Slitherine

"When the serried Macedonian ranks presented their enormously long spears it was like a shield-wall, and when the Romans after fruitlessly hurling their javelins, drew their swords they could not get to close quarters, nor could they hack off the spear-heads; if they did succeed in cutting or breaking any off, the splintered shafts kept their places amongst the points of the uninjured ones and the palisade remained unbroken. Another thing which helped the enemy was.....[that] they had not to attack or retire over a wide stretch of ground, which generally disorders the ranks."

In developing the rules we looked for general issues that are universal and were wary of small numbers of specifics that could be interpretated in several ways. In this way we can gt the core game working well. If alter we then find funky ways to model a few specifics we can always add them.

Hence the above section we felt was a good major item for the rules mechanics ... Romans are Swordsmen in the rules and this is a + if you can "get in amongst them" but useless otherwise. If and when you play the game you will see that this is exactly how the mechanics are set up. If you can DISRUPT the phalanx ther Romans will do well, if the Phalanx remains STEADY it is very hard indeed and the Phalanx has the edge.

As for push backs etc. we decided that it was not the push backs that cause problems per se - so got rid of the old fashioned + for doing this - but rather the disruption effects on either side if this were to happen. In addition in game mechanics we started with push backs and actually monitored the amount of time in a game spent doing it and re-arranging figures. We found that it was consuming huge amounts of time and a fundamental reason for slowing down war games - for little benefit in game terms. So we dropped it and the speed of play and wrapping of effects into what really mattered - whether you were dirsupted or not - has been a huge plus stated by players. The speed of game is quick very much because of this.

However you do the rules there are one or two examples from history that can be interpreted in different ways. The example you give could be interpreted in several ways. Whether the battle disruption occured because of terrain or push backs or the combination is argauble.

We settled for the terrain effect for the following reason. If push backs were common and they caused disruption often then we would hear about it far more frequently in any battle with pahlanxes. We don't we hear more about this exception. When anaylsing history it is as importnat to look at what hassn't been recorded and ask oneself why as it is to look at what has been written down and adjust it for the grandification that is natural to any author with incentivesto do more than just record accurately. The mentining of uneveness of ground is however quite distinct - so we added a 4th terrain level that affects ionly close order troops to represent this. Again this has worked well in game terms.

As for the views from afar it is hard to say what is a "push back" or a "local collapse with follow ups". The latter in fact is much more likely to cause problems - like a scrum following up on a falling over by the opposition. We therefore also represent pursuits which can cause a battle line to have isolated BGs that are now vulnerable - a broader form of dispruption from "following up".

Si

I won't go into the game mechanics as I have no practical idea of how they work just now but, in case it is of any help, when I surveyed the likely sites for the Pydna, Cynoscephalae and Issus battlefields I found:

1. There are significant re-entrants (little valleys) in the hills behind the Roman lines at Pydna. If the phalanx advanced that far it is likely that they would have struggled to maintain formation and that's without taking into account the pesky Romans being awkward and fighting back.

2. The Cynoscephalae ridge is one mother of a hill. When I first saw it I refused to believe it was the right place as I felt a phalanx couldn't possibly have fought effectively on such a steep gradient (for those who ski it's halfway between a red and a black). I looked elsewhere but in the end I kept going back and was finally convinced when I saw the outline of the Roman camp (as described by Hammond). The difference with Pydna is that despite it's steepness there are no obstacles on that hill. It is an unobstructed battlefield on a gradient.

3. At Issus the phalanx fought across a fordable river against hoplites. The latter were defending steep banks with entrechments across those places where the banks were easily climbed. Again, when you see the nature of the "steep banks" which are in fact impassable sheer rock walls and the boulder strewn riverbed I was surprised a phalanx could fight effectively in that terrain. By all accounts it did although it received significant casualties.

Having seen the battlefields, I would say the principal factor in disordering a phalanx was probably the enemy rather than the terrain.

Regards,

Julian

Given your points from visits it seems to me its the enemy x terrain combined that is having the effect - which leaves me pretty comfortable.

