Slitherine

Disclamer : The game is perfect as is. This post is just because I like History. It’s not meant to make any change in the Vanilla game which is based on a smart economy of units and a top-down approach.

My current historical question is : Are there light horse in the Greek lists before the 4th century BC ?

Let's start with Richard Nelson and his book, Armies of the Greek and Persian Wars (500-350 BC). He doesn’t mention any greek light cav. According to him :
1) Till 480 BC, beside the Greek Cavalryman armed like an Hoplite without a shield, the Thessalian cavalrymen were armed with javelins and a long sword.
2) Little changed in terms of offensive weapons for the Greek cavalryman of 400 BC who still carried javelins and sometimes a spear.

Afaik our main sources come from Athens and ‘Athenian’ writers.

Glenn R. Bugh summarizes the introduction of ‘Light Horse’ in the Athenian armies as followed :

1) The Athenians employed a force of two hundred mounted bowmen (Hippotoxotai) in the 5th and early 4th centuries B.C. They are mentioned three times in Thucydides (2.13.8, 5.84.1-2, 6.94.4) and once by Xenophon in his Memorabilia (3.3.1). (imho maybe after witnessing the effectivness of the Persian mounted bowmen ?)

2) Sometime between the 390s and 360s, Hippotoxotai were replaced with prodromoi in Athens.

Note : Prodromoi only means ‘front-runners’ in Ancient Greek. Game wise, it only means 'Light Horse'. They can be equipped either with javelin as the Light Javelin Horse in the Greek lists or with sarissa as the Prodromoi of the Macedonian lists of the game.

Bugh describes the Prodromoi as "an advance force, skirmishers, scouts, couriers". In Athens they are recorded first in Xenophon's Hipparchikos (1.25), usually dated to the 360s. Xenophon advises to train them rigorously in the use of the javelin. The prodromoi are also mentionned in Aristotle’s book, the Athenian Constitution, ca. 325 BC.

About the other Greek areas, Glenn R. Bugh states that "Prodromoi attested elsewhere at almost exactly the same time may offer close parallels to their counterparts in Athens". In Macedonia in the early campaigns of Alexander the Great carrying the long spear called sarissa and are thus known in our sources as sarissophoroi (Arrian 1.14.1, 6; 3.12.3, with Q Curtius Rufus 4.15.13). Bugh adds the Athenian prodromoi were armed like Alexander’s hippakontistai (Javelin Cavalry).

3) The Athenian prodromoi are attested epigraphically as late as the mid 3rd century B.C.

4) In the 2nd century B.C. Athens reorganized its cavalry using ‘Tarantines’ (Tarantinoi), a generic term of the Hellenistic period for the javelin-throwing light cavalry.

So, according to Bugh, in Athens, "as prodromoi had supplanted hippotoxotai (ca 390-360 BC), so in turn tarantinoi replaced the prodromoi (ca 167 BC)".

Sources (from the American School of Classical Studies at Athens) :
- On paper : https://www.ascsa.edu.gr/uploads/media/ ... 148421.pdf
- On Youtube : https://youtu.be/ps0Lx2kVZVY

So what ?
It seems possible that, before the 4th century, javelin light horses were not used by Greeks, meaning that, before this date, there might have been only one type of Greek cavalry : able to throw javelins and to charge other cavalries of the time and the flanks of the hoplites, but not as maneuvrable as Light Horse, while still a bit more maneuvrable than the ingame non-light cav.

Any historical source contradicting this view would of course be very much welcome

My imperssion is that the in-game light cavalry and light-spear armed cavalry are (through most of the game) essentially a representation of one and same type of historical cavalry. Through light and non-light formations they are mechanically assigned to the two extremes of of their role and capability, with their actual capabilities having been somewhere in the middle.

Speaking of Greek cavalry (and kind of continuing from the thread in FoG2M forum), did the book you brought up mention any ancient Greek battles (or can you recall some) where cavalry would have ended up disrupting or severely threatening a phalanx?

