certain facts and information to be told the way it would like them to be told; and it is highly probable that they would want to downplay the role of the Asiatic Siberians in "saving" Moscow".

It also seems odd that ALL historians of any repute would have been aware of, and read, Zhukov's book. And yet, we do not hear about any NEW revelations by historians from his memoirs; instead, we read about the errors and falsehoods in his book.

Here are just a few examples of why we should be more critical of Zhukov's book:

1) Zhukov professes great faith in communism: "I have forgotten many things, but I will remember the day I joined the Party as long as I live. Since then I have tried to suit all my thoughts, aspirations and actions to the demands made of a Party member."

Here Zhukov is professing great love for communism and has no qualms in having his book and facts edited and altered. Yet surely someone who had witnessed Stalin's purges of the 1930s, to which many of Zhukov's colleagues fell victim, or who had himself been prey to the petty machinations of the Party leadership after the war, would have been far more critical of the Soviet political system?

2) Until the 1990 edition was published, Zhukov's book was subject to myriad revisions by the Soviet censors, including one notorious passage where Zhukov was persuaded to write that he had "wanted to consult" with Leonid Brezhnev (who was the Soviet leader when the first edition of Zhukov's memoirs came out in 1969) during a visit to the North Caucasian Front in 1943, when Brezhnev was a lowly political officer.

3) Zhukov Misrepresents Information and Operations: Operation Mars was a costly failure which in his memoirs Zhukov misrepresented as a diversion to prevent German Army Group Center from assisting their comrades at Stalingrad rather than a major offensive in its own right.

In his recent book, Zhukov's Greatest Defeat, David Glantz exposes Zhukov's falsification and recounts in detail the Mars disaster, which had long been covered up by official Soviet sources.

According to John Erickson, the leading historian of Stalingrad, "the full significance of Stalingrad…cannot be grasped without understanding the role of Operation Mars," which was "deliberately misrepresented by Zhukov himself" and is now the subject of "Glantz's indispensable account."


SOURCES:

http://context.themoscowtimes.com/stori ... 2/105.html

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/142

http://www.russiablog.org/2007/04/did_u ... he_war.php

http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-68952101.html

Edite: I'm also unsure of hte provence of the claims that the "siberians" were all veterans of the Japanese-Soviet border clashes of 1939. as someone pinted out on the Matrix boards, the war in Mongolia was over for almost 2 years prior to Barbarossa, so most troops in those divisions would have been conscripted after the end of it, and there were NOT on-going clashes - once the war was over there were no more conflicts in that theatre.

David Glantz is regarded by many as one of the best military historians of the Soviet role in World War II. He is perhaps most associated with the thesis that World War II Soviet military history has been prejudiced in the West by its over-reliance on German oral and printed sources, without being balanced by a similar examination of Soviet source material.

David M. Glantz says in "Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War" that there were 25 'original' Siberian divisions in June 41:

a) 5 were transferred before October/41

b) 8-10 were transferred during Nov/Dec/41

These units that were transferred were replaced by freshly raised troops, keeping the total facing Japan roughly the same.

It would make sense that those Siberian divisions that fought the Japanese in 1939 would have gained valuable experience. Since the Japanese (until late 1941) had the potential for attacking Siberia, then it follows that these divisions would have been fully equipped and continuously trained.

It also makes sense that after the Japanese threat had passed, that the most experienced Siberian divisions would have been sent west. In their place reserve units would have been established.

[ungers_pride]

I've never heard of Gerard A Proudfoot who wrote that review - what's his qualifications?

Forczyk's full "qualifications" are a little more interesting than "merely a PhD" and a Lt Colonel - from the Osprey author's site:

Dr Robert A. Forczyk has a PhD in International Relations and National Security from the University of Maryland and a strong background in European and Asian military history. He is currently a lieutenant colonel in the US Army Reserves and has served 18 years as an armour officer in the US 2nd and 4th Infantry Divisions and as an intelligence officer in the 29th Infantry Division (Light).

