Colonial Portuguese – who made this list???
Posted: Mon Apr 04, 2011 12:59 pm
The first words that came to my mind when I first saw the Colonial Portuguese list were “That’s impossible!!!”. How could have someone made such a list? What sources were used? Or did they used any sources at all? Did they even bothered to investigate?
Obviously, they did not.
Just by looking at the troop classification, I immediately saw that wile some things were correct, most of the classification was just simply wrong.
The first and most striking fault of all is the “averageness” of the troops.
Let’s be honest: this list must accurately reflect groups of men used to strike hard, fight hard and win against all odds, always under a numerical inferiority of 1:5; 1:10; 1:20, sometimes even more. There are numberless accounts on that. No ordinary men would fight in these conditions, time and time again. Therefore, to classify these troops as Average is to actually downgrade them and to go against History.
The second fault in the list is the absence of the “swordsmen” classification. Again, that goes against historical facts. The Portuguese not only were good swordsmen but they also tended to close in and endure close-combat. Wile they are accurately given the “Impact Foot” characteristic, at least until 1626 (I don’t get this particular date), they’re not given the necessary “swordsmen” classification that would give’em the endurance they often showed. The list ignores these facts.
On the other hand, it gives “swordsmen” classification to the Portuguese slaves, as if they had hand to hand fighting abilities unknown to the Portuguese!
As a matter of fact, these (mostly Black) slaves were very hardy, usually under the effects of alchool, but they should be classified as Impact Foot, as stated by the Dutch after their failure to storm Macau:
“Many Portuguese slaves, Blacks and others, after gotten drunk, charged our musketeers so furiously that it was a sight to be seen.“
Another and most incredible thing, is that (as it seems!), until 1525 the Portuguese only had crossbows!!! Amazing! Does the author of this list ignores that, even in the late 15th century, the Portuguese already used handguns (at it already appears in the FOG:AM list!)? So, unless Portugal suffered a technological reversion, this Renascence list - just by using another Portuguese army list for comparison – is wrong.
However, by 1500, the Portuguese had long passed the handgun scene. By that time, they were already using espingardas (arquebuses) with the schnapp-lunte lock, and from 1510 onwards, with the conquest of Goa, its arsenal and its weapon smiths, the Portuguese further increased the use of arquebuses.
The crossbow maintained its existence for a few decades more but, by 1511, the Armada under Afonso de Albuquerque that took Malacca already had an even number of crossbowmen and espingardeiros (arquebusiers). So much for the crossbow!
As for another absurdity, the author of this list puts the introduction of the musket into Portuguese hands only in 1626. This ignores the fact that early in 1608 the galleon Bom Jesus, captured by the Dutch, already had muskets aboard, and that the fortress of Mozambique also had muskets in its inventory (MURTEIRA, André Alexandre Martins. “A Carreira da Índia e o Corso Neerlandês 1595-1625”, Lisbon, 2006).
Another striking feature is the name of the troops.
Civilizados in the 16th and 17th centuries??? That word would be correct in the 19th and 20th centuries, but not in such an early date! If the author actually refers to natives with a certain extent of Portuguese culture, he should use the word topazes instead. According to the Glossário Luso-Asiático, Topaz is a mestiço (half-bread) who spoke and dressed like a Portuguese, was a Catholic and often served as a soldier. It also meant the indigenous Christian who spoke Portuguese.
Then, according to the author, from 1626 to 1650 the Portuguese replaced their soldados and topazes with degredados, i.e., convicts! Stunning! One may wonder where all the others go... And were there no other men available in Portugal to fight in Asia an elsewhere? Yes there were. So, perhaps the author of the list should read C.R. Boxer more carefully.
That convicts and vagabonds were shipped out to India and the East, there are no doubts about it. Actually, there were always convicts present in the Portuguese Expansionand even in the Reconquest against the Moors. They were called homiziados and were sent to the most troublesome places. But to say that from 1626 (why this date, by the way?) the Portuguese troops were all made of convicts (namely in Brazil!) is simply absurd.
Can the author tell us what was the proportion of convicts in the Portuguese companies? 20%? 50%? More?
