What about dividing the map up in western, southern, eastern front and Germany. Each front has 2 levels :an air superiority and a ground/strategic attack level each consisting of different fields e.g. 1-5 where you can place air units (if the faction wants to).
On the superiority level the unit in field 1 engages the unit in field 1 etc. victorious units and those which have no opponent can go down to the ground/strategic attack level to attack units starting from field 1. fighters can also be placed on the ground level (escort) but would then defend with reduced strenghts (e.g. like bombers)
Surviving bombers/ground attack etc can then attack troops, industry and major airfields (if included).
This system was used in The Next war and works really well...it should not be too difficult for the AI.
Air war
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i'm doing a lot of reading on the VVS (Soviet Frontal Airforce, as opposed to the bomber force (ADD), and the "home defence" airforce (PVO)) for Down in Flames' campaigns.
There's a lot to be learned these days now that the info is comign out of the fUSSR!!
My thoughts:
- the major operational units of airforces should be organised as HQ's + units (wings, squadrons, regiments, strength points, whatever). These are the Luftflotte, the Soviet Air Armies and naval Red Air Fleets, RAF "Groups" and USAAF/RAF "Airforces" (2nd TAF, 8th AF, etc). they should have morale, supply, efficiency, etc values just like ground units, reflecting the skills and materials of the air war.
- thus they have a certain physical location/centre
- they should split their time between various roles - tactical ground attack at the front line, more distant interdiction, strategic bombing, pure air superiority either defensive (over your own lines) or offensive(over hte enemy lines) (as opposed to escort), naval patrol/strike
- the effect of an aviation unit should depend upon the emphasis it gives to each role, and the strength it possesses that is suitable for that role.
- air effects should be mainly on supply, morale and organisation factors.
- effects on actual strength/manpower of target units should depend a lot on how much opposition there is in the air - if there's a free-for-all for hte bombers then it should be significant, but if there's anything like reasonable opposition then it should be minimal.
- individual aircraft type characteristics can be factored into national characteristics for the various roles. for example in 1945 Anglo-Allied tactical air support is largely fighter bombers, so they might have a high air attack-defence factor, whereas Soviet tactical support is based around escorted Il-2's and Pe-2's so might have a higher ground strike value and little air-superiority value.
Early war interdiction strikes such as the infamous Battles in France, or the less-well-known-but-just-as-brave-and-just-as-unsuccessful strikes by VVS bombers against Germans in the first few months of Barbarossa would be using a/c that mave moderate ground strike values and absolutely minimal air-defence values. (Russian level bomber pilots found they couldn't hit anything from their standard bombing altitudes of 9000 feet, so they would drop to 3000, and get massacred by ground fire and still not hit anything!)
And example of how things changed is the VVS's doctrine in the 3 major battles of 1942-43 - Stalingrad, Kuban and Kursk. At Stalingrad the VVs operated in a defensive role, maintainign an air "blockade" around the city. They made little effort to go hunt Germans and made almost no strikes on German airfields, even those inside the pocket.
A few months later in hte Kuban (the bit of the mainland jsut to the east of the Crimea - the Straights of Kerch go between the 2, connecting eth Sea of Azov with hte Black Sea) the VVS started allowing pilots to "free hunt" - their first effort at consciously wresting air superiority from the LW.
At Kursk the air battle opened with an attempted strike by the VVS against LW airfields - but they weer picked up by Radar and met by prepared defences and lost quite heavily! However from Kursk onward the VVS was much more active at seekeing "general" air superiority.
so there's an obvious progression from tactical roles in support of the troops to classic air superiority when they finally get the numbers.
There's a lot to be learned these days now that the info is comign out of the fUSSR!!
My thoughts:
- the major operational units of airforces should be organised as HQ's + units (wings, squadrons, regiments, strength points, whatever). These are the Luftflotte, the Soviet Air Armies and naval Red Air Fleets, RAF "Groups" and USAAF/RAF "Airforces" (2nd TAF, 8th AF, etc). they should have morale, supply, efficiency, etc values just like ground units, reflecting the skills and materials of the air war.
- thus they have a certain physical location/centre
- they should split their time between various roles - tactical ground attack at the front line, more distant interdiction, strategic bombing, pure air superiority either defensive (over your own lines) or offensive(over hte enemy lines) (as opposed to escort), naval patrol/strike
- the effect of an aviation unit should depend upon the emphasis it gives to each role, and the strength it possesses that is suitable for that role.
- air effects should be mainly on supply, morale and organisation factors.
- effects on actual strength/manpower of target units should depend a lot on how much opposition there is in the air - if there's a free-for-all for hte bombers then it should be significant, but if there's anything like reasonable opposition then it should be minimal.
- individual aircraft type characteristics can be factored into national characteristics for the various roles. for example in 1945 Anglo-Allied tactical air support is largely fighter bombers, so they might have a high air attack-defence factor, whereas Soviet tactical support is based around escorted Il-2's and Pe-2's so might have a higher ground strike value and little air-superiority value.
Early war interdiction strikes such as the infamous Battles in France, or the less-well-known-but-just-as-brave-and-just-as-unsuccessful strikes by VVS bombers against Germans in the first few months of Barbarossa would be using a/c that mave moderate ground strike values and absolutely minimal air-defence values. (Russian level bomber pilots found they couldn't hit anything from their standard bombing altitudes of 9000 feet, so they would drop to 3000, and get massacred by ground fire and still not hit anything!)
And example of how things changed is the VVS's doctrine in the 3 major battles of 1942-43 - Stalingrad, Kuban and Kursk. At Stalingrad the VVs operated in a defensive role, maintainign an air "blockade" around the city. They made little effort to go hunt Germans and made almost no strikes on German airfields, even those inside the pocket.
A few months later in hte Kuban (the bit of the mainland jsut to the east of the Crimea - the Straights of Kerch go between the 2, connecting eth Sea of Azov with hte Black Sea) the VVS started allowing pilots to "free hunt" - their first effort at consciously wresting air superiority from the LW.
At Kursk the air battle opened with an attempted strike by the VVS against LW airfields - but they weer picked up by Radar and met by prepared defences and lost quite heavily! However from Kursk onward the VVS was much more active at seekeing "general" air superiority.
so there's an obvious progression from tactical roles in support of the troops to classic air superiority when they finally get the numbers.