For a more balanced look Amazon has 8 reviews of the book - http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/custom ... merReviews

2 of htem are 1 star - 1 of which is someone who thought it was a different book entirely!! the otehr is the one you link to above.

One person rates it OK. 1 rates it OK but notes that he's using the author's own harsh review criteria otherwise it would have been excellent, and the other 4 rate it as excellent.

I expect it will be in local bookshelves so I shall purchase it when I see it.

If you are actually not interested in the Siberian question then please feel free not to contribute any further.

To equate a book - that contains only 60 pages of text, that contains no footnotes, and that was written by an author who is not even a professor on the subject (he is a reservist) - with the likes of historian heavyweights such as Glantz, Clark, Beever, et al is simply ludicrous.

All I have seen presented so far from the opposite side in looking at the Siberian issue are websites and Zhukov's memoirs. And this..... 60 page booklet.

Yet, I have presented information mainly from books written by well respected historians.

Alan Clark's book, "Barbarossa" still remains a classic work on the German-Soviet struggle.

Here is what he says about the Siberians on page 149:

"But there was one reserve pool still left to the Russians, and it contained some of the finest units in the whole Red Army; these were the twenty-five infantry divisions, and the nine armoured brigades of General Apanasenko's 'Far Eastern Front'. Apanasenko's command had been fully mobilized on 22nd June, and as the western frontiers began to cave in a Japanese attack was expected hourly."

On page 171, Clark writes:

"Yet by itself the impact of the winter would not be enough for an exhausted and outnumbered Red Army to turn the tables on its adversary; the chosen instrument for this task was the agglomeration of hard, long-service divisions from the Siberian Command. In order that the impact of the Siberian troops take maximum effect, it was vital that they be held back until the last moment...."

For those who have Clark's book, he provides a map on page 173 indicating where all these divisions were located.

Clark, an historian, mentions that the Siberian divisions had been in LONG service, and were experienced. Why would he say that? In 1939, the Soviets fought a battle with Japan, in which Japan suffered 50,000 casualties.

Between that time and late 1941 Hitler took great pains to get Japan to attack NORTH into Siberia. Stalin simply could not disband these Siberian troops in the east. The Japanese threat was always there.

It was not until late 1941 when Stalin's spy Richard Sorge indicated that the Japanese had decided to attack SOUTH, that Stalin released about 15 to 20 of these Siberian divisions to move west around Moscow.

[stalins_organ]

you're a pretty angry person reallym, aren't you!!

I dont' care how many pages a book has - it is the content that is important. A book also does not have to be footnoted to be accurate, although that helps checking.

Do you mean Beevor's "Stalingrad"? Clark wrote "Barbarossa" and does not have a "Stalingrad" title.

Beevor is certainly well regarded, but he's not perfect. I have his work on Crete and there are several mistakes in it

whether your quote is from Beevor or Clark - the style is chatty but not as informative as it could be - the extracts you quote apparently give some good information, and yet the points you have bolded are presented without any particular justification.

We know, for example, that the Soviets only used a handful of divisions at Khalkin Gol, plus a couple of tank brigades and some other small forces - and yet apparently all 25 divisions are experienced?

and what I am asking is not just the prose:

the chosen instrument for this task was the agglomeration of hard, long-service divisions from the Siberian Command. In order that the impact of the Siberian troops take maximum effect, it was vital that they be held back until the last moment...

Very nice, bold statement.....what's the ACTUAL evidence? what were those divisions? when were they sent? How many of the troops in them served at Khalkin Gol to make them "hard, long service divisions"? Why were they different from the rest of the soviet army - lots of divisions had been in service for some time, but it's men who get the experience, not the formation, and the whole Soviet army was conscript. Why does Glantz note in Stumbling Collossus that up to 50% of the manpower of units east of the Urals was made up of recent European Russian conscripts who often did not get on with the local recruits? Why does glantz list more than 25 divisions in the East? which is the right number?

Writing in 1986 Glantz says this about Clark's "Barbarossa": (from http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/e-front.htm)

Alan Clark's survey account of the war in the East, entitled Barbarossa, contained more operational detail.18 However, it still lacked any solid body of Soviet data.