Based on the seemingly auxiliary role (ranging from mounted infantry and scounting to screening and "area denial") of Greek cavalry in all pre-Macedonian battles that I know of, I suspect their real combat role was that of light cavalry, with threat they pose to heavy infantry being mainly theoretical. Based on my memory and a quick look at the (very few) relevant books I have at hand, I can't find any examples of Greek cavalry attacking the flanks or rear of the infantry after winning the cavalry duel on a flank. In contrast, it happens quite often in the Macedonian and Roman eras.

MVP7 wrote: My imperssion is that the in-game light cavalry and light-spear armed cavalry are (through most of the game) essentially a representation of one and same type of historical cavalry. Through light and non-light formations they are mechanically assigned to the two extremes of of their role and capability, with their actual capabilities having been somewhere in the middle.

Except that there seems to be no Greek javelin-armed light cavalry during the 5th century while there is one from the 4th century on, according to Glenn R. Bugh and other authors.

RL non-light Greek cavalry might actually be seen as an average of the two extremes in game (LH and non-LH) : non-light cav throwing javelin and a bit more maneuvrable than ingame non-light cav :

MVP7' wrote: Based on the seemingly auxiliary role (ranging from mounted infantry and scounting to screening and "area denial") of Greek cavalry in all pre-Macedonian battles that I know of, I suspect their real combat role was that of light cavalry, with threat they pose to heavy infantry being mainly theoretical. Based on my memory and a quick look at the (very few) relevant books I have at hand, I can't find any examples of Greek cavalry attacking the flanks or rear of the infantry after winning the cavalry duel on a flank. In contrast, it happens quite often in the Macedonian and Roman eras.

I suspect the Ancient Greek of choosing their battlefields so that their hoplites couldn’t be flanked (by any kind of enemy units). Others did it, such as the HYW English longbowmen. The most famous case is, of course, the Thermopylai : « These places, then, were thought by the Greeks to suit their purpose. After making a thorough survey, they concluded that the barbarians could not make use of their entire army, nor of their horsemen. » ( Herodotus VII, 177). But it could also be the case at Marathon.

That said, as you requested, here are a few copy/pasted quotes from the book you mention. The topic would require more reseach. As Thucydide put it :

At Delion in 424 BC, the Theban commander Pagondas sent a few hundred horsemen round behind a hill to support his crumbling left wing; the Athenians, thinking a whole fresh army was bearing down on them, broke and fled (Thuc. 4.96.5).

During Gylippos' second battle as the commander of the Syracusans (414 BC), he posted his cavalry at the end of his line, where they charged and shattered the Athenian left wing, and the rest of the army was, therefore, also defeated by the Syracusans (Thuc. 7.6.2-3).

At the battle of Cynoscephalae in 364, after Pelopidas had been killed, his hoplites pinned the enemy down until « the cavalry, charging up, routed the entire phalanx of the enemy, and, following on a great distance in pursuit, filled the country with their dead bodies, slaying more than three thousand of them. » (Plutarch, Pelopidas 32.7).

A horse, even a small one, charging your back even at a trot, even without saddle, it’s heavy, it’s too fast for your taste, it hurts and/or it frightens. See all the concussion protocols in rugby matches nowadays.

Btw charges from the flank or rear that would bother me much more in FoG2 would be massed archers charging Heavy foot, Keils...

(edit 1)

MVP7 wrote: Based on the seemingly auxiliary role (ranging from mounted infantry and scounting to screening and "area denial") of Greek cavalry in all pre-Macedonian battles that I know of, I suspect their real combat role was that of light cavalry, with threat they pose to heavy infantry being mainly theoretical.

I for one think, on the contrary, that any cavalry can charge from the rear or flank with some effects, while being able to ride as light horse, that is being able to ride fast, fire fast and disengage fast without being caught, require some skills and a bit of training. I think it is something present in the FoG/P&S series with the introduction of non-light cav before the light horse.

It seems to me that most (if not all) cavalry of all times spent some time carrying out the auxiliary role you mention.

(edit 2)
Btw it is non-sense to assess the effectivness of the Greek cav without taking into account the terrain. To compare the FoG2 units with the historical ones, one has to use them on 'Mediterranean Mountains' with quite a few strips of rough and mountains.