In the mechanics the uneven terrain will affect a phalanx more than legionaries - so a battle fought on that sort of terrain will give a compounding effect of the two to swing the odds in favour of the legions.

However if they were facing waeker opponents at a river crossing the compounding effect is much less so and advantage the pahlanx. So overall FOG mechanics will give the Romans an advantage at Pynda and the Phalanx an advantage at Issue as Hoplites have similar -ves fromt he terrain as pikes.

Up a hill is a 50/50 affair as long as the hill is not rough in nature so that the phalanx can keep formation solid.

So FOG mechanics would mirror all 3 of the items you raise rather well. In rules where the effect of terrain is equal for such troop types the odds don't change, it is just the rate of damage that goes up. Such mechanics therefore sdo not handle such realities as well.

Hope that helps

Si

benny wrote:
Sorry Nik but you do seem to be rather flogging a dead horse on this one......

It's a lot safer flogging a dead one, live ones can get nasty if flogged

To be honest I think all we're doing now is illustrating that different gamers have different "needs" as to what makes a game satisfying, plus of course the fact that it is quite possible to read the accounts slightly differently and give emphasis to different parts depending on your view of how ancient warfare actually happened.

It appears to me that you see the push back as an important factor (the important factor even) in the Pydna battle and so feel that it should be explicitly represented in the game whereas I see it as just one of the factors and so am comfortable with it being more abstracted.

Julian's comments are interesting.

nikgaukroger wrote:
It appears to me that you see the push back as an important factor (the important factor even) in the Pydna battle and so feel that it should be explicitly represented in the game whereas I see it as just one of the factors and so am comfortable with it being more abstracted.

If it were just me and just Pydna then I'd let the matter drop. But I'd be interested if you could direct me to any analysis of the three battles we have been discussing that did not see the push backs as significant.

FWIW, a couple of quotes re Cannae:

"It is perhaps likely that each time the opposing lines engaged the Celts were the first to disengage, gradually pulling further and further away. Such a controlled withdrawal must have been slow enough to maintain cohesion............" (From Gregory Daly "Cannae" pp190-1 )

And more tellingly

"Eventually the pressure grew too great and the Celts and Spaniards began to give way. They did so slowly at first, perhaps moving back after each flurry of fighting, but still facing the enemy. We read in accounts of other battles of the ancient world of lines which were pushed back several hundred metres or even more than a kilometre [sadly, no references given], but still maintained a front and did not dissolve into rout." (Adrian Goldsworthy "Cannae" p143)

You'll forgive me if I consider myself in credible company regards the reality and significance of push backs and follow ups in ancient warfare .

nikgaukroger wrote: Julian's comments are interesting.

Indeed. I had not realised the slope at Kynaekephalae was that extreme. Certainly makes the push back of the Romans even more understandable

cheers

Benny

First thanks for all the comments. Understanding history and trying to calibrate reasonably to it has been one of the challenges we have focused on. All such discussions are very interesting and sometimes come up with nougets that we, as authors, have never seen before. So keep it coming.

To clarify, the issue isn't whether pushbacks happened at times in the real world. It is whether you bother to represent them as sole items or as the beginning of a broader collapse. We have found that moving figures around for pushbacks takes a lot of game time and slows things down, when 99% of the time this was merely the precipitation of a broader collapse. In any rules a few exceptional battles are never easy, and if one tries to reflect them in the general rules then all the "normal" battles start to look odd.

As I pointed out the FOG mechanisms actually reflect Julians 3 situations rather well if you try to refight them - except insofar as you are determined to derive some personal pleasure from moving 100s of bases back and forward 20mm at a time.

I was priveleged to share a room at Uni with a History student and learned a fair bit from him - it influenced a lot how I look at history when I am analysing it. To paraphrase him on his subject of expertise......... "when analysing history it is as important to study what isn't recorded and ask oneself why, as it is to study what is recorded. Only then do you have a scientific understanding of history as there are many things, if they did happen, that it is implausible to believe were not recorded. This can cut out many a false hypothesis based on the odd exception here and there that are, just that". Wise words that I have benefited from a great deal.

What I take from this is the following....