Your acceptance and dismissal of information athat does or does not support your view is prety shallow IMO, and really does little to further my understanding of the situation.

[ungers_pride]

you're a pretty angry person reallym, aren't you!!

Calm down.

I am not "angry".

But it is frustrating to see theories put forward without any real evidence to back them up.

From time-to-time on the internet and on forums such as these, there are individuals who set out to present NEW evidence or theories, and yet simply don't have the evidence of solid historical facts to back them up. Rather than rely upon respected historians they opt to use websites and light-weight books and authors.

And it is obvious that in the beta test certain individuals got the Siberian reinforcements removed form the game based on their arguments. All of this simply flies in the face of the well documented historical record.

Thank goodness the developer is now trying to rectify the situation.

I dont' care how many pages a book has - it is the content that is important. A book also does not have to be footnoted to be accurate, although that helps checking.

That new book on Moscow: 41 which has 60 pages of text, looks more like the type of book they would read in high school. I know that type of book. It is lightweight and is an introductory book and is aimed at the general reader.

If you cannot discern between the quality of this 60 page book and Glantz's world recognized status as an authority of German-Soviet relations in WWII, then I can understand your statement above.

Even in basic history classes in university, when there are two competing theories the author or presenter with the greater authority takes precedence. Glantz, Clark, Beever, et al win hands down over Forczyk. No contest.

Do you mean Beevor's "Stalingrad"? Clark wrote "Barbarossa" and does not have a "Stalingrad" title.

Beevor is certainly well regarded, but he's not perfect. I have his work on Crete and there are several mistakes in it

whether your quote is from Beevor or Clark - the style is chatty but not as informative as it could be - the extracts you quote apparently give some good information, and yet the points you have bolded are presented without any particular justification.

Read my post above - I said Clark's Barbarossa. Where did you get Beever from? Chatty? heheh I gave only a couple of small quotes.

Have you even read the book?

Alan Clark is a respected historian and his book remains a classic.

We know, for example, that the Soviets only used a handful of divisions at Khalkin Gol, plus a couple of tank brigades and some other small forces - and yet apparently all 25 divisions are experienced?

Where is your source for this statement?

and what I am asking is not just the prose:

the chosen instrument for this task was the agglomeration of hard, long-service divisions from the Siberian Command. In order that the impact of the Siberian troops take maximum effect, it was vital that they be held back until the last moment...

Very nice, bold statement.....what's the ACTUAL evidence? what were those divisions? when were they sent? How many of the troops in them served at Khalkin Gol to make them "hard, long service divisions"? Why were they different from the rest of the soviet army - lots of divisions had been in service for some time, but it's men who get the experience, not the formation, and the whole Soviet army was conscript.

May I suggest a trip to your local library...

Why does Glantz note in Stumbling Collossus that up to 50% of the manpower of units east of the Urals was made up of recent European Russian conscripts who often did not get on with the local recruits? Why does glantz list more than 25 divisions in the East? which is the right number?

Please provide page numbers for these assertions.

Writing in 1986 Glantz says this about Clark's "Barbarossa": (from http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/e-front.htm)

Alan Clark's survey account of the war in the East, entitled Barbarossa, contained more operational detail.18 However, it still lacked any solid body of Soviet data.

You'll note that Glantz said Clark's book didn't contain any Soviet data. He did not say Clark's book was in error!

In fact, Alan Clark, in his preface to the 1995 printing of his book, said that he found no substantive evidence in the Soviet archives to alter the views and evidence in his book.

Your acceptance and dismissal of information athat does or does not support your view is prety shallow IMO, and really does little to further my understanding of the situation.

I don't know how old you are or whether you went to university or not, but I do not base my acceptance or dismissal of evidence based on whether it supports my views.

I am university trained and so I base my acceptance of an idea or of a theory based on the following criteria:

1) Is the author an authority?

2) How many books has he written?