In FoG2 terms, I would prefer a lower quality non-light cavalry for the non-Thessalian (maybe non-Theban/Syracusan) Classical Greek cavalry (unmaneuverable, average, light-spear, 50% swordsmen would be my pitch) instead of the usual light javelin and the non-light light-spear cavalry.

To clarify, I'm mainly speaking of the Athenian or "typical" Greek cavalry (as flawed as that consept is). The usual FoG2 light-spear cavalry could still be fine fit for the more highly regarded(?) Thessalian, Theban and Sicilian(?) cavalry. However, my impressions on this subject are largely based on Wargame Research Group published Armies of the Greek and Persian wars (1978) by Richard Bruce Nelson that I last red years ago. (IIRC, RBS mentioned in some thread that he thought that book was a bit outdated by now)

Regarding the influence of the battlefield on the efficiency of cavalry: Certainly all armies in history have strived to pick such locations for their battles that their flanks wouldn't be vulnerable. It seems exceedingly unlikely that the Greeks would have managed to avoid exposed flanks without fault for hundreds of years when such events occur regularly for the next two millennia and then some (even to the English). I think it's far more likely that Greek cavalry of that era simply wasn't organized in a way that would have allowed them to effectively conduct large flanking actions or shock attacks (more on this last statement later).

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Regarding the tactical mobility of Greek cavalry: Lack of drilled movement and formation, even in loose form, does not make a collection of individuals tactically maneuverable entity. Thinking that a formationless force is somehow omnidirectionally efficient and maneuverable disregards the psychological, communicational, and social aspects of the excercise.

It's not cavalry (which would make the movement and organization even more complicated) but here's an interesting video of tribal warfare in 1960's Papua that gives some perspective of what an undrilled force realistically acts like in a battle: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JI4uirwxx1Y . Securing flanks isn't much of an factor. There is no Total War-esque Borg collective mind that would allow execution of decisive flanking maneuvers even if such opportunities physically existed. The commander has his hands full managing even the linear skirmish. The rudimentary command structure means the flow of combat is mostly determined by individual initiative/bravery and any semblance of formation is more social than tactical in nature.

E.g. In a "barbarian" army there may be no contubernium and century to maintain and align but instead you are most likely inclined to stay with your brother and father, who are following your influential uncle (who wears a rare hauberk and fights in the front and center) accompanied by the rest of your close relatives. Furhermore, the uncle is following the local chieftain, whom he's sworn to, while making sure he doesn't lead your family too close to your distant cousin's people whom your family has been feuding with for years and who would no doubt take an oppotunity to shank your father in the heat of battle. This is how the Warband's wedge like shape is organically formed as I understand it. As a whole, the absence of rigid drilled tactical formation does not make an efficiently free flowing unidirectional force that will reliably maneuver to exploit every tactical opportunity, it merely makes a formation that is still otherwise rigidly organized by conforming to the social and psychological realities of warfare.

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Regarding the examples you provided: None of them seem to be flanking shock cavalry attacks but rather the approaching cavalry being the last psychological straw that breaks the wavering men. The FoG2 equivalent would be a Fragmented Hoplite unit breaking on contact when charged by cavalry. While I'll be the first to point out that the difference between the psychological and physicals aspect of an assault and combat is mostly nonexistent (e.g. bayonet charges rarely connecting before one side breaks), the battlefield successes of cavalry in this Greek era seem to be more related to the psychological side of the cavalry's presence, rather than them actively creating the openings in stable enemy formations with physical contact.

edit. Cynoscephalae 364 BC seems like the best example of cavalry being influential in classical Greece. Then again, it involves the highly regarded Thessalian and Theban cavalry while taking place only decades before cavalry arm would become the decisive hammer of the Macedonian way of war.