1) If it was push backs that caused the issues at Pynda mainly , then such issues with pahalanxes would be mentioned in dozens of battles. My understanding is that this is not what is written generally - thus the terrain is logically the most likely culprit as it is specifically recorded and clearly was there.

2) To take Pydna. Cannae etc as general rules is potentially hazardous. If they were general rules then we would see repeated and regular similar patterns and evidence all over historical literature. There are 100s of battles without such peculiarities to calibrate to.

3) We need to reflect the broader pattern of battles and with any rules if doing a refight one can introduce something special to reflect the strategy of the day. For instance if doing Cannae we might want to introduce a fall back while fighting option on passing a CMT, but we would not want it available in every game or 99% of other games end up looking false and wrong. At times Cannae seems an act of divine control over irregular gauls. More likely I believe is that he rather predicted their collapse and set up to deal with that once the Romans were committed in pressing them. Also in doing so he protected his veterans who had travelled 1000s of miles and were hard to replace and risked his allies who would always regrow if the battle were won. Tactical and strategic mastery combined in my opinion.

4) The general case is that push backs were the precipitation of a broader collapse so this is what is essential to represent somehow. We do so with cohesion levels rather than by moving figures about in a fiddly manner.

Interestingly I have refought a number of these battles with past rules including explicit pushbakcs and non of them worked at all. An in fact if you believe in push backs it is hard to believe in quick kills - they hardly co-exist well as concepts.

Refighting Pynda in DBM the Romans get slaughtered as the pushabcks give them a -2 before the pikes so the legionaires die on 2 vs 5...... so die being 1 in 3 chance before the effect of push backs causing them to fight on 1 to 5 or 0 to 5. Soabout 40% of them die when they hit the rough terrrain in 1 go - end of command end of game.
Cannae doesn't work at all in DBM either as the game is always decide by the Legionaries destroying the Gauls quickly or vice-versa due to the quick kill mechanism - which works directly contrary to the long drawn out slog that Cannae was in the middle - the exact point from this history is there were no quick kills between Wb and Bd. FOG at least gives a long hard fight for the centre and gives time for the wings to do something.
Kurikara in DBM is a Bw(S) fest where the samurai never touch each other - it is as if two machine guns were set up opposite each other. The probelm here being the abstraction of Samurai as Bw(S) which they most certainly were not.

Each to his own on wherther they feel this is more hsitorical all Iwould suggest is that one takes a broad rather than a narrow view of the question.

Si

Both worth analysing rather than taking at face value ... very interesting stuff if one can figure out what it all means and all on my bookcase ....

"It is perhaps likely that each time the opposing lines engaged the Celts were the first to disengage, gradually pulling further and further away. Such a controlled withdrawal must have been slow enough to maintain cohesion............" (From Gregory Daly "Cannae" pp190-1 )

This sentence is speculation by the author - "perhaps likely" being a fair old disclaimer. Have you ever tried a slow withdrawal maintaining cohesion iun a reanactment situation ... I ahve.....also ever tried dsisengaging from a pushing Rugby scrum? The only time it physically works well is if 1) you are much faster than the opposition (horses vs foot) so you rapidly put distance between you, or if the opposing troops do not want to pursue you and force you into a rout. Are we really saying that ill-trained Gauls executed a controlled fall back while fighting - something Napoleonic British infantry could just about manage 2000 years later? If so I think we can safely say it is the exception not the rule can we not.

And more tellingly

"Eventually the pressure grew too great and the Celts and Spaniards began to give way. They did so slowly at first, perhaps moving back after each flurry of fighting, but still facing the enemy. We read in accounts of other battles of the ancient world of lines which were pushed back several hundred metres or even more than a kilometre [sadly, no references given], but still maintained a front and did not dissolve into rout." (Adrian Goldsworthy "Cannae" p143)

One fo my favoruite writers ........ As you say sadly no references given to the bit that matters and I haven't seen any such accounts - I see several where there were "breaks and rallies" to reform lines. So troops had broken locally and been steadied by generals having not suffered huge losses. This fits in that it is not what we call an ARMY ROUT, but rather localised breaks and reforms that do happen in the game. If BG has lost less than 25% it is quite rallyyable and can reform a new line. We did consider "break offs" for foot troops but decided in testing that it was detrimental to the game and general history - even if primae facae it gave a mechanism for such big push backs. So we tried a loser breaks off concept. Honestly it didn't add much and just consumed game time.

