McGuba wrote:Wow! I am very happy to read this, thanks for sharing, I did not know about it, but it fits in my general concept extremly well as I already set up the scenario according to this assumption.
Really glad that helped. And excellent planning on your part.
There is no disagreement in this at all. 1941 was mainly about Moscow (and Leningrad and Kiev), but from 1942 it lost its importance in favour of the Caucasus IMO partly because the Soviets were expecting the renewed offensive there again (and Sun Tzu says attack where the enemy does not defend itself) and partly because the lack of enough oil supplies in a protracted war were getting an increasing concern.
Agreed. By 1942 the decentralization of industry to the east plus the buildup of forces around Moscow had served to render the opportunity lost. So as you say, the strategic situation had changed drastically and opportunities had to be sought elsewhere.
BTW, interesting you mention Sun Tzu and attacking where the enemy does not expect it. It reminds me of arguably the greatest German success in attacking with concentrated armor through the supposedly impenetrable Ardennes in 1940. The attack was so swift and so unexpected that the Western Allies were kept off-balance largely due to the sheer pace of the advance.
Consider if you will what would have happened if after crossing the Meuse the Germans merely sat in the beachheads for two months while they focused on clearing the Allies from Belgium in an infantry driven sideshow? This is basically what happened in July of 1941 when Fuhrer directive 33 announced the shift to Kiev.
In his memoirs Heinz Guderian wrote: "I never received any further orders as to what I was to do once the bridgehead over the Meuse was secured. All my decisions, until I reached the Atlantic seaboard at Abbeville were taken by me and me alone. The Supreme Command's influence on my actions was merely restrictive throughout."
So basically, Guderian 'dragged' the High Command to the Atlantic. This resulted in the greatest German victory of the war as the Allied defenders were so disrupted by the pace of the advance that they were never afforded an opportunity to prepare an organized defense. Virtually every time they tried, the panzers were already in the rear of the newly proposed line of defense.
Now then back to the east. Rather than maintaining a blitzkrieg advance on Moscow in July of 1941, the Germans opted to turn south and give the Soviets a two month reprieve in which to organize their defenses. In July, Army Group Center faced four armies between itself and Moscow. By the time Operation Typhoon was finally launched in October, AGC now faced nine rested armies all fully prepared and waiting.
Despite squandering the initiative, Typhoon still managed to reach the outskirts of Moscow so I suppose the question is how well would it have done if it had been launched in July when opposing forces were still scant and unprepared?
I continued to think about the possible consequencies of an early Geman attack on Moscow in 1941. Given that the Germans did not take the turn south to help the capture of Kiev, they should have reached the outskirts Moscow let's say two months earlier, in October, instead of December., right?
Yes, if not even sooner for the initial pace of Barbarossa had been quite breathtaking. As Von Manstein wrote in Lost Victories:
"Exactly four days and five hours after zero hour [the 56th Panzer Corps] had actually completed as the crow flies a non-stop dash through 200 miles of enemy territory ... if at the same time Panzer Group H.Q, pushed the (41st) Panzer Corps straight through Dvinsk behind us, it seemed likely that the enemy would have to keep opposing us with whatever forces he had on hand at the moment and be incapable ... of fighting a set battle."
When the Germans began their self imposed halt near Smolensk in July, (in order to prepare to turn south to Kiev), they were already within 186 miles of Moscow. This being the case, if they were able to maintain the dash (and keep the defenders off-balance and incapable of fighting set battles) then I have no doubt they would have arrived at Moscow in much less than two months.
Question is that, could this two month be enough to capture such a huge city before the Soviet winter counter offensive was started? My assumption is that counter offensive with the fresh troops from the far east and with the brand new heavy tanks would have happened anyway in December and if, at that time, Germans were still fighting within the city, it could have easily led to an even more decisive "Stalingrad like" encirclement with much of the infantry being trapped in Moscow.
You raise a good point, but I think it unlikely for a number of reasons. First is the fact that Stalingrad and Moscow are very different in terms of geography. While Stalingrad lies entirely on the west bank of the Volga, which serves as a natural barrier along its rear, Moscow is much easier to flank. The major waterways in and around Moscow would already have been breached during the attempt to occupy, so German armor would be in a much better position to maneuver and respond to the winter counter attack.
Also in 1941, the flanks would not be guarded by ill-equipped Axis minor forces, so a devastating Stalingrad type encirclement seems far less likely. Last but not least, the historical winter offensive of 1941 failed to produce anything approaching the stunning success of Uranus, so I see little reason to suggest it might have if the Germans had advanced to Moscow.
I do not know the strenght of the available forces that could have been used to defend the city in October, but I suspect there must have been some units, maybe enough to hold the city for just two months, until the fresh troops arrived to attack. Even then, Moscow was a huge city, possibly larger than any of Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, Stalingrad, or Sevastopol, and all of these were held for many weeks, and, with the exception of Kiev, for more than two months. And even in the case of Kiev, the siege was only concluded earlier because of the units diverted from Moscow.
This is perhaps the most interesting question of all. Namely, what might have happened in heavy street fighting? While it's obviously a huge 'what if', there are a number of factors to consider.
Firstly, AGC would have had much better weather in which to fight. Second, (by avoiding Kiev), they would have avoided 36 days of exhausting combat plus at least 800 miles of wear and tear on the vehicles, not counting losses, injuries and battle damage. Then if we propose an immediate dash to the capital, it seems conceivable that a coordinated pincer movement may have succeeded in cutting off many of the Soviet regulars before they were able to retreat into the city.
If this was accomplished, (and it does seem within the realm of possibility), then the street fighting might have come down to veteran German infantry against mostly Russian civilians, militia and NKVD. If it did come down to this then I would think the veterans would do quite well.