To clarify my view, I don't think the Greek cavalry didn't contribute to the outcomes of battles, or that the Greek cavalry were barely staying in the saddle and tactically incapable. They would certainly have had important operational role and their mere existence on the battlefield would limit what the enemy would be able to do. The Greek cavalry couldn't be ignored but neither does it seem to have been the decisive precision instrument that some other cultures would make it into (and no doubt the terrain of Greece is part of the reason to the development of this secondary or tertiary role). My impression of the Greek cavalry is that their martial and tactical capability was at a level where they could mostly contribute to battles in a fairly linear and low intensity manner. They would still be lethal in the late stages and the aftermath of the battle, not as a course changing decisive event but as the last straw when the writing was already on the wall.

That turned into a long post. I'll edit in my responses if your edits changed or addressed something I was replying to

Everyone is of course entitled to his opinions. A couple of things bother me in your reasoning though :
1) your only source is Armies of the Greek and Persian wars (1978) by Richard Bruce Nelson,
2) you don't take into account the differences between Regular Hippeis, Hippotoxotai, Prodromoi and Tarantinoi in the Athenian cavalry army during the classical and hellenistic times, while they appear in the Archaeological sources,
3) you don't take into acoount Greek terrain,
4) you write "None of (my example) seem to be flanking shock cavalry attacks but rather the approaching cavalry being the last psychological straw that breaks the wavering men". Imho you make an hypothetical interpretation of the wording of an author, Thucydides, that goes way beyond what his text actually says and most likely beyond what the author actually knew of the battles for sure. Ten witnesses to an accident = ten versions of what happened
The only thing I for one can deduce from these texts is that cav successfully charged hoplites from the rear/flank. Why, how, what kind of cav was it ? I don't know.

MVP7 wrote: In FoG2 terms, I would prefer a lower quality non-light cavalry for the non-Thessalian (maybe non-Theban/Syracusan) Classical Greek cavalry (unmaneuverable, average, light-spear, 50% swordsmen would be my pitch) instead of the usual light javelin and the non-light light-spear cavalry.

1) What are the sources showing part of the Classical Thessalian/Theban/Syracusan cavalry acted as Light horse ? This is not a trick question. Just for my knowledge.
2) Still the "non-Thessalian (maybe non-Theban/Syracusan) Classical Greek cavalry" threw javelins. So they tried to act as light skirmishers, even if they were not as skilled in manoeuvrability as the LH units in FoG2.


PS : Sorry for editing my texts too much. Writing/thinking in English remains for me a very hard task.

Here is an interesting short extract of Roel Konijnendijk' book. I don't give the examples nor the explanations at length (for copyright matter). You’ll have to read the book (or free extracts from google books) if wanted :

"It is true that there were some major battles, like First Mantineia, Nemea, and Koroneia, in which cavalry apparently had no part to play until after the matter was decided. However, in each of these cases, our sources dutifully report the presence of significant numbers of horsemen on both sides. Modern authors have sometimes struggled to explain the failure of these horsemen to act. Indeed, the list of battles cited above raises the question: if cavalry attacks against hoplites were so effective, why did cavalry not always decide battles in which they were involved?"

His possible explanations from his sources (p. 186-189) :
1) Restrictive terrain at times prevented cavalry manoeuvre
2) Cavalry were sometimes instructed not to engage in order to play a crucial role in the immediate aftermath of battle : covering the retreat or chasing the routed enemies
3) ... (I don't have access to these pages)
4) "If we assume instead that the Greek historians focused primarily on the forces that decided the outcome, it becomes easier to understand why cavalry action was sometimes left out. Where the horsemen of both sides held each other in check, the decision was left to the hoplites, whose actions were consequently described in more detail."
5) "The same goes for engagements in which mounted troops were held back on purpose. However, where armies were able to use cavalry to tip the scales in their favour, their actions were duly recorded, and credit was given to the decisive force."

@MVP7 : Note that our views are quite close.

Athos1660 wrote: ↑Sun Jun 22, 2025 8:03 am Everyone is of course entitled to his opinions. A couple of things bother me in your reasoning though :
1) your only source is Armies of the Greek and Persian wars (1978) by Richard Bruce Nelson,

That was not the point I was trying to make. My overall impression of the Greek cavalry's low performance is based on the lack of decisive role and overall low importance of Greek cavalry in every book, source and documentary on the subject of pre-Hellenic Greek battles that I have ever seen.