What is "began to give way" "initially facing the enemy" "perhaps moving back after each flurry of fighting" Even for this specific battle there is nothing here that defines it either way for sure for us. If you know of lots of such accounts of macro-push backs, if I can call it that, then I would be genuinely keen to read them.

Take more recent history - Tunisia in WW2. A famous Ameircan general described his troops as "falling back"........and observer pointed out that it wasn't a fall back it was a "rout by any definition". The troops then rallied having got away from the immediate strain of battle. Imagine 2000 years in the future and somebody finds only the first text, or only the second.........thus history is written not as fact but as the fragments of words chosen by those whose records are found.

All the above is simply to say that with all such texts there are different ways one can intepret the same events.

Si

Actually, the Romans were pushed back a significant distance at Cynoscephalae. Anything between six to nine hundred metres depending on where the initial melee started. The Macedonians were pushed back/retired (depending on whose propaganda you believe) an unknown distance but again significant enough to be mentioned in the sources.

In POW (the Ancients version) the push backs and more importantly the retire moves do work rather well and like I mentioned in another post we did a refight of Cannae and got an almost exact refight of the historical battle.

However, I'm not sure how you can introduce those aspects in FoG. The system does not allow for any involuntary fall back other than a rout and I get the feeling that this point has been decided upon. In case it's not, here's an idea:

Units which lose the melee phase of combat and fail the cohesion test could choose to break off against enemy of the same or less speed. The break-off would be a variable move, facing the enemy and would automatically reduce the unit's cohesion by one level whether the enemy keeps up or not. Enemy pursues unless they pass a CMT.

With regards to other funny situations I think the POW system has it right. Keep the rules simple and any funny business goes in the individual list. For example, cavalry wedges were only used by a handful of armies so you amend the rules in the actual lists. Works a treat as you just can't cover every exceptional situation over a period of 3000 years of warfare. Even better if the competition uses the historical pairs system but that's another story...

Regards,

Julian

benny wrote:
If it were just me and just Pydna then I'd let the matter drop. But I'd be interested if you could direct me to any analysis of the three battles we have been discussing that did not see the push backs as significant.

FWIW, a couple of quotes re Cannae:

"It is perhaps likely that each time the opposing lines engaged the Celts were the first to disengage, gradually pulling further and further away. Such a controlled withdrawal must have been slow enough to maintain cohesion............" (From Gregory Daly "Cannae" pp190-1 )

And more tellingly

"Eventually the pressure grew too great and the Celts and Spaniards began to give way. They did so slowly at first, perhaps moving back after each flurry of fighting, but still facing the enemy. We read in accounts of other battles of the ancient world of lines which were pushed back several hundred metres or even more than a kilometre [sadly, no references given], but still maintained a front and did not dissolve into rout." (Adrian Goldsworthy "Cannae" p143)

You'll forgive me if I consider myself in credible company regards the reality and significance of push backs and follow ups in ancient warfare .

Firstly nobody has denied the reality of push backs, the question is whether you absolutely need to explicity represent them on the table top to get the right results for the game.

Significance is more difficult, but I do note that Goldswrothy you quote above says that the Carthaginian front was maintained and there was no rout - so I think we can can assume that in that the push back here caused no direct impact. It did, as you have poited out earlier, allow the African Spearmen to get onto the Romans flank and I think we can agree that FoG would not represent that particular bit very well, but the authors have also stated that they're OK with this single instance (although others may not be).

BTW I suspect Sellasia may be the battle Goldsworthy mentioned with very long push backs.