And were there any penal companies that we should know of? To my knowledge, there were none.
In fact, most of the troops were made of free men, just as free as any other in Europe, send there as levy or looking after fortune. There were convicts, too many for many people’s taste, but they were never the majority, unless the place was a disease-infested dump such as parts of Angola, for instance.
Organized infantry units first appeared in Brazil in 1625 with the Terço da Baía, raised by D. Fradique de Toledo Osório. A Neapolitan Tercio was shipped to Brazil in 1636 and fought against the Dutch until the latter’s surrender.
In Goa, the first organised infantry formation was raised in 1671.
Obviously, these terços or regiments were not made of convicts, but the list seems to ignore that.
Regarding the artillery, to my knowledge, the proportion was much, much higher than that showed in the list. In Ethiopia, D. Cristovão da Gama had 400 men, 2 medium guns, 6 light guns and 11 makeshift organ guns (each one made of 10 arquebuses put together in a cart). In 1504 Duarte Pacheco Pereira defended Cochim against the troops of Calecut by using a line of fortified “islets” manned by 70 men and 9 guns. And there are many more examples of a high proportion of artillery (and fortified positions, by the way!).
One other absurdity is the ally list. Does the guy who made this list ignore that in Ceylon the Portuguese used allied troops, sometimes to an extent that, in a Portuguese army, only one in forty was actually a Portuguese? So, how can it be affirmed that the Hindu (and therefore, Sinhalese) list can only be used “in India”???
And since we’re talking about allies, please revise a few things in the Ethiopian list. First of all, the Portuguese were not mercenaries. That’s just ridiculous. They were not Hessians not “contractors”. The expedition sent under D. Cristovão da Gama was all made of volunteers, ordinary soldiers that were not under the Abyssinian King’s payroll.
Moreover (and that reverts, once again, to the Portuguese troop classification), if the 400 Portuguese sent to help the Ethiopians were just “Average, Arquebus, Impact Foot” soldiers, one wonders how did they stormed a fortress manned by 1500 men, engaged in hand to hand fight, killed everybody inside and suffered only 8 dead and 50 wounded. “Average” soldiers do that? To the best of my knowledge, they do not, not even against “Poor” rated soldiers.
In order to show what is right and what is wrong in this list, I will show a few examples, all taken from Ribeiro, João. “Fatalidade História da Ilha de Ceilão”; Lisboa: Alfa - Biblioteca da Expansão Portuguesa nº 3, 1989:
In 04 January 1644, D. António Mascarenhas, leading two groups of 300 and 200 men each, faced 7 Dutch esquadrões (generic term for battle formations), each one made of 600 men, “all in one line and separated from each other 30 paces, but because of the woods only two of these [esquadrões] could be seen by our men. D. António Mascarenhas and the captain-major António da Mota Galvão decided to strike the two esquadrões in their front; their were marching toward us in square formation, and after the first volley fired at them, also receiving theirs, they were attacked by our men, sword in hand, and of these two esquadrões, most of the men were gorged [degolados, in the original]; however, [because] our people did not took precautions, they were hit in their flanks by the five esquadrões who, at a fast pace, charged our men who were disorganised, running after and killing those who had escaped from the first two esquadrões; and thus they found us spread all over, incapable of facing them in any way so that the enemy, with a few volleys, took care of us in a way that those who were spared by the bullet were saved by their feet.”
(Ribeiro, book II, chapter XIV)
“And there was no time we wanted him to flee to the mountains that we couldn’t force him to, storming Kandy and putting his city and palace ablaze and then leaving his kingdom and returning home at a fast pace. Therefore, neither could he prevent us from attacking nor could he stop us from turning home at will. So, one can see that, with us, he live unquiet wile whit the Dutch he suffers nothing as they are not such a people that fearlessly enters the woods, crossing rivers and swaps barefoot, covered in bleaches, wile we didn’t even noticed these things.” (Ribeiro, book III, chapter X)
João Botado de Seixas, with 40 soldiers, “all of them honoured men who volunteered to accompany him”, along with 1500 Sinhalese lanscarins, faced 18000 Sinhalese from Kandy. This hardly fought battle lasted for about two hours and was all fought with “spear and sword”. The Portuguese lost 19 men and 132 lanscarins, their enemies lost 600 men and their leader. (Ribeiro, book II, chapter XVII)
In late March 1655, the King of Kandy, with an army made of 3000 musketeers, 9000 arquebusiers, 13000 bowmen, 15000 spearmen and 50 Dutch mounted arquebusiers, invadeds Portuguese held lands.