It is the idea that Thessalians, Thebans and Syracusans placed more importance on and put more effort into their cavalry that I mainly base on wargames and (IIRC) Nelson's book (which, I suspect, many of the wargames can trace their lineage to). To support this perception of higher quality, I haven't seen any direct battlefield evidence, ergo, my belief of those exceptions to the Greek cavalry quality is mostly based on what indirect evidence was presented in Nelson's book (differences in ratio of cavalry to foot, regional habits in hiring mercenaries, anecdotes of some states having trouble gettomg their nobles to train or fight mounted, etc).

2) you don't take into account the differences between Regular Hippeis, Hippotoxotai, Prodromoi and Tarantinoi in the Athenian cavalry army during the classical and hellenistic times, while they appear in the Archaeological sources,

I strictly refer to the performance and role of Greek cavalry in the pre-Hellenistic period. The efficiency and prominence of cavalry is clear and undeniable in the Hellenistic era. As for the 4th century BCE and earlier Greek cavalry types, I have not seen anything pointing to significant differences in their overall (small) impact during battles so I'm reluctant to draw botton up conclusions from their alleged equipment and status. In FoG2 terms, mediocre non-light cavalry seems like the most appropriate depiction to me.

Ultimately the influence of the exact equipment of troops isn't as clear set or cut in real life as we are prone to think as wargamers with our clear and neat lists and rule books. This is also my short response to your second-second point regarding my sources supporting the "light cavalry" role of the Thessalian/Theban/Syracusan cavalry, which I have not meant to allege in the sense that you seem to think. More on this later.

3) you don't take into acoount Greek terrain,

I have already commented on it and certainly do not deny its influence. To counter, I maintain that you place far too great emphasis on it.

If I have understood you correctly, you suggest that the Greek cavalry was potent and highly tactically mobile strike force that never, over the hundreds of years, had a real chance to shine on the battlefield due to the Greek terrain.

Is it possible that every Greek commander in every significant Greek battle managed to negate a critical heavy cavalry flank threat just by the clever use of terrain? Yes it is. Is it possible to throw 20 dice with every one rolling a six? Yes it is. Do I think either of these possibilities are likely enough to bet on? I do not.

I'll break down the reasons for my extreme scepticism* of Greek terrain being the main limiting factor of the Greek cavalry's performance in pre-Macedonian era.

Firstly, The Greek went through the effort of maintaining cavalry, and cavalry participates in some degree in many or most Greek battles. This clearly shows that the Greek terrain does not prevent the use of cavalry in combat. Furthermore, Hoplite Phalanxes aren't exactly terrain agnostic formations either and would generally fight in fairly open terrain.

Secondly, (please excuse the hyperbole,) Greece isn't the only hilly and rockly place in the Old World and neither is everything outside of Greece an open steppe. We know that cavalry has made decisive flank and rear, even frontal attacks against infantry body before, after, and likely contemporary to the Greek warfare. The Greeks also faced off outside Greece.

Thirdly, it is unlikely that the Greeks would have put a ton of effort into their cavalry force when their terrain and dominant military system (i.e. large numbers of well organized and shock resistant heavy foot) so clearly didn't lend itself to decisive elite cavalry arm operations. This is no doubt something of a feedback loop with the suboptimal terrain making the cavalry less prevalent, pushing the elites to the phalanxes, further diminishing the effiency and importance of cavalry that would have to face that favored heavy foot.

*(I'm generally sceptical of any single factor ever explaining a wider phenomena, e.g. stirrups leading to rise to the knight, tin shortage causing the bronze age collapse, etc)

4) you write "None of (my example) seem to be flanking shock cavalry attacks but rather the approaching cavalry being the last psychological straw that breaks the wavering men". Imho you make an hypothetical interpretation of the wording of an author, Thucydides, that goes way beyond what his text actually says and most likely beyond what the author actually knew of the battles for sure. Ten witnesses to an accident = ten versions of what happened
The only thing I for one can deduce from these texts is that cav successfully charged hoplites from the rear/flank. Why, how, what kind of cav was it ? I don't know.