Anyway, please excuse short reply this time as I'm just off to hit people with rubber swords for a few days

However, I'm not sure how you can introduce those aspects in FoG. The system does not allow for any involuntary fall back other than a rout and I get the feeling that this point has been decided upon. In case it's not, here's an idea:

Units which lose the melee phase of combat and fail the cohesion test could choose to break off against enemy of the same or less speed. The break-off would be a variable move, facing the enemy and would automatically reduce the unit's cohesion by one level whether the enemy keeps up or not. Enemy pursues unless they pass a CMT.

Yes this we are much more comrfortable with than "push backs" which as I say are hard imagine surviving for long without a, rout and rally, or run away and reform, or whatever we choose to call it. Sounds like we are agreeing a lot really.

In fact this secific idea above is almost what we tried out. But you need it without the cohesion drop or you will have a rout in your hands before you know it - the above one actually creates what I am tempted to believ happens in an atempted fall back. Alos tried it wheere you can do it automatically but taake a test to avoid dropping a cohesion level. In fact we found the all to be less good as a game overall. It would allow a few unusual battles to be handled better, which is why we tried it, but the net result was a lot of time and effort and slowing down of play - so a fun reduction. Hence we have left it out for vs 1 and kept it as one of 5 or so ideas alive on a back burner for future consideration. So its pretty easy to put in, but in practice it detracts from the speed and feel of most games for the sake of one or two exceptions.

On the macro push back what we are mainly concerned about is whether this was a common thing or not. If it is, then it is something to reflect in general rules. This is my "what isn't written about challenge" which is good to define execptions from rules. My point is that there seem to be a few exceptions to the general writings of history. We also need to bear in mind that a bse width in FOG is quite a distance. Cf pushback distances to bow range.

The POW point you make Julian is also how we have approached FOG = keeping quirky specifics out of the main rules as much as possible. We have already put some campaign specific things in the lists. Overall my preference to dealing with the exceptions would be to have a specific rule for a specific game that handles it. In fact I hope we will have a hirotical battles in FOGsection on the website where we might do this. The first might be Mankikert which we adoing at the SOA games day in Sept.

So for Cannae we could have the gauls automatically break off as above without any cohesion loss and the Romans have to follow up. But this would be game specfic just to re-enact the usual event that is Cannae.

So in short my personal mindset is basically: general evidence for general rules; specific evidence for specific rules. Any definitive documentations of macro pushbacks while engaged in combat would be of great interest to me. Nik/Julian/Benny maybe you can point me in the right direction for any documentation that would be worth a specific look.

Thanks

Si

However, I'm not sure how you can introduce those aspects in FoG. The system does not allow for any involuntary fall back other than a rout and I get the feeling that this point has been decided upon. In case it's not, here's an idea:

Units which lose the melee phase of combat and fail the cohesion test could choose to break off against enemy of the same or less speed. The break-off would be a variable move, facing the enemy and would automatically reduce the unit's cohesion by one level whether the enemy keeps up or not. Enemy pursues unless they pass a CMT.

Yes this I am personally much more comrfortable with than "push backs" which as I say are hard imagine surviving for long without a, rout and rally, or, run away and reform, or whatever we choose to call it. Sounds like we are agreeing a lot really. Break offfs and reform quite a reasonable way of thinking of it.

In fact this specific idea above is almost what we tried out. But you need it without the cohesion drop or you will have a rout in your hands before you know it - the above one actually creates what I am tempted to believe happens in an attempted fall backin the general case - precipitation of disaster. Also tried it wheere you can do it automatically but take a test to avoid dropping a cohesion level - this isn't bad for Cannae as Hannibal - if he stays close - pushes the Guals up above the threshold most of the time. However what we found was that it always made for a less good game overall. It would allow a few unusual battles to be handled better, which is why we tried it, but the net result was a lot of time and effort and slowing down of play - so a fun reduction. Hence we have left it out for vs 1 and kept it as one of 5 or so ideas alive on a back burner for future consideration. So its pretty easy to put in, but in practice it detracts from the speed and changes the feel of most games for the sake of one or two exceptions.

On the macro push back what we are mainly concerned about is whether this was a common thing or not. If it is, then it is something to reflect in general rules. This is my "what isn't written about challenge" which is good to define exceptions from rules. My point is that there seem to be a few exceptions in the general writings of history. We also need to bear in mind that a base width in FOG is quite a distance. Cf pushback distances to bow range.