3) Do other scholars acknowledge his authority in the field in which he is writing?

4) What is the evidence presented in the book? How reliable is that evidence? Is it well documented? What are the sources for the book? How well do his theories stand up to scrutiny and critical analysis?

5) Is there any bias in the author or in his views?

6) Has the book been censored?

etc....

I simply will not accept half-baked theories based on a few websites, on a biased book, or on a light-weight author.

Yet, I find that on certain forums, some people seem to readily accept ideas and theories based on the weakest of evidence....

[Stryder]

this is a great debate but I missed how it relates to the game, what changes to the game are being considered?

[ungers_pride]

this is a great debate but I missed how it relates to the game, what changes to the game are being considered?

This is what I have been led to believe:

This whole Siberian reinforcement thing started when a couple of beta testers argued successfully to have the Siberian reinforcements removed from the game in general, and from the USSR in particular.

Basically, they were claiming that the Siberians had no real impact on the Moscow Front and should not be there.

Their evidence?

That's a very good question.

The developer is now trying to rectify the situation by implementing a "Mobilization Bonus" to account for reinforcements.

[stalins_organ]

This is what I have been led to believe:

This whole Siberian reinforcement thing started when a couple of beta testers argued successfully to have the Siberian reinforcements removed from the game in general, and from the USSR in particular..

what other Siberian reinforcement were there??

Basically, they were claiming that the Siberians had no real impact on the Moscow Front and should not be there..

Absolute nonsense. no-one has ever claimed that and you continuing to repeat it is slander.

My point, and that of otehrs, is that the Siberian reinforcements arrived in "dribs and drabs" rather than in one great lump. they were certainly important, but they were not a single force arriving suddenly. And that is ALL that we claim.

Their evidence?

That's a very good question..

which has been answered to you ad nauseum. however you choose not to believe it. OK - that's your right, but then yuo have even less evidence of the contrary - a few vague denunciation of Zhukov as a historian - denunciations not backed up by reputable western sources, and misquotes from old western authors that give no sources for their own assumptions presented as fact.

The developer is now trying to rectify the situation by implementing a "Mobilization Bonus" to account for reinforcements.

Which is a much better option than suddenly having a few armies arrive at Moscow IMO.

University trained - golly gosh - me too. A history major no less. Means squat.

some of the factors you list are important for sure, but since you ahve made no effort to actually see how the author concerned rates in most of them your conclusions are lightweight.

But others are nonsenese - do you think that Glantz's first book became more accurate after he published a few more??

your willingness to dismiss Zhukov's memoirs for irrelvant factors is also telling - Glantz thinks a lot mroe of them than you do it seems, and is quite happy to use them as a source. his coments about soviet histories in general are that htey are great as long as you identify the political messages they often try to portray - their facts are excellent - see http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/e-front.htm

One is struck in Soviet accounts by the accuracy of facts, principally concerning unit, place, and time. Soviet sources in this regard invariable match up with the operational and tactical maps found in German (or Japanese) unit archives. It is apparent in some cases that Soviet military historians have made extensive use of such German archival materials in preparing their own studies.38 Less unanimity exists over what actually occurred at a given place and at a given time. Just as is the case in some German accounts, towns abandoned by the enemy were "taken after heavy fighting," and units driven back in disarray simply "withdrew to new positions."39

and

Thus, in addition to the general American (and Western) ignorance of the existence of Soviet source material and the presence of an imposing language barrier, Americans question the credibility of Soviet sources. While this questioning was once valid, it is increasingly less valid as time passes. Soviet sources have some inherent weaknesses; but these weaknesses, over time, have been diminishing. Unfortunately, the American perception of Soviet sources remains negative; and, hence, the American perception of the Eastern Front has changed very little. Only time, more widespread publication of candid operational materials (some of it in English), and more extensive use of those materials by American military historians will alter those perceptions. That alteration will likely be painfully slow.

and, lastly

The dominant role of German source materials in shaping American perceptions of the war on the Eastern Front and the negative perception of Soviet source materials have had an indelible impact on the American image of war on the Eastern Front. What has resulted in a series of gross judgments treated as truths regarding operations in the East and Soviet (Red) Army combat performance. The gross judgments appear repeatedly in textbooks and all types of historical works, and they are persistent in the extreme.