Under Gaspar Figueira [de Serpa, a Portuguese-Sinhalese half-bread] were 240 Portuguese, 37 half bread or converted topazes and 4000 Sinhalese lanscarins. Not only the Portuguese didn’t fled but they actually attacked the enemy.
“At a short distance he [Gaspar Figueira] saw the valley filled with countless enemies and, without stop, he ordered a charge so to embolden our men and, despising the enemy, he was the first to joint the fight against such an amazing multitude of men. (…) musket and arquebus bullets were being fired from every side like a hail of fire, while the arrows shot by that huge mob seemed like clouds. All that would be horror and confusion, were not for the fact that that was a nation such as ours, used to that sort of ordeal, so that they broke through them with repeated charges, and Figueira, sword in hand before everyone else, was like a lightning, striking so hard that Death befell upon every of his victims. This battle lasted little more than an hour and the enemy, unable to stand ground, lost his nerve, every men fleeing and taking refuge everywhere he could (…). Our lanscarins shopped off 11000 heads and took 1600 prisoners, 700 muskets and countless arquebuses.” (Ribeiro, book II, chapter XX)
17 october 1655, Gaspar Figueira with 900 soldiers was given orders to attack the Dutch as soon as they came in sight. In Moroto beach, near Columbo, the Portuguese fought against 6400 Dutch and their Sinhalese auxiliaries.
“Fighting with spears [Ajustados às lançadas], this hardly fought battle lasted for about one and a half hour, neither side gaining advantage over the other, although the Dutch wrecked great destruction in our ranks by using four guns, and because our numbers weren’t enough to secure the entire length of that beach, the enemy surrounded our right flank with a strong esquadrão (singular for esquadrões, i.e., battle formation) so that we came under crossfire, thus forcing us to show’em our backs “(Ribeiro, book II, chapter XXII)
By reading these accounts, and many others, one can clearly see that the Portuguese were used to fight against overwhelming numbers and often won. That clearly puts the “Average” classification at stake.
Along with it, these descriptions clearly show that the Portuguese were used to strike fast and hard (therefore, Impact Foot), but they also endured long lasting hand to hand fights, therefore they also must be classified as Swordsmen.
These characteristics should no be limited to such an early date as 1626 (?) since, as stated above, even in the 1650’s, the same methods of fight were in use.
Along with these thoughts, one must simply take care to look at numbers. With this sort of army, the Colonial Portuguese will equal, if not surpass, in sheer numbers, most of its foes. That’s simply absurd when – History makes no secret about it! – reality was quite the opposite.
Therefore, the Colonial Portuguese list suffers from poor classification standards.
The troops should be classified as follows:
Until 1515: Warriors; Unarmoured; up to ½ Superior/ remaining Average; up to ½ Arquebus / remaining Crossbow; Impact Foot; Swordsmen
From 1516 to 1550: Warriors; Unarmoured; up to ½ Superior/ remaining Average; Arquebus or Crossbow; Impact Foot; Swordsmen
From 1551: Warriors; Unarmoured; up to ½ Superior/ remaining Average; Arquebus; Impact Foot; Swordsmen
From 1600 (a more plausible date than 1626!): Warriors; Unarmoured; up to ½ Superior/ remaining Average; up to ½ Musket / remaining Arquebus; Impact Foot; Swordsmen
Casados: Warriors; Unarmoured; Average; Arquebus; Swordsmen
Topazes: Warriors; Unarmoured; Average; Arquebus
Slaves: Warriors; Unarmoured; Average; Impact Foot
The light infantry should follow this scheme.
As for the artillery, they should have 2 more light artillery bases.
They also should be given some 8 bases of fortifications.
