Yes (as well as the matching anti-US uppercuts in the Philippines and Guam). But you're largely making ajs's point. And in particular that the Japanese High Command could go through all of these victories- many of them unprecedented or at least shocking (such as the largest surrender of American Union and British armies in the history of ever) and STILL recognize it was in a war it had slim potential to win. Hence Yamamoto's famous "Six Months' prediction.
The Axis succeeded massively in the early war- in some cases Significantly beyond what they anticipated- and still faced the issue of being hemmed in by Allied dominance of the oceans and inability to link up over Eurasia, let alone strike deep into relative "Safe Areas" like the Caucasus and Urals or North America.
I'm one of those hacks that still makes Devil's Advocate arguments about how I do think the Axis were not COMPLETELY, 100% doomed to lose the war, but even I have to admit the odds were loooooonnnng indeed.
uzbek2012 wrote: ↑Wed Apr 21, 2021 3:50 pm
Power is good but sometimes the power of the spirit is stronger )
Sometimes.
But if the power of the spirit cannot translate into material power, it's not likely to do you that much good. Just ask the Japanese how Bataan and Singapore worked out for them in the long run.
uzbek2012 wrote: ↑Wed Apr 21, 2021 3:50 pm France in 1940 also had one of the largest and strongest armies in Europe but fell like a house of cards within 6 weeks ))
Correct, but it was also facing an enemy roughly on par with its own materially. And it fell largely out of a combination of military incompetence and obsolescence (meaning that it could not direct the substantial forces it did have where they were needed like at Sedan) and the decision of the French leadership after Reynaud to throw in the towel in spite of the significant forces in West and Southern France, let alone in the Empire.
And that was largely abetted by extremely favorable conditions for that which- to make a long story short- aren't likely to be repeated, given how differently the Nazis treated France from-say- their actions in the USSR.
uzbek2012 wrote: ↑Wed Apr 21, 2021 3:50 pm And delaying the opening of the second front in Europe UNTIL 1944 is generally a song )))
Oh don't even get me STARTED on "Muh Second Front."
Firstly: The Eastern Front was the Second Front. The UK and Minors had been fighting alone with tactic Western Hemisphere support since late 1940, at a time when the Soviet Union was if anything a pro-Axis neutral that was backstabbed in Barbarossa.
Secondly: Italy in 1943 says Hi. Especially since it saw the collapse of Hitler's most important European Axis ally, the effective collapse of the Italian Military (even dispersed across occupied Europe), and the need by Germany to divert substantial troops to parry even the (frankly in a lot of ways incompetent and poorly managed) Western Allied landings.
So when people usually talk about the "Second Front in 1944" they mean the Trans-Channel invasion of France rather than Any Second Front.
Thirdly: This ignores WHY the "delaying the opening of the so-called Second Front until 1944" happened. Including one crucial reason: namely that when told that preparations
TL:DR, when told that preparations for invading France would require substantial diversions of Allied shipping for the buildup and reductions to Lend Lease, a lot of the US and UK's continental allies- particularly the Soviets through Molotov- consistently begged off the matter and muted the rumbling demands for a second front when they did pop up. Now you can argue that even if the Soviets hadn't done this the Western powers would have acted similarly (somewhat doubtful, especially since at least one of these was a reaction to FDR offering expedited Trans-Channel operations in 1943), but the point is: The Soviets at the time knew quite a bit on how important Western shipping was to the global war effort (including playing a secondary but important role supporting their own front) and the demands that Overlord would impose. After the fact chest thumping is a poor substitute for logistical reality.
uzbek2012 wrote: ↑Wed Apr 21, 2021 3:50 pm Now imagine all the forces that fought on the eastern front were transferred to fight on the western front ) Then D-Day would just be a bloodbath with a kick and a Yankee go home cry !
We don't have to imagine.
Start counting the number of Axis- and particularly German- forces in coastal or near-coastal rear area postings prior to D-Day, from Northern Norway to the Dalmatian Islands.
Go on, I'll wait.
Protip: when you have ALMOST half a million (specifically 400,000ish) German and collaborator troops tied up in Norway alone waiting for a repeat of Plan R4 that never comes, you're already investing a huge proportion of your military guarding against the Atlantic.
And Festung Norway was just one- albeit one of the single largest- parts of the Atlantic Wall. Add that the 58ish or so divisions plus collaborators that were in the Channel-facing Western European countries by Spring 1944 and you start adding these up.
So rather than asking "if all the forces that fought on the Eastern front went to the Western Front" we should if anything be focusing on what would have happened if all the forces tied up in defensive work on the Western Front (or otherwise not tied down dealing with partisan war) got shifted East, which a lot of them probably would have been without the knowledge that the Western Allies could and would launch amphibious attacks ranging from solo sneaking to commando raids up to the giant extravaganzas of Husky, Avalanche, and Overlord.
Especially when you realize that basic force dissipation and disinformation means that unless Allied intelligence has screwed the pooch *so much worse* than it did IOTL, the Western Allies will NEVER have to face the full might of the European Axis at the point they land, for the simple reason that as long as the Axis don't have superior naval or air power the Axis will have to try and cover every strip of beach, at least passively. While the Allies can choose the time and place they can land, Especially if they are not facing political or strategic pressure to help the Eastern Front and capitalize on what develops there.
uzbek2012 wrote: ↑Wed Apr 21, 2021 3:50 pm But this is just reasoning and arguing here proving that someone is ungrateful work !