At Delium, the cavalry switched flank around a hill behind their friendly line and the apparent sight of fresh reinforcements caused the enemy to break. The cavalry used during the Sicilian Expedition was largely some of the better regarded(?) and from what I have understood, they achieved their greatest successes in screening, defense, harrasment, and in direct cooperation with light infantry. As far as I can tell, there's no sign of them operating as a maneuvering flanking force.

As for Cynoscephalae 364 BCE, Based on excerpt Fred Eugene Ray Jr.'s Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century B.C, There was a cavalry vs cavalry duel fought in the plain that the Thessalians and Thebans won. The commander then dismounted(!), and joined the infantry in pushing the enemy holding a hilltop. After several hard clashes The Pheraean commander decided to retreat due to the possbility(!) of the Thessalian&Theban unengaged cavalry reserve threatening their rear and line of retreat.

In the finale of the battle the now leaderless Theban&Thessalian force was fighting the already once retreated Pheraean army downhill and the pressed Pheraeans broke after the cavalry "joined" the fight. I don't see anything pointing to this final act being a flanking action (or even that those men fought mounted or made it to contact), based on this narration.

The fact that the commander decided to leave the command of the (by then unopposed) cavalry contingent, rather than personally lead it to the exploit the weakness that even the enemy could see (and later acted on) perhaps tells something of the attitude this commander had for the use of cavalry in that kind of offensive tactical maneuver. In a more cavalry minded culture, this sizable contingent would have likely been thought of as the decisive element rather than a conclusion of a sideshow that was the cavalry duel. At the same time, this battle shows the unignorable threat that the cavalry forms merely by being present, even when it isn't the mainstay of an army.

So as far as I can tell, these examples (or any others that I know of) don't really have that element of cavalry winning the flank and wheeling about to assault the enemy's main body from the flank/rear, as you would so often see in battles through the next 20+ centuries.

1) What are the sources showing part of the Classical Thessalian/Theban/Syracusan cavalry acted as Light horse ? This is not a trick question. Just for my knowledge.
2) Still the "non-Thessalian (maybe non-Theban/Syracusan) Classical Greek cavalry" threw javelins. So they tried to act as light skirmishers, even if they were not as skilled in manoeuvrability as the LH units in FoG2.

Let's dig a bit more into the definitions. Imagine a group of horse archers charging at at a group of javelinmen who turn tail and run. The horse archers shoot some but increasingly draw their sabers to cut down the fleeing skirmishers. Are they now considered heavy cavalry?
Next a formation of armoured cavalrymen with javelins come to the reascue of the fleeing skirmishers and the horse archers turn tail to retreat from the pursuing cavalry, both sides loosing and casting at each other as they go. Are these groups now light cavalry, heavy cavalry?
Next the horse archers slip through a solid shieldwall that the pursuing armored cavalry is reluctant to approach. They instead cast some javelins at the sshieldwall in hope of producing or finding a weakness. They now definitely seems to fight like light cavalry but with the aim of getting to act like heavy cavalry.
That cavalry is then driven off by a charging bunch of armored lancers. One of the lancers has butterfingers and accidentally yeets his lance at a fleeing horsemen when he tries to thrust. Is that lancer now light cavalry?

The point I'm making here is that "light" and "heavy" cavalry are highly relative and mostly artificial neologisms that wouldn't have been recognised as such by the people at the time. When describing an ancient battle, they serve as a convenient alternative to dedicating a chapter to pondering the exact relative performance of the cavalry in that particular army or battle. In wargames they are a necessary compromise when trying to translate a battle, as in, the act of organized mass violence, into a battle, as in, the moving of tiny pewter figurines and throwing of dice for enterntainment.

So was the pre-Hellenic Greek cavalry (or any regional variant thereof) light or heavy? To me it seems that they certainly weren't what I would call heavy. The reason being the lack of decisive and aggressive maneuvers or anything resembling direct shock attacks against heavy foot. They mostly seems to have fought other cavalry and operated in screening, skirmishing, pursuit, communication and utility roles, as well as covering retreats. From top down perspective, the exact number and length of the pointy sticks they carried (and may or may not have thrown) is a matter of lesser importance.