When making a Portuguese Colonial army list (or any other, as a matter of fact), one must cling to historical facts. These come from sources and investigation. By looking at this list, I cannot but say that those were never taken into account.
Obviously, they did not.
Just by looking at the troop classification, I immediately saw that wile some things were correct, most of the classification was just simply wrong.
The first and most striking fault of all is the “averageness” of the troops.
Let’s be honest: this list must accurately reflect groups of men used to strike hard, fight hard and win against all odds, always under a numerical inferiority of 1:5; 1:10; 1:20, sometimes even more. There are numberless accounts on that. No ordinary men would fight in these conditions, time and time again. Therefore, to classify these troops as Average is to actually downgrade them and to go against History.
The second fault in the list is the absence of the “swordsmen” classification. Again, that goes against historical facts. The Portuguese not only were good swordsmen but they also tended to close in and endure close-combat. Wile they are accurately given the “Impact Foot” characteristic, at least until 1626 (I don’t get this particular date), they’re not given the necessary “swordsmen” classification that would give’em the endurance they often showed. The list ignores these facts.
On the other hand, it gives “swordsmen” classification to the Portuguese slaves, as if they had hand to hand fighting abilities unknown to the Portuguese!
As a matter of fact, these (mostly Black) slaves were very hardy, usually under the effects of alchool, but they should be classified as Impact Foot, as stated by the Dutch after their failure to storm Macau:
“Many Portuguese slaves, Blacks and others, after gotten drunk, charged our musketeers so furiously that it was a sight to be seen.“
Another and most incredible thing, is that (as it seems!), until 1525 the Portuguese only had crossbows!!! Amazing! Does the author of this list ignores that, even in the late 15th century, the Portuguese already used handguns (at it already appears in the FOG:AM list!)? So, unless Portugal suffered a technological reversion, this Renascence list - just by using another Portuguese army list for comparison – is wrong.
However, by 1500, the Portuguese had long passed the handgun scene. By that time, they were already using espingardas (arquebuses) with the schnapp-lunte lock, and from 1510 onwards, with the conquest of Goa, its arsenal and its weapon smiths, the Portuguese further increased the use of arquebuses.
The crossbow maintained its existence for a few decades more but, by 1511, the Armada under Afonso de Albuquerque that took Malacca already had an even number of crossbowmen and espingardeiros (arquebusiers). So much for the crossbow!
As for another absurdity, the author of this list puts the introduction of the musket into Portuguese hands only in 1626. This ignores the fact that early in 1608 the galleon Bom Jesus, captured by the Dutch, already had muskets aboard, and that the fortress of Mozambique also had muskets in its inventory (MURTEIRA, André Alexandre Martins. “A Carreira da Índia e o Corso Neerlandês 1595-1625”, Lisbon, 2006).
Another striking feature is the name of the troops.
Civilizados in the 16th and 17th centuries??? That word would be correct in the 19th and 20th centuries, but not in such an early date! If the author actually refers to natives with a certain extent of Portuguese culture, he should use the word topazes instead. According to the Glossário Luso-Asiático, Topaz is a mestiço (half-bread) who spoke and dressed like a Portuguese, was a Catholic and often served as a soldier. It also meant the indigenous Christian who spoke Portuguese.
Then, according to the author, from 1626 to 1650 the Portuguese replaced their soldados and topazes with degredados, i.e., convicts! Stunning! One may wonder where all the others go... And were there no other men available in Portugal to fight in Asia an elsewhere? Yes there were. So, perhaps the author of the list should read C.R. Boxer more carefully.
That convicts and vagabonds were shipped out to India and the East, there are no doubts about it. Actually, there were always convicts present in the Portuguese Expansionand even in the Reconquest against the Moors. They were called homiziados and were sent to the most troublesome places. But to say that from 1626 (why this date, by the way?) the Portuguese troops were all made of convicts (namely in Brazil!) is simply absurd.
Can the author tell us what was the proportion of convicts in the Portuguese companies? 20%? 50%? More?
And were there any penal companies that we should know of? To my knowledge, there were none.