Yes....very persistant!

[Stryder]

ugh, i stepped into the middle of a duel between you too, sorry to interrupt.. please carry on without any further interruption from me.... Instant Messenger may be a good way to throw insults back and forth... quicker if nothing else

[stalins_organ]

I'm trying to keep it civilised...honest!!

[ungers_pride]

Basically, they were claiming that the Siberians had no real impact on the Moscow Front and should not be there..

Absolute nonsense. no-one has ever claimed that and you continuing to repeat it is slander.

My point, and that of otehrs, is that the Siberian reinforcements arrived in "dribs and drabs" rather than in one great lump. they were certainly important, but they were not a single force arriving suddenly. And that is ALL that we claim.

Slander? heheh I didn't name anyone.

possum said it, not me....

This is what possum said on the forum about the beta testing:

#1 (about Siberian reinforcements) was discussed in beta. I argued for the "siberian armor", and Stalins_Organ expressed the opinion that the whole business of siberian reinforcements was largely a myth.

Since you never corrected possum's statement which was out in public view since June 30th, 2007, then I accepted it at face value.

Even so, it is clear that the developer left out the Siberian reinforcements for some reason. I wonder why?

So you accept that the Siberian reinforcements did come. You say they were IMPORTANT. And you also claim they came in dribs and drabs, but not in one large force.

So where are your sources to show this?

[evidence] which has been answered to you ad nauseum. however you choose not to believe it. OK - that's your right, but then yuo have even less evidence of the contrary - a few vague denunciation of Zhukov as a historian - denunciations not backed up by reputable western sources, and misquotes from old western authors that give no sources for their own assumptions presented as fact.

What evidence??

A few websites that list nothing but data?

Your statements saying that what you say is true?

That's your evidence?


REGARDING ZHUKOV:

Vague denunciations? Misquotes of old western historians?

heheh

Let's do this again, shall we?

I think we should be careful about everything that Zhukov writes about in his memoirs.

Zhukov wrote his book in 1964 and published it in 1969. This, at a time when the USSR was still under the heavy dictatorship of the Communist Party, of which Zhukov was a prominent member.

As such, Zhukov's book was heavily censored by Soviet authorities on numerous occasions during its 10 printings. It was last printed in 1990.

Due to this heavy censorship we may never truly know the exact extent of true or fabricated information in this book. No doubt Zhukov would want to make himself look good; no doubt the Communist Party would want certain facts and information to be told the way it would like them to be told; and it is highly probable that they would want to downplay the role of the Asiatic Siberians in "saving" white Russia (Moscow)".

It also seems odd that ALL historians of any repute would have been aware of, and read, Zhukov's book. And yet, we do not hear about any NEW revelations by historians from his memoirs; instead, we read about the errors and falsehoods in his book.

Here are just a few examples of why we should be more critical of Zhukov's book:

1) Zhukov professes great faith in communism: "I have forgotten many things, but I will remember the day I joined the Party as long as I live. Since then I have tried to suit all my thoughts, aspirations and actions to the demands made of a Party member."

Here Zhukov is professing great love for communism and has no qualms in having his book and facts edited and altered. Yet surely someone who had witnessed Stalin's purges of the 1930s, to which many of Zhukov's colleagues fell victim, or who had himself been prey to the petty machinations of the Party leadership after the war, would have a more nuanced view of the Soviet political system?

2) Until the 1990 edition was published, Zhukov's book was subject to myriad revisions by the Soviet censors, including one notorious passage where Zhukov was persuaded to write that he had "wanted to consult" with Leonid Brezhnev (who was the Soviet leader when the first edition of Zhukov's memoirs came out in 1969) during a visit to the North Caucasian Front in 1943, when Brezhnev was a lowly political officer.