There's plenty of ingratitude to go around, starting with the Soviet government collaborating with the post-WWI Reichswehr to try and revitalize and rearm the single greatest existential threat it faced short of a major, no holds barred Western Allied invasion (that was unlikely to happen in the age of Lloyd-George and Wilson after WWI) and moving on to shortcharging for Operation Hula (essentially the largest naval giveaway in human history).
uzbek2012 wrote: ↑Wed Apr 21, 2021 3:50 pm Percival goes under a white flag to negotiate a surrender
15.02.1942 G. A. Percival surrendered Singapore to the Japanese General Yamashita. The largest and most humiliating surrender in English history resulted in the capture of 80,000 British, Malays, Australians, and Indians. The Japanese tried to create the appearance of their strength. The forces of the "Malay Tiger", exhausted after 2 months of battles and transitions through the tropics, were three times less than the British troops. They have completely run out of fuel and ammunition. If Percival had been brave, it would have been the samurai, not the British, who would have been defeated. However, the Singapore garrison surrendered.
The issue is that even if Percival had stood strong, Thailand had entered into the Japanese camp and the IJN had naval superiority, meaning that they could resupply while the Allies could not (indeed).
But I'm not here to try and defend the track record of Percival or British Malaya Command, or that of most of the ABDA Command in the first months after Pearl Harbor. There is incredibly little to defend. But it's telling that in spite of these historic victories, -with the Western Allies having stripped Pacific resources to the bone to feed the war in Europe and continually prioritizing the former over the latter, having dealt with such shattering defeats and more follies, and dealing with a Soviet Union that was studiously neutral in the Pacific War and tuning down its support of the Chinese in order to fight for its life against the Euro Axis- the Japanese High Command *still* recognized that victory by their own force of arms in the larger war was either impossible or all but.
That shows you some idea of how much of an uphill climb the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Pact and Friends had to make.
uzbek2012 wrote: ↑Wed Apr 21, 2021 3:50 pm
P.s.
Similarly from modern Vietnam and Afghanistan the great mighty power cannot cope with the partisans )))
Except actually studying "Modern Vietnam and Afghanistan" render the opposite verdicts, particularly if you've studied things like the highly successful French Union clearing actions in Cambodia and what would become Southern Vietnam in the First Indochinese War (Waddell's In the Year of the Tiger is one of the best focuses on it), the generally successful British Royal attempts to maintain hegemony over Afghanistan, and the still largely successful attempts by the Soviets to sustain a similar hegemony over Kabul and the lowlands.
If "modern Vietnam and Afghanistan" were primarily a matter of whether a mighty power could cope with Partisans, Vietnam would've ended with a shattering bang after the VC blew up during the Tet Offensive and Afghanistan probably would've seen similar after Operation Magistral (which in any case saw the anti-government rebels seriously kneecapped, with the legendary and highly successful defense of Hill 3234 being the most famous).
The issue is less dealing with partisans so much as dealing with Partisans *and their great power backers* and lawless or neutral territory that allows them to shelter or restock. If they don't have those then the odds are seriously against them and they typically fail, even if it takes a long time (anybody hear about the Tamil Tigers lately? And they were some of the most shockingly successful "Indie" Guerilla movements in recent history). If they do then you have bigger issues. If you successfully deal with them (as the British largely did in Afghanistan during the mid 1910's) then victory still favors the "house"; it's if you can't that you run into B I G problems.
It's probably not a coincidence that of the Four big Great Power influence periods in Afghanistan during the 19th and 20th centuries (Britain 1880-1919/1948ish, USSR 1918-1926 ish, USSR 1978-1991, NATO/ISAF 2001-Now(?)) only one came even Close to managing tight control over the crucial Southeastern Frontier between what's now Afghanistan and Pakistan, and that was with large conventional garrisons and mobile forces along with so many conflicts and asterisks it would be remarkable. And it's not like these powers didn't recognize the importance of the area; I do think the high point of the Soviet war was from about 1985-1988, when both conventional operations and the strikes on the caravan routes through Afghanistan ramped up and were putting serious hurt on the assorted Mujahadeen Groups and their great power backers.
But in any case, as for the reference of PHCAS, the main side dealing with guerillas in the relevant conflicts is going to be the Axis. The Allies generally guerillas from Tito to the and the KLA to Ho with whatever they thought could be spared and with scant concern for politics beyond "are these factions hurting the Axis?" Even a lot (not all but a lot) of guerilla movements that were otherwise inclined to take potshots at the Allies such as the Burmese and Filipino Communists and Algerian Nationalists *generally* said "Nah, let's wait" because they assumed (usually correctly) that the defeat of the Axis would give them better operating conditions.
Hence why you had so many Axis troops playing "Whack-a-Mole" or "Burn-the-Village" in reprisal killings and garrison work, on top of those already tied up in stationary garrisons worrying about major raids.
The closest comparison to what the Axis faced were the issues on the plates of the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent the European Colonial Powers after WWII, with the Soviets fighting a bunch of somewhat interconnected guerilla wars from the Baltics to Romania and the UK, Dutch, and French fighting anti-imperial rebels from Kenya to Vietnam to Indonesia (in addition to the utter disaster that was the Indian Partition fallout).
And even then it's not PARTICULARLY close, because the Axis had fewer resources and more pressing commitments to deal with it.