Re: D2R - Das 2. Reich - The Second Empire
Posted: Wed Jul 10, 2024 5:04 pm
I have just read the book "Blitzkrieg-Legende" by Karl-Heinz Frieser, which is also available in English (The Blitzkrieg Legend). It is primarily about the German Western campaign of May/June 1940 and specifically about the phase from May 10 to June 4 ("Operation Gelb").
But there are also overarching themes that help us to better understand the context of the time. On the subject of "flanking the enemy", for example, Schlieffen wrote about the ancient battle of Cannae: "The battle of annihilation can be fought today according to the same plan as Hannibal devised in forgotten times. The enemy front is not the target of the main attack. It is not against it that the masses need to be assembled and the reserves deployed; the essential thing is to press in the flanks. Destruction is completed by an attack against the enemy's rear."
A major difference between the Allies' and the Germans' way of fighting in the First and Second World Wars was the emphasis on operational thinking on the German side. The Germans were always trying to maneuver, flank, surround and use every opportunity to get into a better position. This was less due to the fact that the German general staff was so much smarter than the other side. Rather, it was because the Allies had such strategic superiority that the German side had the only chance of victory in the superior operation. Churchill once described this very vividly: "The Germans had to win every battle, we only had to win the last one." This was mainly due to the fact that they had maneuvered themselves into an isolated and disadvantageous political position before the two wars. What politics had messed up, the first-class military was supposed to pull out again. But even a good army (fortunately) cannot perform miracles.
Due to the emphasis on the operational level, the German air force developed during the Second World War, focusing on ground combat and direct army support (Stuka and tactical bombers), while the Allies focused on strategic bombers. The command of the tanks and the associated technology were also subject to this. There was hardly any German tank production in the 1st World War. Although there were a sufficient number of German tanks in 1940 during the Second World War, also thanks to the Czech models, the quality was rather inferior to the British and especially the French vehicles. However, there were two technical weaknesses in the Allied tanks - the radio and the refueling. Both of these points were less important in France, as the operational doctrine was completely different, still based on the 1918 scheme. These two plus points (radio and refueling), together with the better articulation, made even weaker German tank models more dangerous attackers than the French Somua and Char B, which in individual cases caused the worst losses on the German side. But these remained rare isolated cases. The book contains a quote from a French tank general (Delestraint) that describes this in exaggerated terms: "We had 3000 tanks, similar to the Germans. While we deployed 1000 groups of 3 tanks each, the Germans had 3 groups of 1000 tanks each."
In US films, German soldiers are usually portrayed as stubborn followers of orders who are repeatedly outwitted by their much more agile British and American opponents. This means that such films are far removed from reality. It was not the supposed Prussian cadaver obedience, but the pronounced order tactics, the foundations of which were developed by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and which Moltke applied to excellent effect during the wars of unification (1864-71), that determined the deployment of the German military in the two world wars. This victory in May 1940 was also due to these operational principles. "The independence of the leaders down to the sub-leader and the individual infantryman, which no other army cultivated to the same extent, held the secret of success." (Manstein)
The descriptions of the famous halt order of May 24, 1940, which made it possible to save considerable parts of the BEF, were also very interesting. Initially, it had only been planned as a brief halt for the tanks on May 23 to allow infantry to catch up. Rundstedt of the decisive Army Group A gave the corresponding order, which had not been absolutely necessary. The OKH (v.Brauchitsch and Halder) did not like this halt of the tanks on May 24. They reacted with a trick. The subordination of Kleist's Panzer Corps was withdrawn from Army Group A (v. Rundstedt) and placed under Army Group B (v. Bock) as of 8 p.m. on May 24. This meant that the halt of the German tanks at Dunkirk would only have been a short chapter that would not have had any serious consequences. But at 11:30 a.m. on May 24, Hitler visited v. Rundstedt, who had been "robbed" of his tanks. Hitler was very upset afterwards, as the OKH had carried out this regrouping without his permission and even without informing him. Hitler felt that his most sensitive point had been hit; he had been ignored. He then rescinded the OKH's order and the tanks remained with v. Rundstedt, who was now to decide at his own discretion when to continue the attack. As a result, v.Rundstedt delayed the attack until May 27. This meant that the armored divisions had to stand around for just over 3 days, while the British and French were able to form a sufficiently strong defensive ring around Dunkirk, which made a more extensive evacuation possible in the first place. To put it bluntly, you could say that two "petulant toddlers" (von Rundstedt and Hitler) were determined to get their way, even if this meant losing the strategic victory. After the war, von Rundstedt put all the blame for stopping the tanks on Hitler, although his own behavior in the incident was more serious. This is particularly regrettable as von Rundstedt can otherwise be regarded as a very capable officer.
I can only recommend this book to any interested reader. It has very good descriptions, maps and pictures - a clear recommendation to buy. The book "Blitzkrieg" by Len Deighton, which I read many years ago, is also very well presented and written.