In fact, most of the troops were made of free men, just as free as any other in Europe, send there as levy or looking after fortune. There were convicts, too many for many people’s taste, but they were never the majority, unless the place was a disease-infested dump such as parts of Angola, for instance.
Organized infantry units first appeared in Brazil in 1625 with the Terço da Baía, raised by D. Fradique de Toledo Osório. A Neapolitan Tercio was shipped to Brazil in 1636 and fought against the Dutch until the latter’s surrender.
In Goa, the first organised infantry formation was raised in 1671.
Obviously, these terços or regiments were not made of convicts, but the list seems to ignore that.
Regarding the artillery, to my knowledge, the proportion was much, much higher than that showed in the list. In Ethiopia, D. Cristovão da Gama had 400 men, 2 medium guns, 6 light guns and 11 makeshift organ guns (each one made of 10 arquebuses put together in a cart). In 1504 Duarte Pacheco Pereira defended Cochim against the troops of Calecut by using a line of fortified “islets” manned by 70 men and 9 guns. And there are many more examples of a high proportion of artillery (and fortified positions, by the way!).
One other absurdity is the ally list. Does the guy who made this list ignore that in Ceylon the Portuguese used allied troops, sometimes to an extent that, in a Portuguese army, only one in forty was actually a Portuguese? So, how can it be affirmed that the Hindu (and therefore, Sinhalese) list can only be used “in India”???
And since we’re talking about allies, please revise a few things in the Ethiopian list. First of all, the Portuguese were not mercenaries. That’s just ridiculous. They were not Hessians not “contractors”. The expedition sent under D. Cristovão da Gama was all made of volunteers, ordinary soldiers that were not under the Abyssinian King’s payroll.
Moreover (and that reverts, once again, to the Portuguese troop classification), if the 400 Portuguese sent to help the Ethiopians were just “Average, Arquebus, Impact Foot” soldiers, one wonders how did they stormed a fortress manned by 1500 men, engaged in hand to hand fight, killed everybody inside and suffered only 8 dead and 50 wounded. “Average” soldiers do that? To the best of my knowledge, they do not, not even against “Poor” rated soldiers.
In order to show what is right and what is wrong in this list, I will show a few examples, all taken from Ribeiro, João. “Fatalidade História da Ilha de Ceilão”; Lisboa: Alfa - Biblioteca da Expansão Portuguesa nº 3, 1989:
In 04 January 1644, D. António Mascarenhas, leading two groups of 300 and 200 men each, faced 7 Dutch esquadrões (generic term for battle formations), each one made of 600 men, “all in one line and separated from each other 30 paces, but because of the woods only two of these [esquadrões] could be seen by our men. D. António Mascarenhas and the captain-major António da Mota Galvão decided to strike the two esquadrões in their front; their were marching toward us in square formation, and after the first volley fired at them, also receiving theirs, they were attacked by our men, sword in hand, and of these two esquadrões, most of the men were gorged [degolados, in the original]; however, [because] our people did not took precautions, they were hit in their flanks by the five esquadrões who, at a fast pace, charged our men who were disorganised, running after and killing those who had escaped from the first two esquadrões; and thus they found us spread all over, incapable of facing them in any way so that the enemy, with a few volleys, took care of us in a way that those who were spared by the bullet were saved by their feet.”
(Ribeiro, book II, chapter XIV)
“And there was no time we wanted him to flee to the mountains that we couldn’t force him to, storming Kandy and putting his city and palace ablaze and then leaving his kingdom and returning home at a fast pace. Therefore, neither could he prevent us from attacking nor could he stop us from turning home at will. So, one can see that, with us, he live unquiet wile whit the Dutch he suffers nothing as they are not such a people that fearlessly enters the woods, crossing rivers and swaps barefoot, covered in bleaches, wile we didn’t even noticed these things.” (Ribeiro, book III, chapter X)
João Botado de Seixas, with 40 soldiers, “all of them honoured men who volunteered to accompany him”, along with 1500 Sinhalese lanscarins, faced 18000 Sinhalese from Kandy. This hardly fought battle lasted for about two hours and was all fought with “spear and sword”. The Portuguese lost 19 men and 132 lanscarins, their enemies lost 600 men and their leader. (Ribeiro, book II, chapter XVII)
In late March 1655, the King of Kandy, with an army made of 3000 musketeers, 9000 arquebusiers, 13000 bowmen, 15000 spearmen and 50 Dutch mounted arquebusiers, invadeds Portuguese held lands.