3) Zhukov Misrepresents Information and Operations: Operation Mars was a costly failure which in his memoirs Zhukov misrepresented as a diversion to prevent German Army Group Center from assisting their comrades at Stalingrad rather than a major offensive in its own right.

In his recent book, Zhukov's Greatest Defeat, David Glantz exposes Zhukov's falsification and recounts in detail the Mars disaster, which had long been covered up by official Soviet sources.

According to John Erickson, the leading historian of Stalingrad, "the full significance of Stalingrad…cannot be grasped without understanding the role of Operation Mars," which was "deliberately misrepresented by Zhukov himself" and is now the subject of "Glantz's indispensable account."

Yes, Glantz uses Zhukov's memoirs, but only sparingly. Glantz has shown the lies that Zhukov has used in his book, and he is also very aware of the heavy censorship the book went through for years. So he uses Zhukov when that information can also be verified by other sources. However, nowhere in Glantz's books does he use Zhukov's information about the Siberian divisions (which is a contentious part of Zhukov's book).

University trained - golly gosh - me too. A history major no less. Means squat.

Well, you only get out of education what you put into it.

Personally, I love history....

some of the factors you list are important for sure, but since you ahve made no effort to actually see how the author concerned rates in most of them your conclusions are lightweight.

I have presented nothing except quotes from reliable historians - book names with page numbers. And I have a lot more books on the floor beside me. But I don't have to prove anything. The burden is on you to disprove what these historians have been saying for years.

It is you who claim the Siberians arrived in dribs and drabs. So what constitutes a drib? And what makes up a drab? How many divisions are in a drib or a drab?

Although, you claim the Siberians were important, it is apparent that this is in contradiction to Zhukov who claims the Siberians weren't that important!

But others are nonsenese - do you think that Glantz's first book became more accurate after he published a few more??

huh?

your willingness to dismiss Zhukov's memoirs for irrelvant factors is also telling - Glantz thinks a lot mroe of them than you do it seems, and is quite happy to use them as a source. his coments about soviet histories in general are that htey are great as long as you identify the political messages they often try to portray - their facts are excellent - see

Well, Glantz uses Zhukov's memoirs, but only sparingly. Glantz has shown the lies that Zhukov has used, and he is also very aware of the heavy censorship the book went through for years. So he uses Zhukov when that information can also be verified by other sources. In addition, nowhere in Glantz's books does he use Zhukov's information about the Siberian divisions (which is a contentious part of Zhukov's book).

But be careful! You are arguing against Zhukov! The very guy you have been using as part of your evidence!

You now claim the Siberians were important. Zhukov argues that they weren't important!

So I guess we are on the same side now!

[stalins_organ]

You have a gift for misquoting and putting words in peoples mouths.

zhukov does not claim that siberians weer unimportant - he says that they arrived in dribs and drabs and not in one bunch and that the bulk of the counterattacking forces in December of 1941 were not recent arrivals from Siberia.

where does Glantz say that Zhukov has lied? I have Zhukov's memoirs - the 1985 2-volume set, and I've posted a link to Glantz's assessment of Soviet historians and quoptes from it - nowhere in there does he say Zhukov has lied. Certainly he is inaccurate in some cases - you pointed out some. Can you show me why he is inaccurate in his assessment of the nature of the Siberian reinforcements? how is this any different from inaccuracies and "selective memory" of other allied leaders in their memoirs?

Why is Zhukov's support for the communist party important? That's the 2nd time you've quoted those 3 factors on here - as if they are vidence of something - yet you give no actual evidence of how they are relevant to Zhukov's statements about the Siberians. Glantz praises the accuracy of Soviet material about unit positions and dates in the post Stalin era - which is when Zhukov published.

But others are nonsenese - do you think that Glantz's first book became more accurate after he published a few more??

huh?

One of the things you said went to the credibility of an author was how many books he had published - so presumably you think that Glantz became more accurate when he published more books.

I'm not surprised you don't understand my comment - the initial point was silly.

Dribs and drabs - you really are clutching at straws.