Finally, a quote from Napoleon on the formation of the center of gravity, which applies timelessly from antiquity to the present day and is also valid in the game "Panzer Corps": "The art of warfare can be reduced to a single principle - concentrate on a single point a greater mass than the enemy."
But there are also overarching themes that help us to better understand the context of the time. On the subject of "flanking the enemy", for example, Schlieffen wrote about the ancient battle of Cannae: "The battle of annihilation can be fought today according to the same plan as Hannibal devised in forgotten times. The enemy front is not the target of the main attack. It is not against it that the masses need to be assembled and the reserves deployed; the essential thing is to press in the flanks. Destruction is completed by an attack against the enemy's rear."
A major difference between the Allies' and the Germans' way of fighting in the First and Second World Wars was the emphasis on operational thinking on the German side. The Germans were always trying to maneuver, flank, surround and use every opportunity to get into a better position. This was less due to the fact that the German general staff was so much smarter than the other side. Rather, it was because the Allies had such strategic superiority that the German side had the only chance of victory in the superior operation. Churchill once described this very vividly: "The Germans had to win every battle, we only had to win the last one." This was mainly due to the fact that they had maneuvered themselves into an isolated and disadvantageous political position before the two wars. What politics had messed up, the first-class military was supposed to pull out again. But even a good army (fortunately) cannot perform miracles.
Due to the emphasis on the operational level, the German air force developed during the Second World War, focusing on ground combat and direct army support (Stuka and tactical bombers), while the Allies focused on strategic bombers. The command of the tanks and the associated technology were also subject to this. There was hardly any German tank production in the 1st World War. Although there were a sufficient number of German tanks in 1940 during the Second World War, also thanks to the Czech models, the quality was rather inferior to the British and especially the French vehicles. However, there were two technical weaknesses in the Allied tanks - the radio and the refueling. Both of these points were less important in France, as the operational doctrine was completely different, still based on the 1918 scheme. These two plus points (radio and refueling), together with the better articulation, made even weaker German tank models more dangerous attackers than the French Somua and Char B, which in individual cases caused the worst losses on the German side. But these remained rare isolated cases. The book contains a quote from a French tank general (Delestraint) that describes this in exaggerated terms: "We had 3000 tanks, similar to the Germans. While we deployed 1000 groups of 3 tanks each, the Germans had 3 groups of 1000 tanks each."
In US films, German soldiers are usually portrayed as stubborn followers of orders who are repeatedly outwitted by their much more agile British and American opponents. This means that such films are far removed from reality. It was not the supposed Prussian cadaver obedience, but the pronounced order tactics, the foundations of which were developed by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and which Moltke applied to excellent effect during the wars of unification (1864-71), that determined the deployment of the German military in the two world wars. This victory in May 1940 was also due to these operational principles. "The independence of the leaders down to the sub-leader and the individual infantryman, which no other army cultivated to the same extent, held the secret of success." (Manstein)
The descriptions of the famous halt order of May 24, 1940, which made it possible to save considerable parts of the BEF, were also very interesting. Initially, it had only been planned as a brief halt for the tanks on May 23 to allow infantry to catch up. Rundstedt of the decisive Army Group A gave the corresponding order, which had not been absolutely necessary. The OKH (v.Brauchitsch and Halder) did not like this halt of the tanks on May 24. They reacted with a trick. The subordination of Kleist's Panzer Corps was withdrawn from Army Group A (v. Rundstedt) and placed under Army Group B (v. Bock) as of 8 p.m. on May 24. This meant that the halt of the German tanks at Dunkirk would only have been a short chapter that would not have had any serious consequences. But at 11:30 a.m. on May 24, Hitler visited v. Rundstedt, who had been "robbed" of his tanks. Hitler was very upset afterwards, as the OKH had carried out this regrouping without his permission and even without informing him. Hitler felt that his most sensitive point had been hit; he had been ignored. He then rescinded the OKH's order and the tanks remained with v. Rundstedt, who was now to decide at his own discretion when to continue the attack. As a result, v.Rundstedt delayed the attack until May 27. This meant that the armored divisions had to stand around for just over 3 days, while the British and French were able to form a sufficiently strong defensive ring around Dunkirk, which made a more extensive evacuation possible in the first place. To put it bluntly, you could say that two "petulant toddlers" (von Rundstedt and Hitler) were determined to get their way, even if this meant losing the strategic victory. After the war, von Rundstedt put all the blame for stopping the tanks on Hitler, although his own behavior in the incident was more serious. This is particularly regrettable as von Rundstedt can otherwise be regarded as a very capable officer.
I can only recommend this book to any interested reader. It has very good descriptions, maps and pictures - a clear recommendation to buy. The book "Blitzkrieg" by Len Deighton, which I read many years ago, is also very well presented and written.
Finally, a quote from Napoleon on the formation of the center of gravity, which applies timelessly from antiquity to the present day and is also valid in the game "Panzer Corps": "The art of warfare can be reduced to a single principle - concentrate on a single point a greater mass than the enemy."