The POW point you make Julian is also how we have approached FOG - keeping quirky specifics out of the main rules as much as possible. We have already put some campaign specific things in the lists. Overall my preference to dealing with the exceptions would be to have a specific rule for a specific game that handles it. In fact I hope we will have a hirotical battles in FOGsection on the website where we might do this. The first might be Mankikert which we adoing at the SOA games day in Sept.

So for Cannae we could have the gauls automatically break off as above without any cohesion loss and the Romans have to follow up. This specific rule will create a macro pushback ofsome size. But this would be game specfic just to re-enact the usual event that is Cannae.

So in short my personal mindset is basically: general evidence for general rules; specific evidence for specific rules. Any definitive documentations of macro pushbacks while engaged in combat would be of great interest to me. In fact I have enjoyed reading a lot of history again throughout the process.

Nik/Julian/Benny maybe you can point me in the right direction for any documentation that would be worth a specific look.

Thanks again for the interest and help

Si

shall wrote:

So in short my personal mindset is basically: general evidence for general rules; specific evidence for specific rules. Any definitive documentations of macro pushbacks while engaged in combat would be of great interest to me. In fact I have enjoyed reading a lot of history again throughout the process.

Nik/Julian/Benny maybe you can point me in the right direction for any documentation that would be worth a specific look.

Thanks again for the interest and help

Si

I haven't got much time today as I'm off to Barcelona for my first weekend of FoGing (as Tim so delicately puts it). So, from memory here's a summary:

2nd Punic War
Trebia: Roman Cavalry gets pushed back far enough to uncover the wings
Cannae: Carthaginian centre pushed back.
Zama: Possible pushing back of first two lines for some distance before they flee.

Caesar's Gallic tour
Sambre: a couple of legions push the Viromandui back down the hill and into the river but are unable to go further until reinforcements arrive.
Bibracte: Romans push back or Helvetii retreat down a hill, across a plain and up a hill.

Various Macedonian battles:
Chaeronea: phalanx retreats or pushed back by Athenians.
Crannon: phalanx pushes hoplites up a slope.
Cynoscephalae: Romans pushed down hill
Pydna: Romans pushed back into foothills
Sellasia: Spartan and Macedonian phalanx push to and fro signifcant distances on one of the hills but can't remember which.

That's what comes to mind and I think you'll find there was a fair bit of push and shove in pitched battles between Romans and Germans during the Imperial period but I didn't study that period so can't be sure. Will try to get the references to you sometime next week.

Regards,

Julian

Thanks Julian.

All helpful stuff for us considering the rules as they evolve.

Simon

Hi Simon

Apologies for the delay in getting back to you. A combination of lots of interesting stuff to digest coupled with the inevitable distractions of 'real life'.

Your point about push backs often leading to collapse and rout is well made and not one that I generally disagree with. A good example is Illipia in the 2nd Punic War where the Spanish on the Carthaginians wings are described as initially falling back in good order before eventually breaking and fleeing. As you say, the same is also described of the Gauls and Spaniards forming Hannibal's centre at Cannae (as an aside, the fact that FoG provides a mechanism for these to later rally and return to the fight is encouraging - something that I've never been comfortable with in, say, DBM).

However the point is that it is by no means clear that such retirements automatically led to such routs. I would contend that there are more than enough situations documented where the retreat was not only eventually halted, but indeed created situations which enabled the advantage to be reversed, to justify general as opposed to scenario specific representation.

In support of this I'd suggest you read Polybios's famous analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the phalanx, in particular 18.32 (http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/R ... s/18*.html). Here he talks about the weakness of a phalanx as it pushes forward ahead of its supports against a retreating enemy. That this enemy (Romans) are then able to exploit the situation by attacking the flanks show that they are not broken despite being forced to give ground. His point is that the Romans are able to absorb the impact of the phalanx, draw it forward and then exploit its exposed flanks. Remember this is one of the most credible ancient historians talking about general characteristics, he is not discussing an isolated 'special case'. Let's also choose not to overlook the evidence of Livy 32.17 regards the invulnerability of a stationary phalanx with secure flanks - it is the ability of the Romans to exploit tactical circumstances that give them the advantage. Take away these circumstances and the phalanx is secure. Failing to represent these tactical circumstances surely weakens any simulation of the interaction.