I started this looking for information about the Siberians. I have quoted books and websites. you have misquoted, misrepresented and mis-directed at every turn. You quote an author who says there were 25 divisions in siberia? Glantz says there were over twice that many.

you say (in the patch thread) that Glantz in Stumbling colossus gives dates for siberian units arriving in hte west - I cannot find them and you do not give a page reference whn I ask for one.

It would have ben nice if you'd presented some actual evidence other than your repeated irrelevant denunciations of Zhukov, but alas I see you are hot air - you claim a love of history, but do nothing to try to draw apart it's veils.

I really wish you could offer me some actual information instead of your opinionated dismissal of such information as I have.
Can you actually give me division numbers assigned to armies on 6 December 1941, and when they had arrived from Siberia? that is the level of information I would like to see - regardless of whether it supports "my position" or not.

alas I fear you cannot.

I have jsut recently ordered half of Charles Sharp's OOB's for the Soviet army in WW2 tho - maybe his research will be better than what I have found through here. I dont' know that I'll bother summarising it for you tho. I dont' think you're really interested.

My apologies to others who may be interested in this subject - clearly my debate with this person is unproductive for actual information.

[davetheroad]

Rather than endless arguments about validity of sources how about tracking the movement of Siberian forces, to start.

The OOB in Glantz' Stumbilng Colossus says:

Central Asian Military District
Rifle Divisions - 68, 83, 194, 238,
Tank Divisions - 9, 53
Motorized Divisions - 221
Mountain Cavalry divisions - 18, 20, 21

Trans-Baikal Military District
Rifle Divisions - 65, 94, 93, 114
Tank Divisions - 57, 61
Motorized Divisions - 82
MRD ???????? - 36, 57

Far Eastern Front
Rifle Divisions - 21, 22, 26, 39, 59, 3, 12, 34, 32, 40, 92, 105, 79, 35, 66, 78,
Mountain Rifle Division - 101
Rifle Brigades - 1, 4, 5,
Tank Divisions - 58, 60, 59,
Motorized Divisions - 239, 69,
Cavalry Division - 8,
Airborne Batallion - 202

To settle the argument all we need to do is track the deployment of these units through winter 1941

Any volunteers!

Dave

[vypuero]

Unger - This statement is either false and you are mistaken, or you are deliberately lying, and I hope it is the former:

This whole Siberian reinforcement thing started when a couple of beta testers argued successfully to have the Siberian reinforcements removed from the game in general, and from the USSR in particular.

There were NEVER siberian units in the game. The reason is NOT that anyone felt they should not be there, or should be there, historically. The reason was that the designers have a philosophy to avoide one-off rules at all costs. I believe, personally, that they take the idea too far. However, the fact remains that they want to use the existing dynamics of the rules, the ability to adjust war effort and the like, to reflect such things, rather than create a special rule that applies to only one country.

[ungers_pride]

You have a gift for misquoting and putting words in peoples mouths.

zhukov does not claim that siberians weer unimportant - he says that they arrived in dribs and drabs and not in one bunch and that the bulk of the counterattacking forces in December of 1941 were not recent arrivals from Siberia.

where does Glantz say that Zhukov has lied? I have Zhukov's memoirs - the 1985 2-volume set, and I've posted a link to Glantz's assessment of Soviet historians and quoptes from it - nowhere in there does he say Zhukov has lied. Certainly he is inaccurate in some cases - you pointed out some. Can you show me why he is inaccurate in his assessment of the nature of the Siberian reinforcements? how is this any different from inaccuracies and "selective memory" of other allied leaders in their memoirs?

Why is Zhukov's support for the communist party important? That's the 2nd time you've quoted those 3 factors on here - as if they are vidence of something - yet you give no actual evidence of how they are relevant to Zhukov's statements about the Siberians. Glantz praises the accuracy of Soviet material about unit positions and dates in the post Stalin era - which is when Zhukov published.

But others are nonsenese - do you think that Glantz's first book became more accurate after he published a few more??

huh?