Under Gaspar Figueira [de Serpa, a Portuguese-Sinhalese half-bread] were 240 Portuguese, 37 half bread or converted topazes and 4000 Sinhalese lanscarins. Not only the Portuguese didn’t fled but they actually attacked the enemy.
“At a short distance he [Gaspar Figueira] saw the valley filled with countless enemies and, without stop, he ordered a charge so to embolden our men and, despising the enemy, he was the first to joint the fight against such an amazing multitude of men. (…) musket and arquebus bullets were being fired from every side like a hail of fire, while the arrows shot by that huge mob seemed like clouds. All that would be horror and confusion, were not for the fact that that was a nation such as ours, used to that sort of ordeal, so that they broke through them with repeated charges, and Figueira, sword in hand before everyone else, was like a lightning, striking so hard that Death befell upon every of his victims. This battle lasted little more than an hour and the enemy, unable to stand ground, lost his nerve, every men fleeing and taking refuge everywhere he could (…). Our lanscarins shopped off 11000 heads and took 1600 prisoners, 700 muskets and countless arquebuses.” (Ribeiro, book II, chapter XX)
17 october 1655, Gaspar Figueira with 900 soldiers was given orders to attack the Dutch as soon as they came in sight. In Moroto beach, near Columbo, the Portuguese fought against 6400 Dutch and their Sinhalese auxiliaries.
“Fighting with spears [Ajustados às lançadas], this hardly fought battle lasted for about one and a half hour, neither side gaining advantage over the other, although the Dutch wrecked great destruction in our ranks by using four guns, and because our numbers weren’t enough to secure the entire length of that beach, the enemy surrounded our right flank with a strong esquadrão (singular for esquadrões, i.e., battle formation) so that we came under crossfire, thus forcing us to show’em our backs “(Ribeiro, book II, chapter XXII)
By reading these accounts, and many others, one can clearly see that the Portuguese were used to fight against overwhelming numbers and often won. That clearly puts the “Average” classification at stake.
Along with it, these descriptions clearly show that the Portuguese were used to strike fast and hard (therefore, Impact Foot), but they also endured long lasting hand to hand fights, therefore they also must be classified as Swordsmen.
These characteristics should no be limited to such an early date as 1626 (?) since, as stated above, even in the 1650’s, the same methods of fight were in use.
Along with these thoughts, one must simply take care to look at numbers. With this sort of army, the Colonial Portuguese will equal, if not surpass, in sheer numbers, most of its foes. That’s simply absurd when – History makes no secret about it! – reality was quite the opposite.
Therefore, the Colonial Portuguese list suffers from poor classification standards.
The troops should be classified as follows:
Until 1515: Warriors; Unarmoured; up to ½ Superior/ remaining Average; up to ½ Arquebus / remaining Crossbow; Impact Foot; Swordsmen
From 1516 to 1550: Warriors; Unarmoured; up to ½ Superior/ remaining Average; Arquebus or Crossbow; Impact Foot; Swordsmen
From 1551: Warriors; Unarmoured; up to ½ Superior/ remaining Average; Arquebus; Impact Foot; Swordsmen
From 1600 (a more plausible date than 1626!): Warriors; Unarmoured; up to ½ Superior/ remaining Average; up to ½ Musket / remaining Arquebus; Impact Foot; Swordsmen
Casados: Warriors; Unarmoured; Average; Arquebus; Swordsmen
Topazes: Warriors; Unarmoured; Average; Arquebus
Slaves: Warriors; Unarmoured; Average; Impact Foot
The light infantry should follow this scheme.
As for the artillery, they should have 2 more light artillery bases.
They also should be given some 8 bases of fortifications.
When making a Portuguese Colonial army list (or any other, as a matter of fact), one must cling to historical facts. These come from sources and investigation. By looking at this list, I cannot but say that those were never taken into account.