As far as specifics go, in addition to those already referred to for Cannae, Kynoskephalai (one day I'll get the spelling right!) and Pydna cited earlier in this thread, plus those supplied by Julian, you might also like to add Thermopylai in 191BC where the the Romans initially forced back the Selucid phalanx (again, no suggestion of a rout) until it had retreated to a ruined rampart whereupon they had the advantage of the ground and the Romans were unable to make further impression (Livy 36, 18 ).

There is also Sellasia which Nik suggests this may be the source of Goldsworthy's comment regards prolonged push backs (Polybios 2, 68-69; Plutarch Kleomenes 28 ). This is interesting in that it includes not one but two significant instances of push backs. The first is where the Spartan right elects to receive the Macedonians at the halt on the crest of a hill. However they then lose the initial contact, are driven over the crest and now, disadvantaged by the ground, break. Polybios is quite clear that it was the disadvantage of the slope that was the principle cause of the defeat and this only comes into play after they have been pushed off the crest. Polybios actually says that if they had advanced forward from the crest then, even if forced back, they would have maintained the advantage of the ground and been better able to resist. It was being forced back off the crest that was decisive.

The second is on the other flank and involves the very long push back of the Macedonian right by the Spartan left charging down hill. The Macedonians manage to keep their formation and structure despite the long retreat (translations I've looked at refer to 'half a mile' and 'five furlongs' ) and the Spartans are then taken in flank and rear by troops from the victorious Macedonian left in a manner strikingly similar to Kynoskephalai. One instance may be argued as a special case but two..........

At this point I have to start asking exactly how much more do you need? I think the amount cited already rather challenge your view that push backs automatically lead to collapses and do not create tactical advantages/disadvantages that need representation.

Now, whether you choose to do so in FoG is a different matter. Richard has quite simply said push backs and follow ups are not represented purely for the convenience of FoGs mechanics. You've also said similar things (I'm actually surprised by your findings about how much moving the troops slows the game - not doubting you, just surprised as its not something that I've ever thought of as an issue). This is fine. What concerns me is your attempt to rationalise what is a pragmatic decision regards the mechanisms of your game system with appeals to history. Personally I believe that more than enough evidence has been presented, in both primary form and in the secondary opinions of such as Goldsworthy and Daly, to show that this is far from convincing.

cheers

Benny

As you say, push backs clearly did occur historically. Leaving out their physical representation from the rules is a simplification to ease play.

In early play-tests we did include push backs. However, we came to the view that the technical complications caused by pushbacks in complex melees (between multiple off-set bodies of troops) outweighed their contribution to the historical feel of the game.

In the last analysis we are aiming at a playable and enjoyable game that gives a strong feel of a historical battle, but which can be played out within 3 hours. We are not aiming at a fully detailed exact simulation.

We have chosen to include several features (e.g. shooting by all troops with long range missile weapons) that are abstracted out in certain popular rules (to the detriment of the historical feel of the game in our view), but have missed out others that we consider less vital to the historical feel. This is not to say that such features would not further add to historical realism, but that some pruning was required to achieve the desired speed of play.

rbodleyscott wrote:In early play-tests we did include push backs. However, we came to the view that the technical complications caused by pushbacks in complex melees (between multiple off-set bodies of troops) outweighed their contribution to the historical feel of the game.

Having been involved in some of these playtests I can safely say that it was indeed complicated to figure what happened when half a battlegroup won and the other half lost or drew. There were several odd situations where one battlegroup had to be pushed back and the other couldn't pursue because of othe opponents.

The current way the rules work is a simplification but the alternative would have probably been several pages of rules and the potential of numerous extra markers.

Hammy

Tnansk Benny

At this point I have to start asking exactly how much more do you need? I think the amount cited already rather challenge your view that push backs automatically lead to collapses and do not create tactical advantages/disadvantages that need representation.