One of the things you said went to the credibility of an author was how many books he had published - so presumably you think that Glantz became more accurate when he published more books.

I'm not surprised you don't understand my comment - the initial point was silly.

Dribs and drabs - you really are clutching at straws.

I started this looking for information about the Siberians. I have quoted books and websites. you have misquoted, misrepresented and mis-directed at every turn. You quote an author who says there were 25 divisions in siberia? Glantz says there were over twice that many.

It would have ben nice if you'd presented some actual evidence other than your repeated irrelevant denunciations of Zhukov, but alas I see you are hot air - you claim a love of history, but do nothing to try to draw apart it's veils.

I really wish you could offer me some actual information instead of your opinionated dismissal of such information as I have.
Can you actually give me division numbers assigned to armies on 6 December 1941, and when they had arrived from Siberia? that is the level of information I would like to see - regardless of whether it supports "my position" or not.

alas I fear you cannot.

I have jsut recently ordered half of Charles Sharp's OOB's for the Soviet army in WW2 tho - maybe his research will be better than what I have found through here. I dont' know that I'll bother summarising it for you tho. I dont' think you're really interested.

My apologies to others who may be interested in this subject - clearly my debate with this person is unproductive for actual information.

I guess you never read my previous posts in this thread.

Twice I posted Glantz's comments on Zhukov's book - Glantz calls Zhukov's details of Operation Mars a FALSIFICATION. You do know what that word means don't you? It means Zhukov LIED.

In addition to having Zhukov's book by your side, you should also have a dictionary handy as well.

If you can't figure out the reason why I mentioned Zhukov's party affiliation with respect to the censorship of his book, then I really am wasting my time on this forum with you.

To have to take time to explain such elementary meaning of words such as "falsification" and "bias" of authors is ridiculous, especially for someone who claims to have a degree in history

If you cannot get past such elementary stuff as this, then I fear greatly about your understanding of anything really meaningful.

Yes, you have posted links to six websites which contain nothing but a collection of raw data. You truly are a fountain of reference material.

You have yet to post a single quote from a single book by a historian in support of your views. You haven't even quoted Zhukov from his book.

Your reply to my posts is the reason why I do not engage in discussions of this type on forums - it is simply a waste of my time.

I have a stack of books beside me right now. The more I read, the more Far East divisions I am finding that were committed to the west. In the link to Battlefront's discussion alone, the author lists 31 divisions that were sent west! Some were whole armies such as the 16th and 24th. And these are just the ones that we can find quickly. Glantz lists 33 divisions from the Far East.

But I am not the person who has to prove anything. All the major historians have already proven it. The onus is on YOU and ZHUKOV to show that the Far Eastern divisions didn't make a big impact on the western front.

So far you get a failing grade.

I am satisfied that the developer is accounting for reinforcements for the USSR in the game.

[ungers_pride]

Unger - This statement is either false and you are mistaken, or you are deliberately lying, and I hope it is the former:

This whole Siberian reinforcement thing started when a couple of beta testers argued successfully to have the Siberian reinforcements removed from the game in general, and from the USSR in particular.

There were NEVER siberian units in the game. The reason is NOT that anyone felt they should not be there, or should be there, historically. The reason was that the designers have a philosophy to avoide one-off rules at all costs. I believe, personally, that they take the idea too far. However, the fact remains that they want to use the existing dynamics of the rules, the ability to adjust war effort and the like, to reflect such things, rather than create a special rule that applies to only one country.

Please.

Didn't you even bother to read the quote from possum, upon which I based my opinion?

Here is the quote. It can be found in the patch thread:

possum said this about Siberian reinforcements on June 30, 2007:

#1 was discussed in beta. I argued for the "siberian armor", and Stalins_Organ expressed the opinion that the whole business of siberian reinforcements was largely a myth.

Since no one, not even S_O made any comments about the above statement, and since the Siberians didn't appear in the game design, then it follows that one would draw the conclusion that those discussions between the beta testers resulted in the Siberians being removed from the game.

Now that you have finally clarified the issue, it can be discarded.