In FoG2 terms, I don't feel particularly strongly about the Greeks having dedicated light horse javelinmen. That unit type in general is a bit goofy compromise since, if you are close enough to throw a javelin at someone, they are generally close enough to throw something back at you, which kinda turns the whole thing into a normal melee. Consider the video I linked earlier, that is not just how light infantry fights, it's also how "heavy" infantry would have fought for most of a battle's duration. Light cavalry would be mounted but the principle would likely be the same.

I certainly don't think the Greek cavalry would be worse depicted in the game if there were only a non-light cavalry (in the game sense). If all Greek cavalry was non-light, unmaneuverable, protected, average, light-spear, 50% swordsmen, I think it would be a pretty good match for what I know of Greek battles. Not that I would be able to make a quantitative argument against the current light spear cavalry interpretation either.

PS : Sorry for editing my texts too much. Writing/thinking in English remains for me a very hard task.

No problem at all. I have been guilty of repeat editings mid-conversations as well

Couple more comments on the latter post.

Athos1660 wrote: ↑Sun Jun 22, 2025 8:04 am 2) Cavalry were sometimes instructed not to engage in order to play a crucial role in the immediate aftermath of battle : covering the retreat or chasing the routed enemies

This is indeed a vital role that any cavalry is capable of executing. During cursades many armies would have large numbers of very unreliable, borderline combat-inefficient, cavalry that would join the important pursuit of the broken enemy army that ultimately turns a tactical battlefield success into a strategically decisive victory. This is a role where even mounted infantry with limited combat ability (such as a shieldless hoplite on horseback, I imagine) could contribute decisively.

4) "If we assume instead that the Greek historians focused primarily on the forces that decided the outcome, it becomes easier to understand why cavalry action was sometimes left out. Where the horsemen of both sides held each other in check, the decision was left to the hoplites, whose actions were consequently described in more detail."
5) "The same goes for engagements in which mounted troops were held back on purpose. However, where armies were able to use cavalry to tip the scales in their favour, their actions were duly recorded, and credit was given to the decisive force."

These are pretty much the point I'm attempting to make. Cavalry was a necessary element of a fully functional army. The cavalry duel was often a fairly inconsequential (but unignorable) sideshow rather than the battle deciding event. On the occasions when they did join the "main" battle, it's more about tipping the scales than turning the tide (i.e. The reinforcing cavalry being the last straw rather than something in the style of the battle of Cannae).

MVP7 wrote: If I have understood you correctly, you suggest that the Greek cavalry was potent and highly tactically mobile strike force that never, over the hundreds of years, had a real chance to shine on the battlefield due to the Greek terrain.

Ì think that you are totally misunderstanding me. Watch the conference mentioned in the sources of OP, if you want to see how I contemplate the topic and be a bit less black and white.

To summarize my view on Greek cav :
- A Mediterranean Moutains map with rough and big mountains is a fun set up to play the Greeks. Imho it nicely and quite historically hinders the abilities of the ingame cavalry units. But if you put them on a plain plain, don't complain they are too effective.
- About Greek Light horse : see my questioning in OP
- Yes, regular Hippeis (in game : non-light Greek cav) could successfully charge from the rear or flank. Besides, game wise, if 60-kg massed bowmen on foot running at 7 km/h can do it againt Swiss keils, then 450-kg horses trotting at 12 km/h can do it against hoplites.
- How I see Greek cav during the 5th century, maybe wrongly (don't forget to add rough and mountains), which is an average of the two units in game (the LH and the non-LH) :


However, the units associated with the maps in the current version of the game are great, as they are.
One can also choose to use in battles only the Greek LH or the non-LH or both or to mod them to one's tastes.

Only the historical issue raised in OP interests me as far as I am concerned.

From game POV, cavalry in Ancients is underpowered and fairly easy to block with inf. Something like Javelin Horse is very good but it doesn’t cause auto drops with flank attacks. More of a unit for harassing and chasing routed units.