Just to be clear what I have believe is that s the general case through the period of 2000BC to 150AD is that pushbacks tended to be precipatiaon of collapse because it is extremely hard to survive a push back against a determined opponent - not that it automatically leads to collapses as you quote me above. Real life, as you say gets, in the way at times os perhaps my posting have come acroos rather more definite than intended....

This former you agree with, so it seems to me that we are debating not whether they occured at times, but rather where is the best place to draw the line between specific and general in set of rules covering from 2000BC to 1500 AD, that's all.

For what its worth I too found the amount of time and flow lost from actually moving the figures quite a surprise. It was interesting to track it properly with all the knock on effects in fact. Quite a revelation as a pracitcal game design point anda disvoery that certainly made me rethink a few things.

Don't misunderstand my comments, the decision is much more pragmatic than theoretical. as Richard says.

The bottom line really is that most of what we can tell you is experiential from 100+ play testers and a few 1000s actual games. From this we find that by not showing them explicitly the fun and speed of 98% of games seems to have gone up materially, while the historical accuracy of the few big push backs can be still be picked up as specifics if you want to do so. Hence the view from play testers, such as hammy.

As for refights, if I refought Cannae I think I would embellish with a specific rule for the gauls whichever set I used. To be honest I have ended up doing this in many historical refights over 30 years of wargaming - over 100 historical refight ranging from Kadesh to Arnhem 1944 with maybe 20+ sets of rules. All were fun but most needed specific tweaks.

Thanks for the battles though. A couple are not too familiar to me and well worth a look. Part of the reason for my posting comments and challenges to received wisdom is that I generally get some new snippets to work with that increase my understanding.

I expect following some of the leads you mention will do the same.

Si

benny wrote:However the point is that it is by no means clear that such retirements automatically led to such routs. I would contend that there are more than enough situations documented where the retreat was not only eventually halted, but indeed created situations which enabled the advantage to be reversed, to justify general as opposed to scenario specific representation.

I'm now comfortable enough with the rules to accept the abstraction that a generalised push back in FoG is represented by a unit becoming disrupted, or when pressed further, fragmented rather than being physically pushed back on the table. The FOG ladder is Formed => Disrupted => Fragmented => Routed.

I'll comment on Benny's point above regarding a unit which is suffering badly being "rallied". In FoG it can can be "rallied" back up the ladder if the circumstances (and a bit of good fortune with the dice throws) are on the side of the fragmented unit. In other words a unit in desperate straight but not yet routing can be rallied if circumstances and the gods are on their side and eventually go on to win the melee.

Neil

After my first two games, I have to say that adding push backs to the game would complicate the rules significantly for what, given my lack of experience, I suspect is a minor gain in terms of historical simulation. Frankly, I would leave out push backs in the main rules and at a latter date add optional rules on the Slitherine website to simulate particular tactics or battles. The rules are just fine as they stand for a competition set of rules.

Having said that, one solution would be to allow infantry to break off from combat from other infantry if they lose a melee and lose a cohesion test. Variable move for the loser then a variable move for the winner. If the winner stays in contact, the loser takes another cohesion test (or drops down automatically one level, although probably a bit too hard as Simon suggested in a previous post). If the winner is in a multiple melee and cannot physically pursue because he's stuck in combat with another unit, he doesn't actually pursue but still does a variable move to see if he forces a test on the loser. In terms of rule changes it would be fairly easy to add another line to the break-off paragraph.

One last thing about the Sellasia battle. The Macedonian pikes were pushed downhill by the Spartans and only managed to pushed them back when they changed formation. They halved the frontage from 3 foot to 18 inches (sunapismos in Greek if I recall correctly) and had another go. Sunapismos was normally only used in defence as at the defence of the Aous pass and that breach in the walls of a Thessalian city whose name escapes me. Sellasia is, as far as I know, the only instance of that formation being used offensively which isn't surprising Ggven the lack of space.

Regards,

Julian

Hi Julian

That last bit is interesting. Glad you can see the rationale for the simplification.

Si